Contents — 14 sections
Section 138
Soc. Alcibiades, are you on your way to offer a prayer to the god?
Alc. I am, certainly, Socrates.
Soc. You seem, let me say, to have a gloomy look, and to keep your eyes on the ground, as though you were pondering something.
Alc. And what might one ponder, Socrates?
Soc. The greatest of questions, Alcibiades,
138bas I believe. For tell me, in Heaven’s name, do you not think that the gods sometimes grant in part, but in part refuse, what we ask of them in our private and public prayers, and gratify some people, but not others?
138bAlc. I do, certainly.
138bSoc. Then you would agree that one should take great precautions against falling unawares into the error of praying for great evils in the belief that they are good, while the gods happen to be disposed to grant freely what one is praying for? Just as Oedipus,
138cthey say, suddenly prayed that his sons might divide their patrimony with the sword: it was open to him to pray that his present evils might by some means be averted, but he invoked others in addition to those which he had already. Wherefore not only were those words of his accomplished, but many other dread results therefrom, which I think there is no need to recount in detail.
138cAlc. But you have instanced a madman, Socrates: why, do you suppose that anyone could bring himself, while he was in a sound state, to utter such a prayer?
138cSoc. Do you regard madness as the opposite of wisdom?
138cAlc. Certainly I do.
138cSoc. And there are some men whom you regard as unwise, and others as wise?
138cAlc. Why, yes.
138cSoc. Come then, let us consider who these people are. We have admitted that some are unwise, some wise, and others mad.
138cAlc. Yes, we have.
138cSoc. And again, there are some in sound health?
138cAlc. There are.
138cSoc. And others also who are in ill-health?
Section 139
138cAlc. Quite so.
138cSoc. And they are not the same?
138cAlc. No, indeed.
138cSoc. And are there any others besides, who are found to be in neither state?
138cAlc. No, to be sure.
138cSoc. For a human being must needs be either sick or not sick.
138cAlc. I agree.
138cSoc. Well then, do you hold the same view about wisdom and unwisdom?
138cAlc. How do you mean?
138cSoc. Tell me, do you think it is only possible to be either wise or unwise, or is there some third condition between these, which makes
139ba man neither wise nor unwise?
139bAlc. No, there is not.
139bSoc. So he must needs be in one or the other of these two conditions.
139bAlc. I agree.
139bSoc. And you remember that you admitted that madness is the opposite of wisdom?
139bAlc. I do.
139bSoc. And further, that there is no third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?
139bAlc. Yes, I admitted that.
139bSoc. Well now, can there possibly be two opposites of one thing?
139bAlc. By no means.
139bSoc. Then it looks as though unwisdom and madness were the same.
139bAlc. Yes, apparently.
139bSoc. So we shall be right, Alcibiades, in saying that all unwise persons are mad; for example, such of your contemporaries as happen to be unwise—some such there are—and of your elders, even: for tell me, in Heaven’s name, do you not think that in our city the wise people are but few, whereas the majority are unwise, and these you call mad?
139bAlc. I do.
139bSoc. Well, do you suppose we could safely live with so many
139dmadmen as our fellow-citizens, and should not long ago have paid the penalty for it in knocks and blows at their hands, and all the usual proceedings of madmen? Consider now, my wonderful friend, whether the case is not quite different?
139dAlc. Well, it must be, Socrates. For it looks as though it were not as I thought.
139dSoc. And I think so too. But there is another way of regarding it.
139dAlc. I wonder what way you mean.
139dSoc. Well, I will tell you. We conceive there are some who are sick, do we not?
139dAlc. We do, to be sure.
139dSoc. And do you believe that a sick man must necessarily have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia? Do you not think that, although he may be afflicted in none of these ways, he may be suffering from some other disease? For surely there are many of them: these are not the only ones.
139dAlc. I agree.
139dSoc. And is every ophthalmia, in your opinion, a disease?
139dAlc. Yes.
139dSoc. And is every disease also ophthalmia?
139dAlc. No, I should think not: still, I am in doubt as to my meaning.
Section 140
139dSoc. Well, if you will attend to me, two together will be searching, and so mayhap we shall find what we seek.
139dAlc. Nay, but I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power.
139dSoc. Then we have admitted that while every ophthalmia is a disease, every disease, on the other hand, is not ophthalmia?
139dAlc. We have.
139dSoc. And our admission seems to me quite right. For everyone in a fever is sick, but yet not everyone who is sick has a fever or the gout
140bor ophthalmia, I take it; though everything of the sort is a disease, but differs—to quote those whom we call doctors— in its manifestation. For they are not all alike, nor of like effect, but each works according to its own faculty, and yet all are diseases. In the same way, we conceive of some men as artisans, do we not?
140bAlc. Certainly.
140bSoc. That is, cobblers and carpenters and statuaries and a host of others, whom we need not mention in particular; but any way, they have
140ctheir several departments of craft, and all of them are craftsmen; yet they are not all carpenters or cobblers or statuaries, though these taken together are craftsmen.
140cAlc. No, indeed.
140cSoc. In the same way, then, have men divided unwisdom also among them, and those who have the largest share of it we call mad, and those who have a little less, dolts and idiots; though people who prefer to use the mildest language term them sometimes romantic, sometimes simpleminded, or again
140dinnocent, inexperienced, or obtuse; and many another name will you find if you look for more. But all these things are unwisdom, though they differ, as we observed that one art or one disease differs from another. Or how does it strike you?
140dAlc. That is my view.
140dSoc. Then let us turn at this point and retrace our steps. For we said, you know, at the beginning that we must consider who the unwise can be, and who the wise: for we had admitted that there are such persons, had we not?
140dAlc. Yes, we have admitted it.
140dSoc. Then you conceive those to be wise who know what one ought to do and say?
140dAlc. I do.
140dSoc. And which are the unwise? Those who know neither of these things?
140dAlc. The same.
140dSoc. And those who know neither of these things will say and do unawares what one ought not?
140dAlc. Apparently.
Section 141
140dSoc. Well, just such a person, as I was saying, Alcibiades,
141awas Oedipus; and even in our time you will find many who do the same, not in a fit of anger, as he was: they think they pray not for something evil, but for something good. He neither prayed for that, nor thought he did, but there are others who are in the opposite case. For I imagine that if the god to whom you are now going should appear to you and first ask you, before you made any prayer, whether you would be content to become sovereign of the Athenian state and, on your accounting this as something poor and unimportant, should add and of all the Greeks also; and if he saw
141byou were still unsatisfied unless he promised you besides the mastery of all Europe, and should not merely promise you that, but on the self-same day a recognition by all men, if you so desired, of Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, as their sovereign—I imagine you would actually depart in a transport of delight, as having secured the greatest of goods.
141bAlc. So would anybody else, I imagine, Socrates, at such a stroke of luck!
141bSoc. But still you would not wish to sacrifice your life even for the territory and sovereignty of all the Greeks and barbarians together.
141bAlc. I should think not. How could I, without a prospect of making any use of them?
141bSoc. And what if you had a prospect of making an evil and injurious use of them? Not in this case either?
141bAlc. No, indeed.
141bSoc. So you see it is not safe either to accept casually what one is given, or to pray for one’s own advancement, if one is going to be injured in consequence, or deprived of one’s life altogether. Yet we could tell of
141dmany ere now who, having desired sovereignty, and endeavored to secure it, with the idea of working for their good, have lost their lives by plots which their sovereignty has provoked. And I expect you are not unacquainted with certain events of a day or two ago, when Archelaus, the monarch of Macedonia, was slain by his favorite, who was as much in love with the monarchy as Archelaus was with him, and who killed his lover
141ewith the expectation of being not only the monarch, but also a happy man: but after holding the monarchy for three or four days he was plotted against by others in his turn, and perished.
Section 142
141eSoc. You have only to look at some of our own citizens—and these are examples that we know, not by hearsay, but by personal observation—who in their time have desired to hold military command
142aand have obtained it, and see how some to this very day are exiles from our city, while others have lost their lives. And even those who are deemed to be faring best have not only gone through many dangers and terrors in holding their command, but on returning home have continued to be as sorely besieged by informers as they were by the enemy, so that some of them wished to heaven
142bthat they had been anything but commanders rather than have held such appointments. Of course, if these dangers and toils were conducive to our advantage, there would be some reason for them; but the case is quite the contrary. And you will find it is just the same in regard to children: some people have been known to pray that they might have them, and when they have got them have fallen into the greatest disasters and pains. For some have had children that were utterly bad, and have spent their whole lives in repining; while others, though they had good ones,
142cwere bereft of them by disasters that overtook them, and thus were cast into as great misfortune as the others, and wished that no children at all had been born to them. But nevertheless, with all this plain evidence, and a great deal more of a similar kind, before men’s eyes, it is rare to find anyone who has either declined what was offered to him or, when he was likely to gain something by prayer, refrained from praying. Most men would not decline the offer of either a monarchy or a generalship
142dor any of the various other things which bring with them harm rather than benefit, but would even pray to be granted them in cases where they were lacking: but after a little while they often change their tune, and retract all their former prayers. I question therefore if men are not really wrong in blaming the gods as the authors of their ills, when they themselves by their own presumption—or unwisdom, shall we say?—
142ehave gotten them more than destined sorrows. It would seem, at any rate, Alcibiades, that one old poet had some wisdom; for I conceive it was because he had some foolish friends, whom he saw working and praying for things that were not for their advantage, though supposed to be by them, that he made a common prayer on behalf of them all, in terms something like these:
143aKing Zeus, give unto us what is good, whether we pray or pray not; But what is grievous, even if we pray for it, do thou avert.
Section 143
143aSoc. So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of an answer to his words, do not be silent.
143aAlc. It is difficult, Socrates, to gainsay what has been well spoken: one thing, however, I do observe —how many evils are caused to men by ignorance, when, as it seems, we are beguiled by her not only into doing,
143bbut—worst of all—into praying to be granted the greatest evils. Now that is a thing that no one would suppose of himself; each of us would rather suppose he was competent to pray for his own greatest good, not his greatest evil. Why, that would seem, in truth, more like some sort of curse than a prayer!
143bSoc. But perhaps, my excellent friend, some person who is wiser than either you or I may say we are wrong to be so free with our abuse of ignorance,
143cunless we can add that it is ignorance of certain things, and is a good to certain persons in certain conditions, as to those others it is an evil.
143cAlc. How do you mean? Can there be anything of which it is better for anybody, in any condition whatsoever, to be ignorant than cognizant?
143cSoc. I believe so; and do not you?
143cAlc. No, indeed, upon my word.
143cSoc. But surely I shall not have to tax you with an inclination to commit such an act against your own mother as Orestes and Alcmaeon,
143dand any others who have followed their example, are said to have committed against theirs.
143dAlc. No unlucky words, in Heaven’s name, Socrates!
143dSoc. Why, it is not the person who says, Alcibiades, that you would not like to be guilty of such an act, whom you should bid avoid unlucky words, but much rather him who might say the contrary; since the act seems to you so very dreadful as to be unfit even for such casual mention. But do you think that Orestes, if he had had all his wits about him and had known what was best for him to do, would have brought himself to commit any act of the sort?
143dAlc. No, indeed.
143dSoc. Nor would anyone else, I imagine.
143dAlc. No.
143dSoc. Then it seems that ignorance of what is best, and to be ignorant of the best, is a bad thing.
143dAlc. I agree.
143dSoc. And not only for the person himself, but for everyone else?
143dAlc. Yes.
Section 144
143dSoc. Then let us consider this further case. Suppose it should quite suddenly occur to your mind that you had better take a dagger and go to the door of Pericles, your own guardian and friend,
144aand ask if he were at home, with the design of killing just him and no one else, and his servants said he was at home: now, I do not say you would be inclined to do any such thing, but I suppose, if you are under the impression which at some moment may well be present, surely, to the mind of a man who is ignorant of the best—that what is really the worst is best at some moment—or do you not agree?
144aAlc. Quite so.
144aSoc. Well then, if you went indoors and saw Pericles himself,
144bbut did not know him, and thought he was somebody else, would you still venture to kill him?
144bAlc. No, upon my word, I should think not.
144bSoc. For your man was, I presume, not anyone you met, but that particular person whom you wished to kill?
144bAlc. Yes.
144bSoc. And although you might make a number of attempts, if you always failed to know Pericles when you were about to commit the act, you would never attack him.
144bAlc. No, indeed.
144bSoc. Well now, do you suppose that Orestes would ever have attacked his mother if he had similarly failed to know her?
144bAlc. I do not think he would.
144bSoc. For presumably he, too, had no intention of killing the first woman he met, or anybody else’s mother, but only his own.
144bAlc. That is so.
144bSoc. Then to be ignorant in such matters is better for those who are so disposed and have formed such resolves.
144bAlc. Apparently.
144bSoc. So you see that ignorance of certain things is for certain persons in certain states a good, not an evil, as you supposed just now.
144bAlc. It seems to be.
144bSoc. Then if you care to consider the sequel of this, I daresay it will surprise you.
144bAlc. What may that be, Socrates?
144bSoc. I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing
144ewe so confidently intend to say or do?
144eAlc. I think so.
Section 145
144eSoc. Well, take the orators, for example: they either know, or think they know, how to advise us on various occasions—some about war and peace, and others about building walls or fitting up harbors;
145aand in a word, whatever the city does to another city or within herself, all comes about by the advice of the orators.
145aAlc. That is true.
145aSoc. Then observe the consequence.
145aAlc. If I am able.
145aSoc. Why, surely you call men either wise or unwise?
145aAlc. I do.
145aSoc. And the many unwise, and the few wise?
145aAlc. Precisely.
145aSoc. And in either case you name them in reference to something?
145aAlc. Yes.
145aSoc. Then do you call a man wise who knows how to give advice, without knowing whether and when it is better to act upon it?
145aAlc. No, indeed.
145aSoc. Nor, I conceive, a man who knows what war is in itself, without knowing when or for how long a time it is better to make war?
145aAlc. Agreed.
145aSoc. Nor, again, a man who knows how to kill another, or seize his property, or make him an exile from his native land, without knowing when or to whom it is better so to behave?
145aAlc. No, to be sure.
145aSoc. Then it is a man who knows something of this sort, and is assisted by knowledge of what is best,—and this is surely the same as knowledge of the useful, is it not?
145aAlc. Yes.
145aSoc. And we shall call him wise, and a competent adviser both of the city and of his own self; but a man not so qualified we shall call the opposite of these. How do you think?
145aAlc. I agree.
145aSoc. And what of a man who knows how to ride or shoot, or else to box or wrestle or contend in any other sport,
145dor do anything that we know by rule of art? What do you call him who knows what is better done by rule of that particular art? Do you not say that he who goes by the rules of riding is a good rider?
145dAlc. I do.
145dSoc. And the rules of boxing, I suppose, make a good boxer, and those of flute-playing a good flute-player, and so, on the same lines, I presume, with the rest; or is there any difference?
145dAlc. No, it is as you say.
145dSoc. Then do you think it inevitable that he who has some knowledge about these things should also be a wise man,
145eor shall we say he comes far short of it?
145eAlc. Far short of it, I declare.
145eSoc. Then what sort of state do you suppose it would be, where the people were good bowmen and flute-players, together with athletes and artists in general, and mingled with these the men whom we have just mentioned as knowing war in itself and slaughter in itself, and orator-windbags too with their political bluster, but all of them lacked this knowledge of the best, and none knew when or upon whom it was better
146ato employ their respective arts?
Section 146
146aAlc. A paltry one, I should call it, Socrates.
146aSoc. Yes, you would, I expect, when you saw each one of them vying with the other and assigning the largest part in the conduct of the state to thatWherein himself is found most excellent, I mean, what is done best by rule of his particular art—while he is entirely off the track of what is best for the state and for himself, because, I conceive, he has put his trust in opinion apart from intelligence. In these circumstances,
146bshould we not be right in saying that such a state is one great mass of turmoil and lawlessness?
146bAlc. We should, upon my word.
146bSoc. And we took it to be necessary that we should first think we know, or really know, anything that we confidently intend either to do or to say?
146bAlc. We did.
146bSoc. And if a man does what he knows or thinks he knows, and is assisted by knowing how to make it beneficial, we shall find him profitable
146cboth to the city and to himself?
146cAlc. Certainly.
146cSoc. But if, I suppose, he does the contrary, he will not be so either to the city or to himself?
146cAlc. No, indeed.
146cSoc. Well then, do you still take the same view now as before, or do you think differently?
146cAlc. No, I take the same view.
146cSoc. And you said you called the many unwise, and the few wise?
146cAlc. I did.
146cSoc. So now we repeat our statement that the many have missed getting the best because in most cases, I conceive, they have put their trust in opinion apart from intelligence.
146cAlc. Yes.
146cSoc. Then it is an advantage to the many neither to know nor to think they know anything, if they are going to be specially eager to do what they know or think they know, but are likely on the whole, in doing it, to be injured rather than benefited.
146cAlc. That is very true.
146cSoc. So you see that when I said it looked as though
146ethe possession of the sciences as a whole, where it did not include the science of the best, in a few cases helped, but in most harmed the owner, I was evidently right in very truth, was I not?
146eAlc. Though I did not then, I think so now, Socrates.
Section 147
146eSoc. Hence the state or soul that is to live aright must hold fast to this knowledge, exactly as a sick man does to a doctor, or as he who would voyage safely does to a pilot. For without this,
147athe more briskly it is wafted by fortune either to the acquisition of wealth or to bodily strength or aught else of the sort, the greater will be the mistakes in which these things, it would seem, must needs involve it. And he who has acquired the so-called mastery of learning and arts, but is destitute of this knowledge and impelled by this or that one among those others, is sure to meet with much rough weather, as he truly deserves; since, I imagine, he must continue without a pilot on the high seas, and has only the brief span of his life in which to run his course.
147bSo that his case aptly fits the saying of the poet, in which he complains of somebody or other that Full many crafts he knew: but stillHe knew them all so very ill.
147bAlc. Why, how on earth is the poet’s saying apposite, Socrates? For to my mind it has nothing to do with the point.
147bSoc. It is very much to the point: but he, good sir, like almost every other poet, speaks in riddles. For poetry as a whole is by nature
147cinclined to riddling, and it is not every man who can apprehend it. And furthermore, besides having this natural tendency, when it gets hold of a grudging person who wishes not to show forth to us his own wisdom but to conceal it as much as possible, we find it an extraordinarily difficult matter to make out whatever this or that one of them may mean. For surely you do not suppose that Homer, divinest and wisest of poets, did not know it was impossible to know ill; for it is he who says of Margites that he knew many things,
147dbut knew them all ill: but it is a riddle, I think, in which he has made ill stand for evil, and knew for to know. So if we put it together, letting the meter go, indeed, but grasping his meaning, we get this: Full many crafts he knew, but it was evil for him to know them all. Then clearly, if it was evil for him to know many things, he was in fact a paltry fellow, assuming we are to believe what we have previously argued.
147dAlc. But I think we may, Socrates: at least, if I cannot believe those arguments of ours, I shall find it hard to trust any others.
147dSoc. And you are right in so thinking.
147dAlc. I repeat that I think so.
Section 148
147dSoc. But come now, in Heaven’s name—for I suppose you see how great and strange is our perplexity, in which you, as it seems to me, have your share; for you change about from this side to that without settling down for a moment, but as soon as you are firmly convinced of a thing you seem to slip out of it again and
148acease to hold the same view—well, if the god to whom you are going should even now appear to you and ask before you uttered any prayer, whether you would be content to obtain one of those things which were mentioned at the beginning, or whether he should leave you to pray as you were, how do you suppose you would make the best of your chance—by accepting his offer, or by praying for something on your own account?
148aAlc. Well, by the gods, I could not answer your question, Socrates, offhand. Why, I take it to be a fatuous request,
148bwhen it is really a case for great caution lest one pray unawares for what is evil while thinking it to be one’s good, and then after a little while, as you were saying, one change one’s tune and retract all one’s former prayers.
148bSoc. And did not the poet whom I quoted at the beginning of our discussion know more than we, when he bade us pray for the averting of what is grievous, even though we pray for it?
148bAlc. I think so.
148bSoc. Then it is their admiration of this poet, Alcibiades,
148cor perhaps the result of their own study, that causes the Spartans to offer a similar prayer whether the occasion be private or public—that the gods will give them for their own benefit the beautiful as well as the good: more than this no one can ever hear them pray for. The consequence is that to the present time they have been just as fortunate as any other people; and if it has befallen them to be not invariably fortunate, it was anyhow not owing to their prayer.
148dIt rests with the gods, I conceive, to give us either what we may pray for or the reverse. And I would like to give you an account of something else, which I once heard from some of my seniors. A quarrel having arisen between the Athenians and the Spartans, it befell our city to be always unsuccessful in every battle by land and sea, and she could never win a victory. So the Athenians, in their annoyance at this result, and at a loss for some means of finding a deliverance from the trouble they were in,
148etook counsel together and decided that the best thing they could do was to send and inquire of Ammon ; and moreover, to ask also for what reason the gods granted victory to the Spartans rather than to themselves: for we—such was the message—offer up to them more and finer sacrifices than any of the Greeks, and have adorned their temples with votive emblems as no other people have done, and presented to the gods the costliest and stateliest processions year by year, and spent more money thus than
149aall the rest of the Greeks together.
Section 149
149aSoc. But the Spartans have never taken any such pains, and indeed are so neglectful in their behavior to the gods, that they make a practice of sacrificing defective victims, and generally are very much behind us in the honors that they pay, though the wealth they possess is quite equal to that of our city. When they had so spoken, and added the question, what they should do in order to find a deliverance from the trouble they were in,
149bthe prophet’s only answer — evidently it was all that the god allowed—was to call them to him and say: Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians: I would rather have the reverent reserve of the Spartans than all the ritual of the Greeks. So much he said, and not a word further. Now by reverent reserve I suppose the god could only mean their prayer, since in fact it differs greatly from those that are generally offered.
149cFor the Greeks in general either lead up bulls with gilded horns, or else present the gods with votive emblems, and pray for any odd thing, whether it be good or bad: so when the gods hear their irreverent speech they reject all these costly processions and sacrifices. Whereas I think we ought to be very cautious, and fully consider what is to be said and what is not. And in Homer too you will find other tales of a similar sort. For he relates how the Trojans,
149din making their bivouac, Sacrificed to the immortals perfect hecatombs, and how the winds bore the sweet savour from the plain into heaven: But the blessed gods partook not of it, nor would have it, For deep was their hate against holy Ilium,
149eAnd Priam, and the folk of Priam of the good ashen spear. So it was nothing to their purpose to sacrifice and pay tribute of gifts in vain, when they were hated by the gods. For it is not, I imagine, the way of the gods to be seduced with gifts, like a base insurer. And indeed it is but silly talk of ours, if we claim to surpass the Spartans on this score. For it would be a strange thing if the gods had regard to our gifts and sacrifices instead of our souls, and the piety and
150ajustice that may be found in any of us.
Section 150
150aSoc. Far rather at these, I believe, do they look than at those costly processions and sacrifices which are offered, it well may be, by individual and state, year in, year out, though they may have offended greatly against the gods, or as greatly against their neighbors. But the gods are not to be won by bribes, and so they despise all these things, as Ammon and the holy prophet say. Certainly it would seem that justice and wisdom are held in especial honor both by the gods and by men of intelligence;
150band wise and just are they alone who know what acts and words to use towards gods and men. But I should like now to hear what may be your opinion on the subject.
150bAlc. Why, Socrates, it in no wise differs from yours and the god’s; for indeed it would not be fitting for me to record my vote against the god.
150bSoc. And you remember you professed to be in great perplexity lest you should pray unawares for evil,
150cwhile supposing it to be good?
150cAlc. I do.
150cSoc. You see, then, how unsafe it is for you to approach the god with your prayers, for it may chance that when he hears your irreverent speech he will reject your sacrifice altogether, and you may perhaps be accorded some other bad thing as well. In my opinion, therefore, it is best to hold your peace: for I expect you will not consent to use the Spartan’s prayer, you have such a romantic spirit—to give it the fairest of folly’s names.
150dIt is necessary, therefore, to bide one’s time until one can learn how one should behave towards gods and men.
150dAlc. Well, when will that time arrive, Socrates, and who is to be my instructor? For I feel I should very much like to see who the man is,
150dSoc. It is he who is concerned about you. But I think, as Homer relates how Athena removed the mist from the eyes of Diomede,That be might well discern both god and man,
150eso you too must first have the mist removed which now enwraps your soul, and then you will be ready to receive the means whereby you will discern both evil and good. For at present I do not think you could do so.
150eAlc. Let him remove the mist or whatever else he likes to call it: for I am prepared to obey every one of his commands, without shirking, whoever the man may be, so long as I am to be the better for them.
Section 151
150eSoc. I tell you, he on his part is prodigiously anxious to help you.
150eAlc. Then I think it best to defer the sacrifice also till the time comes.
150eSoc. And you are quite right: for that is safer than running so serious a risk.
150eAlc. But how say you, Socrates? Look now, I will crown you with this garland, as I consider you have given me such good advice; and to the gods
151bwe shall offer both garlands and all the other customary things when I see that day has come. And come it will ere long, if they are willing.
151bSoc. Well, I accept this gift; and anything else besides, that you may give me, I shall be only too happy to accept. And as Euripides has made Creon say when he sees Teiresias wearing his wreaths, and hears that he has obtained them, on account of his art, as first-fruits of the spoils of war: As omen good I take thy victor’s wreaths;For in the waves we labour, as you know,—
151cso do I take this opinion of yours as a good omen. For I consider I am no less wave-tossed than Creon, and would like to come off victorious over your lovers.
Contents — 14 sections
Section 138
138aΣΩ. ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἆρά γε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν προσευξόμενος πορεύῃ;
138aΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
138aΣΩ. φαίνῃ γέ τοι ἐσκυθρωπακέναι τε καὶ εἰς γῆν βλέπειν, ὥς τι συννοούμενος.
138aΑΛ. καὶ τί ἄν τις συννοοῖτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;
138aΣΩ. τὴν μεγίστην, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, σύννοιαν, ὥς γʼ ἐμοὶ
138bδοκεῖ. ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τοὺς θεούς, ἃ τυγχάνομεν εὐχόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἐνίοτε τούτων τὰ μὲν διδόναι, τὰ δʼ οὔ, καὶ ἔστιν οἷς μὲν αὐτῶν, ἔστι δʼ οἷς οὔ;
138bΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
138bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι πολλῆς προμηθείας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λήσεται αὑτὸν εὐχόμενος μεγάλα κακά, δοκῶν δʼ ἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ θεοὶ τύχωσιν ἐν ταύτῃ ὄντες τῇ ἕξει, ἐν ᾗ διδόασιν αὐτοὶ ἅ τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνει; ὥσπερ τὸν Οἰδίπουν
138cαὐτίκα φασὶν εὔξασθαι χαλκῷ διελέσθαι τὰ πατρῷα τοὺς ὑεῖς· ἐξὸν αὐτῷ τῶν παρόντων αὐτῷ κακῶν ἀποτροπήν τινα εὔξασθαι, ἕτερα πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν κατηρᾶτο· τοιγαροῦν ταῦτά τε ἐξετελέσθη, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ δεινά, ἃ τί δεῖ καθʼ ἕκαστα λέγειν;
138cΑΛ. ἀλλὰ σὺ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον εἴρηκας· ἐπεὶ τίς ἄν σοι δοκεῖ τολμῆσαι ὑγιαίνων τοιαῦτʼ εὔξασθαι;
138cΣΩ. τὸ μαίνεσθαι ἆρά γε ὑπεναντίον σοι δοκεῖ τῷ φρονεῖν;
138cΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
138dΣΩ. ἄφρονες δὲ καὶ φρόνιμοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τινές σοι;
138dΑΛ. εἶναι μέντοι.
138dΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψώμεθα τίνες ποτʼ εἰσὶν οὗτοι. ὅτι μὲν γάρ εἰσί τινες, ὡμολόγηται, ἄφρονές τε καὶ φρόνιμοι, καὶ μαινόμενοι ἕτεροι.
138dΑΛ. ὡμολόγηται γάρ.
138dΣΩ. ἔτι δὲ ὑγιαίνοντές εἰσί τινες;
138dΑΛ. εἰσίν.
138dΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσθενοῦντες ἕτεροι;
Section 139
139aΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
139aΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί;
139aΑΛ. οὐ γάρ.
139aΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἕτεροί τινές εἰσιν, οἳ μηδέτερα τούτων πεπόνθασιν;
139aΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
139aΣΩ. ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἢ νοσεῖν ἢ μὴ νοσεῖν.
139aΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
139aΣΩ. τί δέ; περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀφροσύνης ἆρά γε τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχεις σὺ γνώμην;
139aΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
139aΣΩ. εἰ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἢ φρόνιμον ἢ ἄφρονα, ἢ ἔστι τι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε
139bφρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα;
139bΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
139bΣΩ. ἀνάγκη ἄρʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων πεπονθέναι.
139bΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
139bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ὁμολογήσας ὑπεναντίον εἶναι μανίαν φρονήσει;
139bΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
139bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα εἶναι;
139bΑΛ. ὡμολόγησα γάρ.
139bΣΩ. καὶ μὴν δύο γε ὑπεναντία ἑνὶ πράγματι πῶς ἂν εἴη;
139bΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
139cΣΩ. ἀφροσύνη ἄρα καὶ μανία κινδυνεύει ταὐτὸν εἶναι.
139cΑΛ. φαίνεται.
139cΣΩ. πάντας οὖν ἂν φάντες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι ὀρθῶς ἂν φαίημεν· αὐτίκα τῶν σῶν ἡλικιωτῶν εἴ τινες τυγχάνουσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες, ὥσπερ εἰσί, καὶ τῶν ἔτι πρεσβυτέρων. ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὀλίγους μὲν εἶναι τοὺς φρονίμους, ἄφρονας δὲ δὴ τοὺς πολλούς, οὓς δὴ σὺ μαινομένους καλεῖς;
139cΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
139cΣΩ. οἴει ἂν οὖν χαίροντας ἡμᾶς εἶναι μετὰ τοσούτων
139dμαινομένων πολιτευομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν παιομένους καὶ βαλλομένους, καὶ ἅπερ εἰώθασιν οἱ μαινόμενοι διαπράττεσθαι, πάλαι δὴ δίκην δεδωκέναι; ἀλλὰ ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ταῦτʼ ἔχει.
139dΑΛ. πῶς ἂν οὖν ποτʼ ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες; κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ᾠήθην.
139dΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ τῇδέ πῃ ἀθρητέον.
139dΑΛ. πῇ ποτε λέγεις;
139dΣΩ. ἐγὼ δή σοί γε ἐρῶ. ὑπολαμβάνομέν γέ τινας εἶναι νοσοῦντας· ἢ οὔ;
139dΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
139eΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν νοσοῦντα ποδαγρᾶν ἢ πυρέττειν ἢ ὀφθαλμιᾶν, ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι καὶ μηδὲν τούτων πεπονθὼς ἑτέραν νόσον νοσεῖν; πολλαὶ γὰρ δήπου γέ εἰσι, καὶ οὐχ αὗται μόναι.
139eΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
139eΣΩ. ὀφθαλμία σοι οὖν δοκεῖ πᾶσα νόσος εἶναι;
139eΑΛ. ναί.
139eΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ πᾶσα νόσος ὀφθαλμία;
139eΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα ἔμοιγε· ἀπορῶ μέντοι γε πῶς λέγω.
Section 140
140aΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἔμοιγε προσέχῃς τὸν νοῦν, σύν τε δύο σκεπτομένω τυχὸν εὑρήσομεν.
140aΑΛ. ἀλλὰ προσέχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς δύναμιν τὴν ἐμήν.
140aΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήθη ἡμῖν ὀφθαλμία μὲν πᾶσα νόσος εἶναι, νόσος μέντοι οὐκ εἶναι πᾶσα ὀφθαλμία;
140aΑΛ. ὡμολογήθη.
140aΣΩ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖ ὁμολογηθῆναι. καὶ γὰρ οἱ πυρέττοντες πάντες νοσοῦσιν, οὐ μέντοι οἱ νοσοῦντες πάντες πυρέττουσιν οὐδὲ ποδαγρῶσιν οὐδέ γε ὀφθαλμιῶσιν,
140bοἶμαι· ἀλλὰ νόσος μὲν πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, διαφέρειν δέ φασιν οὓς δὴ καλοῦμεν ἰατροὺς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶσιν οὔτε ὅμοιαι οὔτε ὁμοίως διαπράττονται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῆς δύναμιν ἑκάστη· νόσοι μέντοι πᾶσαί εἰσιν. ὥσπερ δημιουργούς τινας ὑπολαμβάνομεν· ἢ οὔ;
140bΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
140bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς σκυτοτόμους καὶ τέκτονας καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους παμπληθεῖς, οὓς τί δεῖ καθʼ ἕκαστα λέγειν; ἔχουσι δʼ οὖν διειληφότες δημιουργίας μέρη, καὶ
140cπάντες οὗτοί εἰσι δημιουργοί, οὐ μέντοι εἰσὶ τέκτονές γε οὐδὲ σκυτοτόμοι οὐδʼ ἀνδριαντοποιοί, οἳ σύμπαντές εἰσι δημιουργοί.
140cΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
140cΣΩ. οὕτως μὲν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην διειληφότες εἰσί, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖστον αὐτῆς μέρος ἔχοντας μαινομένους καλοῦμεν, τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγον ἔλαττον ἠλιθίους τε καὶ ἐμβροντήτους· οἱ δὲ ἐν εὐφημοτάτοις ὀνόμασι βουλόμενοι κατονομάζειν οἱ μὲν μεγαλοψύχους, οἱ δὲ εὐήθεις, ἕτεροι δὲ
140dἀκάκους καὶ ἀπείρους καὶ ἐνεούς· εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ ἕτερα πολλὰ ἀναζητῶν ὀνόματα. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἀφροσύνη ἐστίν, διαφέρει δέ, ὥσπερ τέχνη τέχνης ἡμῖν κατεφαίνετο καὶ νόσος νόσου· ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ;
140dΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτως.
140dΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀπʼ ἐκείνου πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν. ἦν γὰρ δήπου καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου, σκεπτέον εἶναι τοὺς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ φρονίμους, τίνες ποτʼ εἰσίν. ὡμολόγητο γὰρ εἶναί τινας· ἦ γὰρ οὔ;
140dΑΛ. ναί, ὡμολόγηται.
140eΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τούτους φρονίμους ὑπολαμβάνεις, οἳ ἂν εἰδῶσιν ἅττα δεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν;
140eΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
140eΣΩ. ἄφρονας δὲ ποτέρους; ἆρά γε τοὺς μηδέτερα τούτων εἰδότας;
140eΑΛ. τούτους.
140eΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἵ γε μὴ εἰδότες μηδέτερα τούτων λήσουσιν αὑτοὺς καὶ λέγοντες καὶ πράττοντες ἅττα μὴ δεῖ;
140eΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Section 141
140eΣΩ. τούτων μέντοι ἔλεγον, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ τὸν
141aΟἰδίπουν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων· εὑρήσεις δʼ ἔτι καὶ τῶν νῦν πολλοὺς οὐκ ὀργῇ κεχρημένους, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον, οὐδʼ οἰομένους κακά σφισιν εὔχεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀγαθά. ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ηὔχετο, οὐδʼ ᾤετο· ἕτεροι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἳ τἀναντία τούτων πεπόνθασιν. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαί σε πρῶτον, εἴ σοι ἐμφανὴς γενόμενος ὁ θεὸς πρὸς ὃν τυγχάνεις πορευόμενος, ἐρωτήσειεν, πρὶν ὁτιοῦν εὔξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσει σοι τύραννον γενέσθαι τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φαῦλον ἡγήσαιο καὶ μὴ μέγα τι, προσθείη καὶ
141bπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων· εἰ δέ σε ὁρῴη ἔτι ἔλαττον δοκοῦντα ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ καὶ πάσης Εὐρώπης, ὑποσταίη σοι καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον ὑποσταίη, ἀλλʼ αὐθημερόν σου βουλομένου ὡς πάντας αἰσθήσεσθαι ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου τύραννός ἐστιν· αὐτὸν οἶμαι ἄν σε ἀπιέναι περιχαρῆ γενόμενον, ὡς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν κεκυρηκότα.
141bΑΛ. ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν, εἴπερ τοιαῦτα συμβαίη αὐτῷ.
141cΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀντί γε τῆς σῆς ψυχῆς οὐδʼ ἂν τὴν πάντων Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων χώραν τε καὶ τυραννίδα βουληθείης σοι γενέσθαι.
141cΑΛ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μηθέν γέ τι μέλλων αὐτοῖς χρήσεσθαι;
141cΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ μέλλοις κακῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς χρῆσθαι; οὐδʼ ἂν οὕτως;
141cΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
141cΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς οὔτε τὰ διδόμενα εἰκῇ δέχεσθαί τε οὔτε αὐτὸν εὔχεσθαι γενέσθαι, εἴ γέ τις
141dβλάπτεσθαι μέλλοι διὰ ταῦτα ἢ τὸ παράπαν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλαγῆναι. πολλοὺς δʼ ἂν ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν, ὅσοι τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμήσαντες ἤδη καὶ σπουδάσαντες τοῦτʼ αὐτοῖς παραγενέσθαι, ὡς ἀγαθόν τι πράξαντες, διὰ τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπιβουλευθέντες τὸν βίον ἀφῃρέθησαν. οἶμαι δέ σε οὐκ ἀνήκοον εἶναι ἔνιά γε χθιζά τε καὶ πρωιζὰ γεγενημένα, ὅτε Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Μακεδόνων τύραννον τὰ παιδικά, ἐρασθέντα τῆς τυραννίδος οὐθὲν ἧττον ἤπερ ἐκεῖνος τῶν παιδικῶν, ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἐραστὴν ὡς τύραννός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων
141eἀνὴρ ἐσόμενος· κατασχὼν δὲ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἡμέρας τὴν τυραννίδα πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐπιβουλευθεὶς ὑφʼ ἑτέρων τινῶν ἐτελεύτησεν.
Section 142
141eΣΩ. ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων πολιτῶν—ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλων ἀκηκόαμεν, ἀλλʼ αὐτοὶ παρόντες οἴδαμεν—
142aὅσοι στρατηγίας ἐπιθυμήσαντες ἤδη καὶ τυχόντες αὐτῆς οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν φυγάδες τῆσδε τῆς πόλεώς εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν· οἱ δὲ ἄριστα δοκοῦντες αὐτῶν πράττειν διὰ πολλῶν κινδύνων ἐλθόντες καὶ φόβων οὐ μόνον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ στρατηγίᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατῆλθον, ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν πολιορκούμενοι πολιορκίαν οὐδὲν ἐλάττω τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων διετέλεσαν, ὥστε ἐνίους αὐτῶν εὔχεσθαι ἀστρατηγήτους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐστρατηγηκέναι.
142bεἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ κίνδυνοί τε καὶ πόνοι φέροντες εἰς ὠφέλειαν, εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τοὐναντίον. εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ περὶ τέκνων τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, εὐξαμένους τινὰς ἤδη γενέσθαι καὶ γενομένων εἰς συμφοράς τε καὶ λύπας τὰς μεγίστας καταστάντας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν διὰ τέλους ὄντων τῶν τέκνων ὅλον τὸν βίον λυπούμενοι διήγαγον· τοὺς δὲ χρηστῶν μὲν γενομένων,
142cσυμφοραῖς δὲ χρησαμένων ὥστε στερηθῆναι, καὶ τούτους οὐδὲν εἰς ἐλάττονας δυστυχίας καθεστηκότας ἤπερ ἐκείνους καὶ βουλομένους ἂν ἀγένητα μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι. ἀλλʼ ὅμως τούτων τε καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν ὁμοιοτρόπων τούτοις οὕτω σφόδρα καταδήλων ὄντων, σπάνιον εὑρεῖν ὅστις ἂν ἢ διδομένων ἀπόσχοιτο ἢ μέλλων διʼ εὐχῆς τεύξεσθαι παύσαιτο ἂν εὐχόμενος· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ οὔτε ἂν τυραννίδος διδομένης ἀπόσχοιντο ἂν οὔτε στρατηγίας οὐδʼ ἑτέρων
142dπολλῶν, ἃ παρόντα βλάπτει μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖ, ἀλλὰ κἂν εὔξαιντο ἂν γενέσθαι, εἴ τῳ μὴ παρόντα τυγχάνει· ὀλίγον δὲ ἐπισχόντες ἐνίοτε παλινῳδοῦσιν, ἀνευχόμενοι ἅττʼ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εὔξωνται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἀπορῶ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάτην θεοὺς ἄνθρωποι αἰτιῶνται, ἐξ ἐκείνων φάμενοι κακά σφισιν εἶναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῇσιν εἴτε ἀτασθαλίαισιν εἴτε ἀφροσύναις χρὴ εἰπεῖν, ὑπὲρ μόρον
142eἄλγεʼ ἔχουσι. κινδυνεύει γοῦν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, φρόνιμός τις εἶναι ἐκεῖνος ὁ ποιητής, ὃς δοκεῖ μοι φίλοις ἀνοήτοις τισὶ χρησάμενος, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ πράττοντας καὶ εὐχομένους ἅπερ οὐ βέλτιον ἦν, ἐκείνοις δὲ ἐδόκει, κοινῇ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων αὐτῶν εὐχὴν ποιήσασθαι· λέγει δέ πως ὡδί—
143aΖεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλά, φησί, καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δειλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν κελεύει.
Section 143
143aΣΩ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καλῶς δοκεῖ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς λέγειν ὁ ποιητής· σὺ δʼ εἴ τι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα, μὴ σιώπα.
143aΑΛ. χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐστὶν ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς τὰ καλῶς εἰρημένα· ἐκεῖνο δʼ οὖν ἐννοῶ, ὅσων κακῶν αἰτία ἡ ἄγνοια τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὁπότε, ὡς ἔοικε, λελήθαμεν ἡμᾶς
143bαὐτοὺς διὰ ταύτην καὶ πράττοντες καὶ τό γε ἔσχατον εὐχόμενοι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τὰ κάκιστα. ὅπερ οὖν οὐδεὶς ἂν οἰηθείη, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν οἴοιτο ἱκανὸς εἶναι, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τὰ βέλτιστα εὔξασθαι, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ κάκιστα. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς κατάρᾳ τινὶ ἀλλʼ οὐκ εὐχῇ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη.
143bΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως, ὦ βέλτιστε, φαίη ἄν τις ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ σοφώτερος ὢν τυγχάνοι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς
143cλέγειν, οὕτως εἰκῇ ψέγοντας ἄγνοιαν, εἴ γε μὴ προσθείημεν τὴν ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις κακόν.
143cΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις; ἔστι γὰρ ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα ὅτῳ δὴ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντι ἄμεινον ἀγνοεῖν ἢ γιγνώσκειν;
143cΣΩ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· σοὶ δʼ οὔ;
143cΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.
143cΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνό σου καταγνώσομαι, ἐθέλειν ἄν σε πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρα διαπεπρᾶχθαι ἅπερ Ὀρέστην φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ εἰ δή τινες ἄλλοι ἐκείνοις
143dτυγχάνουσι ταὐτὰ διαπεπραγμένοι.
143dΑΛ. εὐφήμει πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες.
143dΣΩ. οὔτοι τὸν λέγοντα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις σοι ταῦτα πεπρᾶχθαι, εὐφημεῖν δεῖ σε κελεύειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πολύ, εἴ τις τὰ ἐναντία λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ σφόδρα δεινὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ ῥητέον εἶναι οὕτως εἰκῇ. δοκεῖς δʼ ἂν τὸν Ὀρέστην, εἰ ἐτύγχανε φρόνιμος ὢν καὶ εἰδὼς ὅτι βέλτιστον ἦν αὐτῷ πράττειν, τολμῆσαι ἄν τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι;
143dΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
143eΣΩ. οὐδέ γε ἄλλον οἶμαι οὐδένα.
143eΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι.
143eΣΩ. κακὸν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἄγνοια καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον.
143eΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
143eΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκείνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν;
143eΑΛ. φημί.
Section 144
143eΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα· εἴ σοι αὐτίκα μάλα παρεσταίη, οἰηθέντι βέλτιον εἶναι, Περικλέα τὸν σεαυτοῦ ἐπίτροπόν τε καὶ φίλον, ἐγχειρίδιον λαβόντα,
144aἐλθόντα ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας, εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔνδον ἐστί, βουλόμενον ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα· οἱ δὲ φαῖεν ἔνδον εἶναι—καὶ οὐ λέγω ἐθέλειν ἄν σε τούτων τι πράττειν· ἀλλʼ εἰ, οἶμαι, δόξει σοι, ὅπερ οὐθὲν κωλύει δήπου τῷ γε ἀγνοοῦντι τὸ βέλτιστον παραστῆναί ποτε δόξαν, ὥστε οἰηθῆναι καὶ τὸ κάκιστόν ποτε βέλτιστον εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι;
144aΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
144aΣΩ. εἰ οὖν παρελθὼν εἴσω καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον
144bἀγνοήσαις τε καὶ οἰηθείης ἂν ἄλλον εἶναί τινα, ἆρʼ ἔτι ἂν αὐτὸν τολμήσαις ἀποκτεῖναι;
144bΑΛ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκῶ.
144bΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὸν ἐντυχόντα, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ὃν ἠβούλου. ἦ γάρ;
144bΑΛ. ναί.
144bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ πολλάκις ἐγχειροῖς, αἰεὶ δὲ ἀγνοοῖς τὸν Περικλέα, ὁπότε μέλλοις τοῦτο πράττειν, οὔποτε ἂν ἐπίθοιο αὐτῷ.
144bΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
144bΣΩ. τί δέ; τὸν Ὀρέστην δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε τῇ μητρὶ ἐπιθέσθαι, εἴ γε ὡσαύτως ἠγνόησεν;
144cΑΛ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
144cΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ δήπου οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνος τὴν προστυχοῦσαν γυναῖκα οὐδὲ τὴν ὁτουοῦν μητέρα διενοεῖτο ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ.
144cΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
144cΣΩ. ἀγνοεῖν ἄρα τά γε τοιαῦτα βέλτιον τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις καὶ τοιαύτας δόξας ἔχουσιν.
144cΑΛ. φαίνεται.
144cΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι ἡ ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοια καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ οὐ κακόν, ὥσπερ ἄρτι σοι ἐδόκει;
144cΑΛ. ἔοικεν.
144dΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἄτοπον ἂν ἴσως ἄν σοι δόξειεν εἶναι.
144dΑΛ. τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
144dΣΩ. ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, κινδυνεύει τό γε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό. σκόπει δὲ ὧδε. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅταν τι μέλλωμεν ἤτοι πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, οἰηθῆναι δεῖν πρῶτον ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰδέναι τοῦθʼ ὃ ἂν προχειροτέρως
144eμέλλωμεν ἢ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν;
144eΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Section 145
144eΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ ῥήτορες αὐτίκα ἤτοι εἰδότες συμβουλεύειν ἢ οἰηθέντες εἰδέναι συμβουλεύουσιν ἡμῖν ἑκάστοτε, οἱ μὲν περὶ πολέμου τε καὶ εἰρήνης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τειχῶν οἰκοδομίας ἢ καὶ λιμένων κατασκευῆς· ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, ὅσα δή ποτε ἡ
145aπόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἢ αὐτὴ καθʼ αὑτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων συμβουλῆς πάντα γίγνεται.
145aΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
145aΣΩ. ὅρα τοίνυν καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις.
145aΑΛ. ἂν δυνηθῶ.
145aΣΩ. καλεῖς γὰρ δήπου φρονίμους τε καὶ ἄφρονας;
145aΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
145aΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἄφρονας, τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγους φρονίμους;
145aΑΛ. οὕτως.
145aΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πρός τι ἀποβλέπων ἀμφοτέρους;
145aΑΛ. ναί.
145bΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὸν τοιοῦτον συμβουλεύειν εἰδότα, χωρὶς τοῦ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ ὅτε βέλτιον, φρόνιμον καλεῖς;
145bΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
145bΣΩ. οὐδέ γε οἶμαι ὅστις τὸ πολεμεῖν αὐτὸ οἶδε χωρὶς τοῦ ὁπότε βέλτιον καὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον βέλτιον. ἦ γάρ;
145bΑΛ. ναί.
145bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ εἴ τίς τινα ἀποκτεινύναι οἶδεν οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ φυγάδα ποιεῖν τῆς πατρίδος, χωρὶς τοῦ ὁπότε βέλτιον καὶ ὅντινα βέλτιον;
145bΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι.
145cΣΩ. ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἐὰν μὲν παρέπηται αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—αὕτη δʼ ἦν ἡ αὐτὴ δήπου ἥπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου· ἦ γάρ; —
145cΑΛ. ναί.
145cΣΩ. φρόνιμον δέ γε αὐτὸν φήσομεν καὶ ἀποχρῶντα σύμβουλον καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ· τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον τἀναντία τούτων. ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ;
145cΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτως.
145cΣΩ. τί δʼ εἴ τις ἱππεύειν ἢ τοξεύειν οἶδεν, ἢ αὖ πυκτεύειν ἢ παλαίειν ἤ τι τῆς ἄλλης ἀγωνίας ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι
145dτῶν τοιούτων ὅσα τέχνῃ οἴδαμεν, τί καλεῖς ὃς ἂν εἰδῇ τὸ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τέχνην βέλτιον γιγνόμενον; ἆρʼ οὐ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἱππικὴν ἱππικόν;
145dΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
145dΣΩ. τὸν δέ γε οἶμαι κατὰ τὴν πυκτικὴν πυκτικόν, τὸν δὲ κατʼ αὐλητικὴν αὐλητικόν, καὶ τἆλλα δήπου ἀνὰ λόγον τούτοις· ἢ ἄλλως πως;
145dΑΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτως.
145dΣΩ. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν περὶ τούτων τι ἐπιστήμονα ὄντα ἄρα καὶ ἄνδρα φρόνιμον εἶναι, ἢ πολλοῦ
145eφήσομεν ἐνδεῖν;
145eΑΛ. πολλοῦ μέντοι νὴ Δία.
145eΣΩ. ποίαν οὖν οἴει πολιτείαν εἶναι τοξοτῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀθλητῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν, ἀναμεμειγμένων δʼ ἐν τούτοις οὓς ἄρτι εἰρήκαμεν τῶν τε αὐτὸ τὸ πολεμεῖν εἰδότων καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποκτεινύναι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν ῥητορικῶν πολιτικὸν φύσημα φυσώντων, ἁπάντων δὲ τούτων ὄντων ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος, ὁπότε βέλτιον ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τούτων
146aχρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τίνα;
Section 146
146aΑΛ. φαύλην τινὰ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
146aΣΩ. φαίης γε ἂν οἶμαι ὁπόταν ὁρῴης ἕνα ἕκαστον αὐτῶν φιλοτιμούμενόν τε καὶ νέμοντα τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς πολιτείας . . . τούτῳ μέρος, ἵνʼ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει κράτιστος ὤν· λέγω δὲ τὸ κατʼ αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην βέλτιστον γιγνόμενον· τοῦ δὲ τῇ πόλει τε καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ βελτίστου ὄντος τὰ πολλὰ διημαρτηκότα, ἅτε οἶμαι ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότα.
146bοὕτως δὲ τούτων ἐχόντων, ἆρα οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιμεν φάντες πολλῆς ταραχῆς τε καὶ ἀνομίας μεστὴν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν;
146bΑΛ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι νὴ Δία.
146bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἐδόκει οἰηθῆναι δεῖν πρῶτον ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰδέναι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν προχείρως μέλλωμεν ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν;
146bΑΛ. ἐδόκει.
146bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κἂν μὲν πράττῃ ἅ τις οἶδεν ἢ δοκεῖ εἰδέναι, παρέπηται δὲ τὸ ὠφελίμως, καὶ λυσιτελούντως ἡμᾶς ἕξειν
146cκαὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ;
146cΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
146cΣΩ. ἐὰν δέ γʼ οἶμαι τἀναντία τούτων, οὔτε τῇ πόλει οὔτʼ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ;
146cΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
146cΣΩ. τί δέ; καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὡσαύτως σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἄλλως πως;
146cΑΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτως.
146cΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἔφησθα καλεῖν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἄφρονας, τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγους φρονίμους;
146cΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
146cΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φαμεν πάλιν τοὺς πολλοὺς διημαρτηκέναι τοῦ βελτίστου, ὡς τὰ πολλά γε οἶμαι ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότας.
146dΑΛ. φαμὲν γάρ.
146dΣΩ. Λυσιτελεῖ ἄρα τοῖς πολλοῖς μήτʼ εἰδέναι μηδὲν μήτʼ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι, εἴπερ γε μᾶλλον προθυμήσονται πράττειν μὲν ταῦτα ἅττʼ ἂν εἰδῶσιν ἢ οἰηθῶσιν εἰδέναι, πράττοντες δὲ βλάπτεσθαι τὰ πλείω μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι.
146dΑΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
146dΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὅτε γʼ ἔφην κινδυνεύειν τό γε τῶν ἄλλων
146eἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό, ἆρʼ οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι ὀρθῶς ἐφαινόμην λέγων;
146eΑΛ. καὶ εἰ μὴ τότε, ἀλλὰ νῦν μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Section 147
146eΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν μέλλουσαν ὀρθῶς βιώσεσθαι ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀντέχεσθαι, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἀσθενοῦντα ἰατροῦ ἤ τινος κυβερνήτου τὸν ἀσφαλῶς
147aμέλλοντα πλεῖν. ἄνευ γὰρ ταύτης, ὅσῳπερ ἂν λαμπρότερον ἐπουρίσῃ τὸ τῆς τύχης ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἢ σώματος ῥώμην ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, τοσούτῳ μείζω ἁμαρτήματα ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν καλουμένην πολυμαθίαν τε καὶ πολυτεχνίαν κεκτημένος, ὀρφανὸς δὲ ὢν ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἑκάστης τῶν ἄλλων, ἆρʼ οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι δικαίως πολλῷ χειμῶνι χρήσεται, ἅτε οἶμαι ἄνευ κυβερνήτου
147bδιατελῶν ἐν πελάγει, χρόνον οὐ μακρὸν βίου θέων; ὥστε συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὃ λέγει κατηγορῶν πού τινος, ὡς ἄρα πολλὰ μὲν ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δέ, φησίν, ἠπίστατο πάντα.
147bΑΛ. καὶ τί δή ποτε συμβαίνει τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν δοκεῖ πρὸς λόγον εἰρηκέναι.
147bΣΩ. καὶ μάλα γε πρὸς λόγον· ἀλλʼ αἰνίττεται, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ οὗτος καὶ ἇλλοι δὲ ποιηταὶ σχεδόν τι πάντες. ἔστιν τε γὰρ φύσει ποιητικὴ ἡ σύμπασα αἰνιγματώδης καὶ
147cοὐ τοῦ προστυχόντος ἀνδρὸς γνωρίσαι· ἔτι τε πρὸς τῷ φύσει τοιαύτη εἶναι, ὅταν λάβηται ἀνδρὸς φθονεροῦ τε καὶ μὴ βουλομένου ἡμῖν ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἀλλʼ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ σοφίαν, ὑπερφυῶς δὴ τὸ χρῆμα ὡς δύσγνωστον φαίνεται, ὅτι ποτὲ νοοῦσιν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ δήπου Ὅμηρόν γε τὸν θειότατόν τε καὶ σοφώτατον ποιητὴν ἀγνοεῖν δοκεῖς ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἐπίστασθαι κακῶς—ἐκεῖνος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λέγων τὸν Μαργίτην πολλὰ
147dμὲν ἐπίστασθαι, κακῶς δέ, φησί, πάντα ἠπίστατο—ἀλλʼ αἰνίττεται οἶμαι παράγων τὸ κακῶς μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἠπίστατο ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι· γίγνεται οὖν συντεθὲν ἔξω μὲν τοῦ μέτρου, ἔστι δʼ ὅ γε βούλεται, ὡς πολλὰ μὲν ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακὸν δʼ ἦν ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῷ πάντα ταῦτα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι εἴπερ ἦν αὐτῷ κακὸν τὸ πολλὰ εἰδέναι, φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐτύγχανεν, εἴπερ γε πιστεύειν δεῖ τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις.
147eΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἦ χαλεπῶς γʼ ἂν ἄλλοις τισὶ πιστεύσαιμι λόγοις, εἴπερ μηδὲ τούτοις.
147eΣΩ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ σοι δοκεῖ.
147eΑΛ. πάλιν αὖ μοι δοκεῖ.
Section 148
147eΣΩ. ἀλλὰ φέρε πρὸς Διός—ὁρᾷς γὰρ δήπου τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅση τε καὶ οἵα, ταύτης δὲ καὶ σύ μοι δοκεῖς κεκοινωνηκέναι· μεταβαλλόμενός γέ τοι ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν παύῃ, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἂν μάλιστά σοι δόξῃ, τοῦτο καὶ ἐκδεδυκέναι αὖ
148aκαὶ οὐκέτι ὡσαύτως δοκεῖν—εἰ οὖν σοί γʼ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμφανὴς γενόμενος ὁ θεὸς πρὸς ὃν τυγχάνεις πορευόμενος ἐρωτήσειε, πρὶν ὁτιοῦν εὔξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσει σοι ἐκείνων τι γενέσθαι ὧνπερ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐλέγετο, εἴτε καὶ αὐτῷ σοι ἐπιτρέψειεν εὔξασθαι, τί ποτʼ ἂν οἴει ἢ τῶν παρʼ ἐκείνου διδομένων λαμβάνων ἢ αὐτὸς εὐξάμενος γενέσθαι τοῦ καιροῦ τυχεῖν;
148aΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐθὲν ἂν ἔχοιμί σοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως· ἀλλὰ μάργον τί μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι,
148bκαὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολλῆς φυλακῆς, ὅπως μὴ λήσει τις αὑτὸν εὐχόμενος μὲν κακά, δοκῶν δὲ τἀγαθά, ἔπειτʼ ὀλίγον ἐπισχών, ὅπερ καὶ σὺ ἔλεγες, παλινῳδῇ, ἀνευχόμενος ἅττʼ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εὔξηται.
148bΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχὶ εἰδώς τι πλέον ἡμῶν ὁ ποιητής, οὗ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου ἐπεμνήσθην, τὰ δειλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν ἐκέλευεν;
148bΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
148bΣΩ. τοῦτον μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
148cτὸν ποιητὴν ἐζηλωκότες, εἴτε καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτως ἐπεσκεμμένοι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἑκάστοτε παραπλησίαν εὐχὴν εὔχονται, τὰ καλὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τοὺς θεοὺς διδόναι κελεύοντες αὖ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς· πλείω δʼ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐκείνων εὐξαμένων ἀκούσειεν. τοιγαροῦν εἰς τὸ παρῆκον τοῦ χρόνου οὐδένων ἧττον εὐτυχεῖς εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι· εἰ δʼ ἄρα καὶ συμβέβηκεν αὐτοῖς ὥστε μὴ πάντα εὐτυχεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὖν οὐ διὰ
148dτὴν ἐκείνων εὐχήν, ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς δʼ ἐστὶν ὥστε οἶμαι καὶ διδόναι ἅττʼ ἄν τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνῃ καὶ τἀναντία τούτων. βούλομαι δέ σοι καὶ ἕτερόν τι διηγήσασθαι, ὅ ποτε ἤκουσα τινῶν, ὡς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις διαφορᾶς γενομένης συνέβαινεν ἀεὶ τῇ πόλει ἡμῶν ὥστε καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὁπότε μάχη γένοιτο δυστυχεῖν καὶ μηδέποτε δύνασθαι κρατῆσαι· τοὺς οὖν Ἀθηναίους ἀγανακτοῦντας τῷ πράγματι καὶ ἀπορουμένους τίνι
148eχρὴ μηχανῇ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀποτροπὴν εὑρεῖν, βουλευομένοις αὐτοῖς δοκεῖν κράτιστον εἶναι πέμψαντας πρὸς Ἄμμωνα ἐκεῖνον ἐπερωτᾶν· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις τάδε, ἀνθʼ ὅτου ποτὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις οἱ θεοὶ μᾶλλον νίκην διδόασιν ἢ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, οἳ πλείστας, φάναι, μὲν θυσίας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄγομεν, ἀναθήμασί τε κεκοσμήκαμεν τὰ ἱερὰ αὐτῶν ὡς οὐδένες ἄλλοι, πομπάς τε πολυτελεστάτας καὶ σεμνοτάτας ἐδωρούμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς ἀνʼ ἕκαστον ἔτος, καὶ
149aἐτελοῦμεν χρήματα ὅσα οὐδʼ ἇλλοι σύμπαντες Ἕλληνες·
Section 149
149aΣΩ. Λακεδαιμονίοις δέ, φάναι, οὐδεπώποτʼ ἐμέλησεν οὐδὲν τούτων, ἀλλʼ οὕτως ὀλιγώρως διάκεινται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ὥστε καὶ ἀνάπηρα θύουσιν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὐκ ὀλίγῳ ἐνδεεστέρως τιμῶσιν ἤπερ ἡμεῖς, χρήματα οὐδὲν ἐλάττω κεκτημένοι τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως. ἐπεὶ δὴ εἰρηκέναι ταῦτα καὶ ἐπερωτῆσαι τί χρὴ πράττοντας αὐτοὺς τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγὴν εὑρεῖν, ἄλλο μὲν οὐθὲν ἀποκριθῆναι τὸν
149bπροφήτην—τὸν γὰρ θεὸν οὐκ ἐᾶν δῆλον ὅτι—καλέσαντα δὲ αὐτόν, Ἀθηναίοις, φάναι, τάδε λέγει Ἄμμων· φησὶν ἂν βούλεσθαι αὑτῷ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων εὐφημίαν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σύμπαντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἱερά. τοσαῦτα εἰπεῖν, οὐκέτι περαιτέρω. τήν γʼ οὖν εὐφημίαν οὐκ ἄλλην τινά μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ θεὸς ἢ τὴν εὐχὴν αὐτῶν· ἔστι γὰρ τῷ ὄντι πολὺ
149cδιαφέρουσα τῶν ἄλλων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες οἱ μὲν χρυσόκερως βοῦς παραστησάμενοι, ἕτεροι δʼ ἀναθήμασι δωρούμενοι τοὺς θεούς, εὔχονται ἅττʼ ἂν τύχῃ ταῦτα, ἄντε ἀγαθὰ ἄντε κακά· βλασφημούντων οὖν αὐτῶν ἀκούοντες οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τὰς πολυτελεῖς ταυτασὶ πομπάς τε καὶ θυσίας. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μοι πολλῆς φυλακῆς δεῖσθαι καὶ σκέψεως ὅτι ποτὲ ῥητέον ἐστὶ καὶ μή.εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ παρʼ Ὁμήρῳ ἕτερα παραπλήσια τούτοις
149dεἰρημένα. φησὶν γὰρ τοὺς Τρῶας ἔπαυλιν ποιουμένους ἔρδειν ἀθανάτοισι τεληέσσας ἑκατόμβας· τὴν δὲ κνῖσαν ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου τοὺς ἀνέμους φέρειν οὐρανὸν εἴσω ἡδεῖαν· τῆς δʼ οὔ τι θεοὺς μάκαρας δατέεσθαι, οὐδʼ ἐθέλειν· μάλα γάρ σφιν ἀπήχθετο Ἴλιος ἱρὴ
149eκαὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς ἐυμμελίω Πριάμοιο· ὥστε οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἦν προύργου θύειν τε καὶ δῶρα τελεῖν μάτην, θεοῖς ἀπηχθημένους. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ τῶν θεῶν ὥστε ὑπὸ δώρων παράγεσθαι οἷον κακὸν τοκιστήν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμεῖς εὐήθη λόγον λέγομεν, ἀξιοῦντες Λακεδαιμονίων ταύτῃ περιεῖναι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη εἰ πρὸς τὰ δῶρα καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἀποβλέπουσιν ἡμῶν οἱ θεοὶ ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, ἄν τις ὅσιος καὶ δίκαιος ὢν
150aτυγχάνῃ.
Section 150
150aΣΩ. πολλῷ γε μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἢ πρὸς τὰς πολυτελεῖς ταύτας πομπάς τε καὶ θυσίας, ἃς οὐδὲν κωλύει πολλὰ μὲν εἰς θεούς, πολλὰ δʼ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἡμαρτηκότας καὶ ἰδιώτην καὶ πόλιν ἔχειν ἀνʼ ἕκαστον ἔτος τελεῖν· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐ δωροδόκοι ὄντες, καταφρονοῦσιν ἁπάντων τούτων, ὥς φησιν ὁ θεὸς καὶ θεῶν προφήτης. κινδυνεύει γοῦν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρʼ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι δικαιοσύνη τε
150bκαὶ φρόνησις διαφερόντως τετιμῆσθαι· φρόνιμοι δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι οὐκ ἄλλοι τινές εἰσιν τῶν εἰδότων ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους. βουλοίμην δʼ ἂν καὶ σοῦ πυθέσθαι ὅτι ποτʼ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα.
150bΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄλλῃ πῃ δοκεῖ ἢ ᾗπερ σοί τε καὶ τῷ θεῷ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν εἰκὸς εἴη ἀντίψηφον ἐμὲ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι.
150bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ἐν πολλῇ ἀπορίᾳ φάσκων εἶναι,
150cὅπως μὴ λάθῃς σεαυτὸν εὐχόμενος κακά, δοκῶν δὲ ἀγαθά;
150cΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
150cΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀσφαλές σοί ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐξομένῳ, ἵνα μηδʼ ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, βλασφημοῦντός σου ἀκούων οὐθὲν ἀποδέξηται τῆς θυσίας ταύτης, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ἕτερόν τι προσαπολαύσῃς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ βέλτιστον εἶναι ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων εὐχῇ διὰ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν—τοῦτο γὰρ κάλλιστον τῶν ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ γε ὀνομάτων—οὐκ ἂν οἶμαί σε ἐθέλειν χρῆσθαι.
150dἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἐστι περιμένειν ἕως ἄν τις μάθῃ ὡς δεῖ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους διακεῖσθαι.
150dΑΛ. πότε οὖν παρέσται ὁ χρόνος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τίς ὁ παιδεύσων; ἥδιστα γὰρ ἄν μοι δοκῶ ἰδεῖν τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τίς ἐστιν.
150dΣΩ. οὗτος ᾧ μέλει περὶ σοῦ. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μοι, ὥσπερ τῷ Διομήδει φησὶν τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν Ὅμηρος ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀχλύν, ὄφρʼ εὖ γιγνώσκοι ἠμὲν θεὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα,
150eοὕτω καὶ σοὶ δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρῶτον τὴν ἀχλὺν ἀφελόντα, ἣ νῦν παροῦσα τυγχάνει, τὸ τηνικαῦτʼ ἤδη προσφέρειν διʼ ὧν μέλλεις γνώσεσθαι ἠμὲν κακὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖς δυνηθῆναι.
150eΑΛ. ἀφαιρείτω, εἴτε βούλεται τὴν ἀχλὺν εἴτε ἄλλο τι· ὡς ἐγὼ παρεσκεύασμαι μηθὲν ἂν φυγεῖν τῶν ὑπʼ ἐκείνου προσταττομένων, ὅστις ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἅνθρωπος, εἴ γε μέλλοιμι βελτίων γενέσθαι.
Section 151
151aΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνος θαυμαστὴν ὅσην περὶ σὲ προθυμίαν ἔχει.
151aΑΛ. εἰς τότε τοίνυν καὶ τὴν θυσίαν ἀναβάλλεσθαι κράτιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ.
151aΣΩ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ σοι δοκεῖ· ἀσφαλέστερον γάρ ἐστιν ἢ παρακινδυνεύειν τοσοῦτον κίνδυνον.
151aΑΛ. ἀλλὰ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ μὴν τουτονὶ τὸν στέφανον, ἐπειδή μοι δοκεῖς καλῶς συμβεβουλευκέναι, σοὶ
151bπεριθήσω· τοῖς θεοῖς δὲ καὶ στεφάνους καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ νομιζόμενα τότε δώσομεν, ὅταν ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐλθοῦσαν ἴδω. ἥξει δʼ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ τούτων θελόντων.
151bΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δέχομαι καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ ἄλλο δὲ ἄν τι τῶν παρὰ σοῦ δοθέντων ἡδέως ἴδοιμι δεξάμενον ἐμαυτόν. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ὁ Κρέων Εὐριπίδῃ πεποίηται τὸν Τειρεσίαν ἰδὼν ἔχοντα τὰ στέφη καὶ ἀκούσας ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαρχὰς αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι διὰ τὴν τέχνην, οἰωνὸν ἐθέμην, φησί, καλλίνικα σὰ στέφη· ἐν γὰρ κλύδωνι κείμεθʼ, ὥσπερ οἶσθα σύ· οὕτω δὲ κἀγὼ παρὰ σοῦ τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οἰωνὸν τίθεμαι.
151cδοκῶ δέ μοι οὐκ ἐν ἐλάττονι κλύδωνι τοῦ Κρέοντος εἶναι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν καλλίνικος γενέσθαι τῶν σῶν ἐραστῶν.
Section 138
138aΣΩ. ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ἆρά γε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν προσευξόμενος πορεύῃ;
138aΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
138aΣΩ. φαίνῃ γέ τοι ἐσκυθρωπακέναι τε καὶ εἰς γῆν βλέπειν, ὥς τι συννοούμενος.
138aΑΛ. καὶ τί ἄν τις συννοοῖτο, ὦ Σώκρατες;
138aΣΩ. τὴν μεγίστην, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, σύννοιαν, ὥς γʼ ἐμοὶ
138bδοκεῖ. ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τοὺς θεούς, ἃ τυγχάνομεν εὐχόμενοι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ἐνίοτε τούτων τὰ μὲν διδόναι, τὰ δʼ οὔ, καὶ ἔστιν οἷς μὲν αὐτῶν, ἔστι δʼ οἷς οὔ;
138bΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
138bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ σοι πολλῆς προμηθείας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λήσεται αὑτὸν εὐχόμενος μεγάλα κακά, δοκῶν δʼ ἀγαθά, οἱ δὲ θεοὶ τύχωσιν ἐν ταύτῃ ὄντες τῇ ἕξει, ἐν ᾗ διδόασιν αὐτοὶ ἅ τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνει; ὥσπερ τὸν Οἰδίπουν
138cαὐτίκα φασὶν εὔξασθαι χαλκῷ διελέσθαι τὰ πατρῷα τοὺς ὑεῖς· ἐξὸν αὐτῷ τῶν παρόντων αὐτῷ κακῶν ἀποτροπήν τινα εὔξασθαι, ἕτερα πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν κατηρᾶτο· τοιγαροῦν ταῦτά τε ἐξετελέσθη, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ δεινά, ἃ τί δεῖ καθʼ ἕκαστα λέγειν;
138cΑΛ. ἀλλὰ σὺ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μαινόμενον ἄνθρωπον εἴρηκας· ἐπεὶ τίς ἄν σοι δοκεῖ τολμῆσαι ὑγιαίνων τοιαῦτʼ εὔξασθαι;
138cΣΩ. τὸ μαίνεσθαι ἆρά γε ὑπεναντίον σοι δοκεῖ τῷ φρονεῖν;
138cΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
138dΣΩ. ἄφρονες δὲ καὶ φρόνιμοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι εἶναι τινές σοι;
138dΑΛ. εἶναι μέντοι.
138dΣΩ. φέρε δή, ἐπισκεψώμεθα τίνες ποτʼ εἰσὶν οὗτοι. ὅτι μὲν γάρ εἰσί τινες, ὡμολόγηται, ἄφρονές τε καὶ φρόνιμοι, καὶ μαινόμενοι ἕτεροι.
138dΑΛ. ὡμολόγηται γάρ.
138dΣΩ. ἔτι δὲ ὑγιαίνοντές εἰσί τινες;
138dΑΛ. εἰσίν.
138dΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσθενοῦντες ἕτεροι;
Section 138
Soc. Alcibiades, are you on your way to offer a prayer to the god?
Alc. I am, certainly, Socrates.
Soc. You seem, let me say, to have a gloomy look, and to keep your eyes on the ground, as though you were pondering something.
Alc. And what might one ponder, Socrates?
Soc. The greatest of questions, Alcibiades,
138bas I believe. For tell me, in Heaven’s name, do you not think that the gods sometimes grant in part, but in part refuse, what we ask of them in our private and public prayers, and gratify some people, but not others?
138bAlc. I do, certainly.
138bSoc. Then you would agree that one should take great precautions against falling unawares into the error of praying for great evils in the belief that they are good, while the gods happen to be disposed to grant freely what one is praying for? Just as Oedipus,
138cthey say, suddenly prayed that his sons might divide their patrimony with the sword: it was open to him to pray that his present evils might by some means be averted, but he invoked others in addition to those which he had already. Wherefore not only were those words of his accomplished, but many other dread results therefrom, which I think there is no need to recount in detail.
138cAlc. But you have instanced a madman, Socrates: why, do you suppose that anyone could bring himself, while he was in a sound state, to utter such a prayer?
138cSoc. Do you regard madness as the opposite of wisdom?
138cAlc. Certainly I do.
138cSoc. And there are some men whom you regard as unwise, and others as wise?
138cAlc. Why, yes.
138cSoc. Come then, let us consider who these people are. We have admitted that some are unwise, some wise, and others mad.
138cAlc. Yes, we have.
138cSoc. And again, there are some in sound health?
138cAlc. There are.
138cSoc. And others also who are in ill-health?
Section 139
139aΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
139aΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐχ οἱ αὐτοί;
139aΑΛ. οὐ γάρ.
139aΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἕτεροί τινές εἰσιν, οἳ μηδέτερα τούτων πεπόνθασιν;
139aΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
139aΣΩ. ἀνάγκη γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα ἢ νοσεῖν ἢ μὴ νοσεῖν.
139aΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
139aΣΩ. τί δέ; περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀφροσύνης ἆρά γε τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχεις σὺ γνώμην;
139aΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
139aΣΩ. εἰ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τε εἶναι ἢ φρόνιμον ἢ ἄφρονα, ἢ ἔστι τι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε
139bφρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα;
139bΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
139bΣΩ. ἀνάγκη ἄρʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἕτερον τούτων πεπονθέναι.
139bΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
139bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ὁμολογήσας ὑπεναντίον εἶναι μανίαν φρονήσει;
139bΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
139bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ μηδὲν εἶναι διὰ μέσου τρίτον πάθος, ὃ ποιεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον μήτε φρόνιμον μήτε ἄφρονα εἶναι;
139bΑΛ. ὡμολόγησα γάρ.
139bΣΩ. καὶ μὴν δύο γε ὑπεναντία ἑνὶ πράγματι πῶς ἂν εἴη;
139bΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.
139cΣΩ. ἀφροσύνη ἄρα καὶ μανία κινδυνεύει ταὐτὸν εἶναι.
139cΑΛ. φαίνεται.
139cΣΩ. πάντας οὖν ἂν φάντες, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, τοὺς ἄφρονας μαίνεσθαι ὀρθῶς ἂν φαίημεν· αὐτίκα τῶν σῶν ἡλικιωτῶν εἴ τινες τυγχάνουσιν ἄφρονες ὄντες, ὥσπερ εἰσί, καὶ τῶν ἔτι πρεσβυτέρων. ἐπεὶ φέρε πρὸς Διός, οὐκ οἴει τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει ὀλίγους μὲν εἶναι τοὺς φρονίμους, ἄφρονας δὲ δὴ τοὺς πολλούς, οὓς δὴ σὺ μαινομένους καλεῖς;
139cΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
139cΣΩ. οἴει ἂν οὖν χαίροντας ἡμᾶς εἶναι μετὰ τοσούτων
139dμαινομένων πολιτευομένους, καὶ οὐκ ἂν παιομένους καὶ βαλλομένους, καὶ ἅπερ εἰώθασιν οἱ μαινόμενοι διαπράττεσθαι, πάλαι δὴ δίκην δεδωκέναι; ἀλλὰ ὅρα, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ταῦτʼ ἔχει.
139dΑΛ. πῶς ἂν οὖν ποτʼ ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες; κινδυνεύει γὰρ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ᾠήθην.
139dΣΩ. οὐδʼ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ. ἀλλὰ τῇδέ πῃ ἀθρητέον.
139dΑΛ. πῇ ποτε λέγεις;
139dΣΩ. ἐγὼ δή σοί γε ἐρῶ. ὑπολαμβάνομέν γέ τινας εἶναι νοσοῦντας· ἢ οὔ;
139dΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
139eΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν νοσοῦντα ποδαγρᾶν ἢ πυρέττειν ἢ ὀφθαλμιᾶν, ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι καὶ μηδὲν τούτων πεπονθὼς ἑτέραν νόσον νοσεῖν; πολλαὶ γὰρ δήπου γέ εἰσι, καὶ οὐχ αὗται μόναι.
139eΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.
139eΣΩ. ὀφθαλμία σοι οὖν δοκεῖ πᾶσα νόσος εἶναι;
139eΑΛ. ναί.
139eΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ πᾶσα νόσος ὀφθαλμία;
139eΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα ἔμοιγε· ἀπορῶ μέντοι γε πῶς λέγω.
Section 139
138cAlc. Quite so.
138cSoc. And they are not the same?
138cAlc. No, indeed.
138cSoc. And are there any others besides, who are found to be in neither state?
138cAlc. No, to be sure.
138cSoc. For a human being must needs be either sick or not sick.
138cAlc. I agree.
138cSoc. Well then, do you hold the same view about wisdom and unwisdom?
138cAlc. How do you mean?
138cSoc. Tell me, do you think it is only possible to be either wise or unwise, or is there some third condition between these, which makes
139ba man neither wise nor unwise?
139bAlc. No, there is not.
139bSoc. So he must needs be in one or the other of these two conditions.
139bAlc. I agree.
139bSoc. And you remember that you admitted that madness is the opposite of wisdom?
139bAlc. I do.
139bSoc. And further, that there is no third condition between these, which makes a man neither wise nor unwise?
139bAlc. Yes, I admitted that.
139bSoc. Well now, can there possibly be two opposites of one thing?
139bAlc. By no means.
139bSoc. Then it looks as though unwisdom and madness were the same.
139bAlc. Yes, apparently.
139bSoc. So we shall be right, Alcibiades, in saying that all unwise persons are mad; for example, such of your contemporaries as happen to be unwise—some such there are—and of your elders, even: for tell me, in Heaven’s name, do you not think that in our city the wise people are but few, whereas the majority are unwise, and these you call mad?
139bAlc. I do.
139bSoc. Well, do you suppose we could safely live with so many
139dmadmen as our fellow-citizens, and should not long ago have paid the penalty for it in knocks and blows at their hands, and all the usual proceedings of madmen? Consider now, my wonderful friend, whether the case is not quite different?
139dAlc. Well, it must be, Socrates. For it looks as though it were not as I thought.
139dSoc. And I think so too. But there is another way of regarding it.
139dAlc. I wonder what way you mean.
139dSoc. Well, I will tell you. We conceive there are some who are sick, do we not?
139dAlc. We do, to be sure.
139dSoc. And do you believe that a sick man must necessarily have the gout, or a fever, or ophthalmia? Do you not think that, although he may be afflicted in none of these ways, he may be suffering from some other disease? For surely there are many of them: these are not the only ones.
139dAlc. I agree.
139dSoc. And is every ophthalmia, in your opinion, a disease?
139dAlc. Yes.
139dSoc. And is every disease also ophthalmia?
139dAlc. No, I should think not: still, I am in doubt as to my meaning.
Section 140
140aΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἔμοιγε προσέχῃς τὸν νοῦν, σύν τε δύο σκεπτομένω τυχὸν εὑρήσομεν.
140aΑΛ. ἀλλὰ προσέχω, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς δύναμιν τὴν ἐμήν.
140aΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήθη ἡμῖν ὀφθαλμία μὲν πᾶσα νόσος εἶναι, νόσος μέντοι οὐκ εἶναι πᾶσα ὀφθαλμία;
140aΑΛ. ὡμολογήθη.
140aΣΩ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ μοι δοκεῖ ὁμολογηθῆναι. καὶ γὰρ οἱ πυρέττοντες πάντες νοσοῦσιν, οὐ μέντοι οἱ νοσοῦντες πάντες πυρέττουσιν οὐδὲ ποδαγρῶσιν οὐδέ γε ὀφθαλμιῶσιν,
140bοἶμαι· ἀλλὰ νόσος μὲν πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, διαφέρειν δέ φασιν οὓς δὴ καλοῦμεν ἰατροὺς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶσιν οὔτε ὅμοιαι οὔτε ὁμοίως διαπράττονται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῆς δύναμιν ἑκάστη· νόσοι μέντοι πᾶσαί εἰσιν. ὥσπερ δημιουργούς τινας ὑπολαμβάνομεν· ἢ οὔ;
140bΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
140bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς σκυτοτόμους καὶ τέκτονας καὶ ἀνδριαντοποιοὺς καὶ ἑτέρους παμπληθεῖς, οὓς τί δεῖ καθʼ ἕκαστα λέγειν; ἔχουσι δʼ οὖν διειληφότες δημιουργίας μέρη, καὶ
140cπάντες οὗτοί εἰσι δημιουργοί, οὐ μέντοι εἰσὶ τέκτονές γε οὐδὲ σκυτοτόμοι οὐδʼ ἀνδριαντοποιοί, οἳ σύμπαντές εἰσι δημιουργοί.
140cΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
140cΣΩ. οὕτως μὲν τοίνυν καὶ τὴν ἀφροσύνην διειληφότες εἰσί, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλεῖστον αὐτῆς μέρος ἔχοντας μαινομένους καλοῦμεν, τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγον ἔλαττον ἠλιθίους τε καὶ ἐμβροντήτους· οἱ δὲ ἐν εὐφημοτάτοις ὀνόμασι βουλόμενοι κατονομάζειν οἱ μὲν μεγαλοψύχους, οἱ δὲ εὐήθεις, ἕτεροι δὲ
140dἀκάκους καὶ ἀπείρους καὶ ἐνεούς· εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ ἕτερα πολλὰ ἀναζητῶν ὀνόματα. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ἀφροσύνη ἐστίν, διαφέρει δέ, ὥσπερ τέχνη τέχνης ἡμῖν κατεφαίνετο καὶ νόσος νόσου· ἢ πῶς σοι δοκεῖ;
140dΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτως.
140dΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀπʼ ἐκείνου πάλιν ἐπανέλθωμεν. ἦν γὰρ δήπου καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου, σκεπτέον εἶναι τοὺς ἄφρονάς τε καὶ φρονίμους, τίνες ποτʼ εἰσίν. ὡμολόγητο γὰρ εἶναί τινας· ἦ γὰρ οὔ;
140dΑΛ. ναί, ὡμολόγηται.
140eΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τούτους φρονίμους ὑπολαμβάνεις, οἳ ἂν εἰδῶσιν ἅττα δεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν;
140eΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
140eΣΩ. ἄφρονας δὲ ποτέρους; ἆρά γε τοὺς μηδέτερα τούτων εἰδότας;
140eΑΛ. τούτους.
140eΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἵ γε μὴ εἰδότες μηδέτερα τούτων λήσουσιν αὑτοὺς καὶ λέγοντες καὶ πράττοντες ἅττα μὴ δεῖ;
140eΑΛ. φαίνεται.
Section 140
139dSoc. Well, if you will attend to me, two together will be searching, and so mayhap we shall find what we seek.
139dAlc. Nay, but I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power.
139dSoc. Then we have admitted that while every ophthalmia is a disease, every disease, on the other hand, is not ophthalmia?
139dAlc. We have.
139dSoc. And our admission seems to me quite right. For everyone in a fever is sick, but yet not everyone who is sick has a fever or the gout
140bor ophthalmia, I take it; though everything of the sort is a disease, but differs—to quote those whom we call doctors— in its manifestation. For they are not all alike, nor of like effect, but each works according to its own faculty, and yet all are diseases. In the same way, we conceive of some men as artisans, do we not?
140bAlc. Certainly.
140bSoc. That is, cobblers and carpenters and statuaries and a host of others, whom we need not mention in particular; but any way, they have
140ctheir several departments of craft, and all of them are craftsmen; yet they are not all carpenters or cobblers or statuaries, though these taken together are craftsmen.
140cAlc. No, indeed.
140cSoc. In the same way, then, have men divided unwisdom also among them, and those who have the largest share of it we call mad, and those who have a little less, dolts and idiots; though people who prefer to use the mildest language term them sometimes romantic, sometimes simpleminded, or again
140dinnocent, inexperienced, or obtuse; and many another name will you find if you look for more. But all these things are unwisdom, though they differ, as we observed that one art or one disease differs from another. Or how does it strike you?
140dAlc. That is my view.
140dSoc. Then let us turn at this point and retrace our steps. For we said, you know, at the beginning that we must consider who the unwise can be, and who the wise: for we had admitted that there are such persons, had we not?
140dAlc. Yes, we have admitted it.
140dSoc. Then you conceive those to be wise who know what one ought to do and say?
140dAlc. I do.
140dSoc. And which are the unwise? Those who know neither of these things?
140dAlc. The same.
140dSoc. And those who know neither of these things will say and do unawares what one ought not?
140dAlc. Apparently.
Section 141
140eΣΩ. τούτων μέντοι ἔλεγον, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ τὸν
141aΟἰδίπουν εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων· εὑρήσεις δʼ ἔτι καὶ τῶν νῦν πολλοὺς οὐκ ὀργῇ κεχρημένους, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνον, οὐδʼ οἰομένους κακά σφισιν εὔχεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀγαθά. ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὥσπερ οὐδʼ ηὔχετο, οὐδʼ ᾤετο· ἕτεροι δέ τινές εἰσιν οἳ τἀναντία τούτων πεπόνθασιν. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οἶμαί σε πρῶτον, εἴ σοι ἐμφανὴς γενόμενος ὁ θεὸς πρὸς ὃν τυγχάνεις πορευόμενος, ἐρωτήσειεν, πρὶν ὁτιοῦν εὔξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσει σοι τύραννον γενέσθαι τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο φαῦλον ἡγήσαιο καὶ μὴ μέγα τι, προσθείη καὶ
141bπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων· εἰ δέ σε ὁρῴη ἔτι ἔλαττον δοκοῦντα ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ καὶ πάσης Εὐρώπης, ὑποσταίη σοι καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον ὑποσταίη, ἀλλʼ αὐθημερόν σου βουλομένου ὡς πάντας αἰσθήσεσθαι ὅτι Ἀλκιβιάδης ὁ Κλεινίου τύραννός ἐστιν· αὐτὸν οἶμαι ἄν σε ἀπιέναι περιχαρῆ γενόμενον, ὡς τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν κεκυρηκότα.
141bΑΛ. ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, κἂν ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν, εἴπερ τοιαῦτα συμβαίη αὐτῷ.
141cΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀντί γε τῆς σῆς ψυχῆς οὐδʼ ἂν τὴν πάντων Ἑλλήνων τε καὶ βαρβάρων χώραν τε καὶ τυραννίδα βουληθείης σοι γενέσθαι.
141cΑΛ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε. πῶς γὰρ ἄν, μηθέν γέ τι μέλλων αὐτοῖς χρήσεσθαι;
141cΣΩ. τί δʼ εἰ μέλλοις κακῶς τε καὶ βλαβερῶς χρῆσθαι; οὐδʼ ἂν οὕτως;
141cΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
141cΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀσφαλὲς οὔτε τὰ διδόμενα εἰκῇ δέχεσθαί τε οὔτε αὐτὸν εὔχεσθαι γενέσθαι, εἴ γέ τις
141dβλάπτεσθαι μέλλοι διὰ ταῦτα ἢ τὸ παράπαν τοῦ βίου ἀπαλλαγῆναι. πολλοὺς δʼ ἂν ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν, ὅσοι τυραννίδος ἐπιθυμήσαντες ἤδη καὶ σπουδάσαντες τοῦτʼ αὐτοῖς παραγενέσθαι, ὡς ἀγαθόν τι πράξαντες, διὰ τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπιβουλευθέντες τὸν βίον ἀφῃρέθησαν. οἶμαι δέ σε οὐκ ἀνήκοον εἶναι ἔνιά γε χθιζά τε καὶ πρωιζὰ γεγενημένα, ὅτε Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Μακεδόνων τύραννον τὰ παιδικά, ἐρασθέντα τῆς τυραννίδος οὐθὲν ἧττον ἤπερ ἐκεῖνος τῶν παιδικῶν, ἀπέκτεινε τὸν ἐραστὴν ὡς τύραννός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων
141eἀνὴρ ἐσόμενος· κατασχὼν δὲ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἡμέρας τὴν τυραννίδα πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐπιβουλευθεὶς ὑφʼ ἑτέρων τινῶν ἐτελεύτησεν.
Section 141
140dSoc. Well, just such a person, as I was saying, Alcibiades,
141awas Oedipus; and even in our time you will find many who do the same, not in a fit of anger, as he was: they think they pray not for something evil, but for something good. He neither prayed for that, nor thought he did, but there are others who are in the opposite case. For I imagine that if the god to whom you are now going should appear to you and first ask you, before you made any prayer, whether you would be content to become sovereign of the Athenian state and, on your accounting this as something poor and unimportant, should add and of all the Greeks also; and if he saw
141byou were still unsatisfied unless he promised you besides the mastery of all Europe, and should not merely promise you that, but on the self-same day a recognition by all men, if you so desired, of Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, as their sovereign—I imagine you would actually depart in a transport of delight, as having secured the greatest of goods.
141bAlc. So would anybody else, I imagine, Socrates, at such a stroke of luck!
141bSoc. But still you would not wish to sacrifice your life even for the territory and sovereignty of all the Greeks and barbarians together.
141bAlc. I should think not. How could I, without a prospect of making any use of them?
141bSoc. And what if you had a prospect of making an evil and injurious use of them? Not in this case either?
141bAlc. No, indeed.
141bSoc. So you see it is not safe either to accept casually what one is given, or to pray for one’s own advancement, if one is going to be injured in consequence, or deprived of one’s life altogether. Yet we could tell of
141dmany ere now who, having desired sovereignty, and endeavored to secure it, with the idea of working for their good, have lost their lives by plots which their sovereignty has provoked. And I expect you are not unacquainted with certain events of a day or two ago, when Archelaus, the monarch of Macedonia, was slain by his favorite, who was as much in love with the monarchy as Archelaus was with him, and who killed his lover
141ewith the expectation of being not only the monarch, but also a happy man: but after holding the monarchy for three or four days he was plotted against by others in his turn, and perished.
Section 142
141eΣΩ. ὁρᾷς δὴ καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων πολιτῶν—ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλων ἀκηκόαμεν, ἀλλʼ αὐτοὶ παρόντες οἴδαμεν—
142aὅσοι στρατηγίας ἐπιθυμήσαντες ἤδη καὶ τυχόντες αὐτῆς οἱ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν φυγάδες τῆσδε τῆς πόλεώς εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ τὸν βίον ἐτελεύτησαν· οἱ δὲ ἄριστα δοκοῦντες αὐτῶν πράττειν διὰ πολλῶν κινδύνων ἐλθόντες καὶ φόβων οὐ μόνον ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ στρατηγίᾳ, ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ εἰς τὴν ἑαυτῶν κατῆλθον, ὑπὸ τῶν συκοφαντῶν πολιορκούμενοι πολιορκίαν οὐδὲν ἐλάττω τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων διετέλεσαν, ὥστε ἐνίους αὐτῶν εὔχεσθαι ἀστρατηγήτους εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐστρατηγηκέναι.
142bεἰ μὲν οὖν ἦσαν οἱ κίνδυνοί τε καὶ πόνοι φέροντες εἰς ὠφέλειαν, εἶχεν ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ καὶ πολὺ τοὐναντίον. εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ περὶ τέκνων τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, εὐξαμένους τινὰς ἤδη γενέσθαι καὶ γενομένων εἰς συμφοράς τε καὶ λύπας τὰς μεγίστας καταστάντας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ μοχθηρῶν διὰ τέλους ὄντων τῶν τέκνων ὅλον τὸν βίον λυπούμενοι διήγαγον· τοὺς δὲ χρηστῶν μὲν γενομένων,
142cσυμφοραῖς δὲ χρησαμένων ὥστε στερηθῆναι, καὶ τούτους οὐδὲν εἰς ἐλάττονας δυστυχίας καθεστηκότας ἤπερ ἐκείνους καὶ βουλομένους ἂν ἀγένητα μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι. ἀλλʼ ὅμως τούτων τε καὶ ἑτέρων πολλῶν ὁμοιοτρόπων τούτοις οὕτω σφόδρα καταδήλων ὄντων, σπάνιον εὑρεῖν ὅστις ἂν ἢ διδομένων ἀπόσχοιτο ἢ μέλλων διʼ εὐχῆς τεύξεσθαι παύσαιτο ἂν εὐχόμενος· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ οὔτε ἂν τυραννίδος διδομένης ἀπόσχοιντο ἂν οὔτε στρατηγίας οὐδʼ ἑτέρων
142dπολλῶν, ἃ παρόντα βλάπτει μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖ, ἀλλὰ κἂν εὔξαιντο ἂν γενέσθαι, εἴ τῳ μὴ παρόντα τυγχάνει· ὀλίγον δὲ ἐπισχόντες ἐνίοτε παλινῳδοῦσιν, ἀνευχόμενοι ἅττʼ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εὔξωνται. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἀπορῶ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάτην θεοὺς ἄνθρωποι αἰτιῶνται, ἐξ ἐκείνων φάμενοι κακά σφισιν εἶναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ σφῇσιν εἴτε ἀτασθαλίαισιν εἴτε ἀφροσύναις χρὴ εἰπεῖν, ὑπὲρ μόρον
142eἄλγεʼ ἔχουσι. κινδυνεύει γοῦν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, φρόνιμός τις εἶναι ἐκεῖνος ὁ ποιητής, ὃς δοκεῖ μοι φίλοις ἀνοήτοις τισὶ χρησάμενος, ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς καὶ πράττοντας καὶ εὐχομένους ἅπερ οὐ βέλτιον ἦν, ἐκείνοις δὲ ἐδόκει, κοινῇ ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων αὐτῶν εὐχὴν ποιήσασθαι· λέγει δέ πως ὡδί—
143aΖεῦ βασιλεῦ, τὰ μὲν ἐσθλά, φησί, καὶ εὐχομένοις καὶ ἀνεύκτοις ἄμμι δίδου, τὰ δὲ δειλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν κελεύει.
Section 142
141eSoc. You have only to look at some of our own citizens—and these are examples that we know, not by hearsay, but by personal observation—who in their time have desired to hold military command
142aand have obtained it, and see how some to this very day are exiles from our city, while others have lost their lives. And even those who are deemed to be faring best have not only gone through many dangers and terrors in holding their command, but on returning home have continued to be as sorely besieged by informers as they were by the enemy, so that some of them wished to heaven
142bthat they had been anything but commanders rather than have held such appointments. Of course, if these dangers and toils were conducive to our advantage, there would be some reason for them; but the case is quite the contrary. And you will find it is just the same in regard to children: some people have been known to pray that they might have them, and when they have got them have fallen into the greatest disasters and pains. For some have had children that were utterly bad, and have spent their whole lives in repining; while others, though they had good ones,
142cwere bereft of them by disasters that overtook them, and thus were cast into as great misfortune as the others, and wished that no children at all had been born to them. But nevertheless, with all this plain evidence, and a great deal more of a similar kind, before men’s eyes, it is rare to find anyone who has either declined what was offered to him or, when he was likely to gain something by prayer, refrained from praying. Most men would not decline the offer of either a monarchy or a generalship
142dor any of the various other things which bring with them harm rather than benefit, but would even pray to be granted them in cases where they were lacking: but after a little while they often change their tune, and retract all their former prayers. I question therefore if men are not really wrong in blaming the gods as the authors of their ills, when they themselves by their own presumption—or unwisdom, shall we say?—
142ehave gotten them more than destined sorrows. It would seem, at any rate, Alcibiades, that one old poet had some wisdom; for I conceive it was because he had some foolish friends, whom he saw working and praying for things that were not for their advantage, though supposed to be by them, that he made a common prayer on behalf of them all, in terms something like these:
143aKing Zeus, give unto us what is good, whether we pray or pray not; But what is grievous, even if we pray for it, do thou avert.
Section 143
143aΣΩ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καλῶς δοκεῖ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς λέγειν ὁ ποιητής· σὺ δʼ εἴ τι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα, μὴ σιώπα.
143aΑΛ. χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐστὶν ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς τὰ καλῶς εἰρημένα· ἐκεῖνο δʼ οὖν ἐννοῶ, ὅσων κακῶν αἰτία ἡ ἄγνοια τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὁπότε, ὡς ἔοικε, λελήθαμεν ἡμᾶς
143bαὐτοὺς διὰ ταύτην καὶ πράττοντες καὶ τό γε ἔσχατον εὐχόμενοι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τὰ κάκιστα. ὅπερ οὖν οὐδεὶς ἂν οἰηθείη, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν οἴοιτο ἱκανὸς εἶναι, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τὰ βέλτιστα εὔξασθαι, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ κάκιστα. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς κατάρᾳ τινὶ ἀλλʼ οὐκ εὐχῇ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη.
143bΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως, ὦ βέλτιστε, φαίη ἄν τις ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ σοφώτερος ὢν τυγχάνοι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς
143cλέγειν, οὕτως εἰκῇ ψέγοντας ἄγνοιαν, εἴ γε μὴ προσθείημεν τὴν ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις κακόν.
143cΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις; ἔστι γὰρ ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα ὅτῳ δὴ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντι ἄμεινον ἀγνοεῖν ἢ γιγνώσκειν;
143cΣΩ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· σοὶ δʼ οὔ;
143cΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.
143cΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνό σου καταγνώσομαι, ἐθέλειν ἄν σε πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρα διαπεπρᾶχθαι ἅπερ Ὀρέστην φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ εἰ δή τινες ἄλλοι ἐκείνοις
143dτυγχάνουσι ταὐτὰ διαπεπραγμένοι.
143dΑΛ. εὐφήμει πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες.
143dΣΩ. οὔτοι τὸν λέγοντα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις σοι ταῦτα πεπρᾶχθαι, εὐφημεῖν δεῖ σε κελεύειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πολύ, εἴ τις τὰ ἐναντία λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ σφόδρα δεινὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ ῥητέον εἶναι οὕτως εἰκῇ. δοκεῖς δʼ ἂν τὸν Ὀρέστην, εἰ ἐτύγχανε φρόνιμος ὢν καὶ εἰδὼς ὅτι βέλτιστον ἦν αὐτῷ πράττειν, τολμῆσαι ἄν τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι;
143dΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
143eΣΩ. οὐδέ γε ἄλλον οἶμαι οὐδένα.
143eΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι.
143eΣΩ. κακὸν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἄγνοια καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον.
143eΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
143eΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκείνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν;
143eΑΛ. φημί.
Section 143
143aSoc. So then, to my mind the poet spoke well and soundly; but if you have thought of an answer to his words, do not be silent.
143aAlc. It is difficult, Socrates, to gainsay what has been well spoken: one thing, however, I do observe —how many evils are caused to men by ignorance, when, as it seems, we are beguiled by her not only into doing,
143bbut—worst of all—into praying to be granted the greatest evils. Now that is a thing that no one would suppose of himself; each of us would rather suppose he was competent to pray for his own greatest good, not his greatest evil. Why, that would seem, in truth, more like some sort of curse than a prayer!
143bSoc. But perhaps, my excellent friend, some person who is wiser than either you or I may say we are wrong to be so free with our abuse of ignorance,
143cunless we can add that it is ignorance of certain things, and is a good to certain persons in certain conditions, as to those others it is an evil.
143cAlc. How do you mean? Can there be anything of which it is better for anybody, in any condition whatsoever, to be ignorant than cognizant?
143cSoc. I believe so; and do not you?
143cAlc. No, indeed, upon my word.
143cSoc. But surely I shall not have to tax you with an inclination to commit such an act against your own mother as Orestes and Alcmaeon,
143dand any others who have followed their example, are said to have committed against theirs.
143dAlc. No unlucky words, in Heaven’s name, Socrates!
143dSoc. Why, it is not the person who says, Alcibiades, that you would not like to be guilty of such an act, whom you should bid avoid unlucky words, but much rather him who might say the contrary; since the act seems to you so very dreadful as to be unfit even for such casual mention. But do you think that Orestes, if he had had all his wits about him and had known what was best for him to do, would have brought himself to commit any act of the sort?
143dAlc. No, indeed.
143dSoc. Nor would anyone else, I imagine.
143dAlc. No.
143dSoc. Then it seems that ignorance of what is best, and to be ignorant of the best, is a bad thing.
143dAlc. I agree.
143dSoc. And not only for the person himself, but for everyone else?
143dAlc. Yes.
Section 144
143eΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα· εἴ σοι αὐτίκα μάλα παρεσταίη, οἰηθέντι βέλτιον εἶναι, Περικλέα τὸν σεαυτοῦ ἐπίτροπόν τε καὶ φίλον, ἐγχειρίδιον λαβόντα,
144aἐλθόντα ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας, εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔνδον ἐστί, βουλόμενον ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα· οἱ δὲ φαῖεν ἔνδον εἶναι—καὶ οὐ λέγω ἐθέλειν ἄν σε τούτων τι πράττειν· ἀλλʼ εἰ, οἶμαι, δόξει σοι, ὅπερ οὐθὲν κωλύει δήπου τῷ γε ἀγνοοῦντι τὸ βέλτιστον παραστῆναί ποτε δόξαν, ὥστε οἰηθῆναι καὶ τὸ κάκιστόν ποτε βέλτιστον εἶναι· ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι;
144aΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
144aΣΩ. εἰ οὖν παρελθὼν εἴσω καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον
144bἀγνοήσαις τε καὶ οἰηθείης ἂν ἄλλον εἶναί τινα, ἆρʼ ἔτι ἂν αὐτὸν τολμήσαις ἀποκτεῖναι;
144bΑΛ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκῶ.
144bΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὸν ἐντυχόντα, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ὃν ἠβούλου. ἦ γάρ;
144bΑΛ. ναί.
144bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ πολλάκις ἐγχειροῖς, αἰεὶ δὲ ἀγνοοῖς τὸν Περικλέα, ὁπότε μέλλοις τοῦτο πράττειν, οὔποτε ἂν ἐπίθοιο αὐτῷ.
144bΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
144bΣΩ. τί δέ; τὸν Ὀρέστην δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε τῇ μητρὶ ἐπιθέσθαι, εἴ γε ὡσαύτως ἠγνόησεν;
144cΑΛ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
144cΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ δήπου οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνος τὴν προστυχοῦσαν γυναῖκα οὐδὲ τὴν ὁτουοῦν μητέρα διενοεῖτο ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ.
144cΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
144cΣΩ. ἀγνοεῖν ἄρα τά γε τοιαῦτα βέλτιον τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις καὶ τοιαύτας δόξας ἔχουσιν.
144cΑΛ. φαίνεται.
144cΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι ἡ ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοια καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ οὐ κακόν, ὥσπερ ἄρτι σοι ἐδόκει;
144cΑΛ. ἔοικεν.
144dΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἄτοπον ἂν ἴσως ἄν σοι δόξειεν εἶναι.
144dΑΛ. τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
144dΣΩ. ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, κινδυνεύει τό γε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό. σκόπει δὲ ὧδε. ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅταν τι μέλλωμεν ἤτοι πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, οἰηθῆναι δεῖν πρῶτον ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰδέναι τοῦθʼ ὃ ἂν προχειροτέρως
144eμέλλωμεν ἢ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν;
144eΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
Section 144
143dSoc. Then let us consider this further case. Suppose it should quite suddenly occur to your mind that you had better take a dagger and go to the door of Pericles, your own guardian and friend,
144aand ask if he were at home, with the design of killing just him and no one else, and his servants said he was at home: now, I do not say you would be inclined to do any such thing, but I suppose, if you are under the impression which at some moment may well be present, surely, to the mind of a man who is ignorant of the best—that what is really the worst is best at some moment—or do you not agree?
144aAlc. Quite so.
144aSoc. Well then, if you went indoors and saw Pericles himself,
144bbut did not know him, and thought he was somebody else, would you still venture to kill him?
144bAlc. No, upon my word, I should think not.
144bSoc. For your man was, I presume, not anyone you met, but that particular person whom you wished to kill?
144bAlc. Yes.
144bSoc. And although you might make a number of attempts, if you always failed to know Pericles when you were about to commit the act, you would never attack him.
144bAlc. No, indeed.
144bSoc. Well now, do you suppose that Orestes would ever have attacked his mother if he had similarly failed to know her?
144bAlc. I do not think he would.
144bSoc. For presumably he, too, had no intention of killing the first woman he met, or anybody else’s mother, but only his own.
144bAlc. That is so.
144bSoc. Then to be ignorant in such matters is better for those who are so disposed and have formed such resolves.
144bAlc. Apparently.
144bSoc. So you see that ignorance of certain things is for certain persons in certain states a good, not an evil, as you supposed just now.
144bAlc. It seems to be.
144bSoc. Then if you care to consider the sequel of this, I daresay it will surprise you.
144bAlc. What may that be, Socrates?
144bSoc. I mean that, generally speaking, it rather looks as though the possession of the sciences as a whole, if it does not include possession of the science of the best, will in a few instances help, but in most will harm, the owner. Consider it this way: must it not be the case, in your opinion, that when we are about to do or say anything, we first suppose that we know, or do really know, the thing
144ewe so confidently intend to say or do?
144eAlc. I think so.
Section 145
144eΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οἱ ῥήτορες αὐτίκα ἤτοι εἰδότες συμβουλεύειν ἢ οἰηθέντες εἰδέναι συμβουλεύουσιν ἡμῖν ἑκάστοτε, οἱ μὲν περὶ πολέμου τε καὶ εἰρήνης, οἱ δὲ περὶ τειχῶν οἰκοδομίας ἢ καὶ λιμένων κατασκευῆς· ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ, ὅσα δή ποτε ἡ
145aπόλις πράττει πρὸς ἄλλην πόλιν ἢ αὐτὴ καθʼ αὑτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων συμβουλῆς πάντα γίγνεται.
145aΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
145aΣΩ. ὅρα τοίνυν καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοις.
145aΑΛ. ἂν δυνηθῶ.
145aΣΩ. καλεῖς γὰρ δήπου φρονίμους τε καὶ ἄφρονας;
145aΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
145aΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἄφρονας, τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγους φρονίμους;
145aΑΛ. οὕτως.
145aΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πρός τι ἀποβλέπων ἀμφοτέρους;
145aΑΛ. ναί.
145bΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὸν τοιοῦτον συμβουλεύειν εἰδότα, χωρὶς τοῦ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ ὅτε βέλτιον, φρόνιμον καλεῖς;
145bΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
145bΣΩ. οὐδέ γε οἶμαι ὅστις τὸ πολεμεῖν αὐτὸ οἶδε χωρὶς τοῦ ὁπότε βέλτιον καὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον βέλτιον. ἦ γάρ;
145bΑΛ. ναί.
145bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ εἴ τίς τινα ἀποκτεινύναι οἶδεν οὐδὲ χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι καὶ φυγάδα ποιεῖν τῆς πατρίδος, χωρὶς τοῦ ὁπότε βέλτιον καὶ ὅντινα βέλτιον;
145bΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι.
145cΣΩ. ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἐὰν μὲν παρέπηται αὐτῷ ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμη—αὕτη δʼ ἦν ἡ αὐτὴ δήπου ἥπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὠφελίμου· ἦ γάρ; —
145cΑΛ. ναί.
145cΣΩ. φρόνιμον δέ γε αὐτὸν φήσομεν καὶ ἀποχρῶντα σύμβουλον καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ· τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιοῦτον τἀναντία τούτων. ἢ πῶς δοκεῖ;
145cΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὕτως.
145cΣΩ. τί δʼ εἴ τις ἱππεύειν ἢ τοξεύειν οἶδεν, ἢ αὖ πυκτεύειν ἢ παλαίειν ἤ τι τῆς ἄλλης ἀγωνίας ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι
145dτῶν τοιούτων ὅσα τέχνῃ οἴδαμεν, τί καλεῖς ὃς ἂν εἰδῇ τὸ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν τέχνην βέλτιον γιγνόμενον; ἆρʼ οὐ τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἱππικὴν ἱππικόν;
145dΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
145dΣΩ. τὸν δέ γε οἶμαι κατὰ τὴν πυκτικὴν πυκτικόν, τὸν δὲ κατʼ αὐλητικὴν αὐλητικόν, καὶ τἆλλα δήπου ἀνὰ λόγον τούτοις· ἢ ἄλλως πως;
145dΑΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτως.
145dΣΩ. δοκεῖ οὖν σοι ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν περὶ τούτων τι ἐπιστήμονα ὄντα ἄρα καὶ ἄνδρα φρόνιμον εἶναι, ἢ πολλοῦ
145eφήσομεν ἐνδεῖν;
145eΑΛ. πολλοῦ μέντοι νὴ Δία.
145eΣΩ. ποίαν οὖν οἴει πολιτείαν εἶναι τοξοτῶν τε ἀγαθῶν καὶ αὐλητῶν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἀθλητῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνιτῶν, ἀναμεμειγμένων δʼ ἐν τούτοις οὓς ἄρτι εἰρήκαμεν τῶν τε αὐτὸ τὸ πολεμεῖν εἰδότων καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀποκτεινύναι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν ῥητορικῶν πολιτικὸν φύσημα φυσώντων, ἁπάντων δὲ τούτων ὄντων ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης καὶ τοῦ εἰδότος, ὁπότε βέλτιον ἑνὶ ἑκάστῳ τούτων
146aχρῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς τίνα;
Section 145
144eSoc. Well, take the orators, for example: they either know, or think they know, how to advise us on various occasions—some about war and peace, and others about building walls or fitting up harbors;
145aand in a word, whatever the city does to another city or within herself, all comes about by the advice of the orators.
145aAlc. That is true.
145aSoc. Then observe the consequence.
145aAlc. If I am able.
145aSoc. Why, surely you call men either wise or unwise?
145aAlc. I do.
145aSoc. And the many unwise, and the few wise?
145aAlc. Precisely.
145aSoc. And in either case you name them in reference to something?
145aAlc. Yes.
145aSoc. Then do you call a man wise who knows how to give advice, without knowing whether and when it is better to act upon it?
145aAlc. No, indeed.
145aSoc. Nor, I conceive, a man who knows what war is in itself, without knowing when or for how long a time it is better to make war?
145aAlc. Agreed.
145aSoc. Nor, again, a man who knows how to kill another, or seize his property, or make him an exile from his native land, without knowing when or to whom it is better so to behave?
145aAlc. No, to be sure.
145aSoc. Then it is a man who knows something of this sort, and is assisted by knowledge of what is best,—and this is surely the same as knowledge of the useful, is it not?
145aAlc. Yes.
145aSoc. And we shall call him wise, and a competent adviser both of the city and of his own self; but a man not so qualified we shall call the opposite of these. How do you think?
145aAlc. I agree.
145aSoc. And what of a man who knows how to ride or shoot, or else to box or wrestle or contend in any other sport,
145dor do anything that we know by rule of art? What do you call him who knows what is better done by rule of that particular art? Do you not say that he who goes by the rules of riding is a good rider?
145dAlc. I do.
145dSoc. And the rules of boxing, I suppose, make a good boxer, and those of flute-playing a good flute-player, and so, on the same lines, I presume, with the rest; or is there any difference?
145dAlc. No, it is as you say.
145dSoc. Then do you think it inevitable that he who has some knowledge about these things should also be a wise man,
145eor shall we say he comes far short of it?
145eAlc. Far short of it, I declare.
145eSoc. Then what sort of state do you suppose it would be, where the people were good bowmen and flute-players, together with athletes and artists in general, and mingled with these the men whom we have just mentioned as knowing war in itself and slaughter in itself, and orator-windbags too with their political bluster, but all of them lacked this knowledge of the best, and none knew when or upon whom it was better
146ato employ their respective arts?
Section 146
146aΑΛ. φαύλην τινὰ ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες.
146aΣΩ. φαίης γε ἂν οἶμαι ὁπόταν ὁρῴης ἕνα ἕκαστον αὐτῶν φιλοτιμούμενόν τε καὶ νέμοντα τὸ πλεῖστον τῆς πολιτείας . . . τούτῳ μέρος, ἵνʼ αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ τυγχάνει κράτιστος ὤν· λέγω δὲ τὸ κατʼ αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην βέλτιστον γιγνόμενον· τοῦ δὲ τῇ πόλει τε καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ βελτίστου ὄντος τὰ πολλὰ διημαρτηκότα, ἅτε οἶμαι ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότα.
146bοὕτως δὲ τούτων ἐχόντων, ἆρα οὐκ ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγοιμεν φάντες πολλῆς ταραχῆς τε καὶ ἀνομίας μεστὴν εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν;
146bΑΛ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι νὴ Δία.
146bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἐδόκει οἰηθῆναι δεῖν πρῶτον ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰδέναι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν προχείρως μέλλωμεν ἢ πράττειν ἢ λέγειν;
146bΑΛ. ἐδόκει.
146bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κἂν μὲν πράττῃ ἅ τις οἶδεν ἢ δοκεῖ εἰδέναι, παρέπηται δὲ τὸ ὠφελίμως, καὶ λυσιτελούντως ἡμᾶς ἕξειν
146cκαὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ;
146cΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
146cΣΩ. ἐὰν δέ γʼ οἶμαι τἀναντία τούτων, οὔτε τῇ πόλει οὔτʼ αὐτὸν αὑτῷ;
146cΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
146cΣΩ. τί δέ; καὶ νῦν ἔτι ὡσαύτως σοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἄλλως πως;
146cΑΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ οὕτως.
146cΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἔφησθα καλεῖν τοὺς μὲν πολλοὺς ἄφρονας, τοὺς δʼ ὀλίγους φρονίμους;
146cΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
146cΣΩ. οὐκοῦν φαμεν πάλιν τοὺς πολλοὺς διημαρτηκέναι τοῦ βελτίστου, ὡς τὰ πολλά γε οἶμαι ἄνευ νοῦ δόξῃ πεπιστευκότας.
146dΑΛ. φαμὲν γάρ.
146dΣΩ. Λυσιτελεῖ ἄρα τοῖς πολλοῖς μήτʼ εἰδέναι μηδὲν μήτʼ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι, εἴπερ γε μᾶλλον προθυμήσονται πράττειν μὲν ταῦτα ἅττʼ ἂν εἰδῶσιν ἢ οἰηθῶσιν εἰδέναι, πράττοντες δὲ βλάπτεσθαι τὰ πλείω μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι.
146dΑΛ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
146dΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὅτε γʼ ἔφην κινδυνεύειν τό γε τῶν ἄλλων
146eἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό, ἆρʼ οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι ὀρθῶς ἐφαινόμην λέγων;
146eΑΛ. καὶ εἰ μὴ τότε, ἀλλὰ νῦν μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Section 146
146aAlc. A paltry one, I should call it, Socrates.
146aSoc. Yes, you would, I expect, when you saw each one of them vying with the other and assigning the largest part in the conduct of the state to thatWherein himself is found most excellent, I mean, what is done best by rule of his particular art—while he is entirely off the track of what is best for the state and for himself, because, I conceive, he has put his trust in opinion apart from intelligence. In these circumstances,
146bshould we not be right in saying that such a state is one great mass of turmoil and lawlessness?
146bAlc. We should, upon my word.
146bSoc. And we took it to be necessary that we should first think we know, or really know, anything that we confidently intend either to do or to say?
146bAlc. We did.
146bSoc. And if a man does what he knows or thinks he knows, and is assisted by knowing how to make it beneficial, we shall find him profitable
146cboth to the city and to himself?
146cAlc. Certainly.
146cSoc. But if, I suppose, he does the contrary, he will not be so either to the city or to himself?
146cAlc. No, indeed.
146cSoc. Well then, do you still take the same view now as before, or do you think differently?
146cAlc. No, I take the same view.
146cSoc. And you said you called the many unwise, and the few wise?
146cAlc. I did.
146cSoc. So now we repeat our statement that the many have missed getting the best because in most cases, I conceive, they have put their trust in opinion apart from intelligence.
146cAlc. Yes.
146cSoc. Then it is an advantage to the many neither to know nor to think they know anything, if they are going to be specially eager to do what they know or think they know, but are likely on the whole, in doing it, to be injured rather than benefited.
146cAlc. That is very true.
146cSoc. So you see that when I said it looked as though
146ethe possession of the sciences as a whole, where it did not include the science of the best, in a few cases helped, but in most harmed the owner, I was evidently right in very truth, was I not?
146eAlc. Though I did not then, I think so now, Socrates.
Section 147
146eΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα καὶ πόλιν καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν μέλλουσαν ὀρθῶς βιώσεσθαι ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἀντέχεσθαι, ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ ἀσθενοῦντα ἰατροῦ ἤ τινος κυβερνήτου τὸν ἀσφαλῶς
147aμέλλοντα πλεῖν. ἄνευ γὰρ ταύτης, ὅσῳπερ ἂν λαμπρότερον ἐπουρίσῃ τὸ τῆς τύχης ἢ περὶ χρημάτων κτῆσιν ἢ σώματος ῥώμην ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, τοσούτῳ μείζω ἁμαρτήματα ἀπʼ αὐτῶν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνεσθαι. ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν καλουμένην πολυμαθίαν τε καὶ πολυτεχνίαν κεκτημένος, ὀρφανὸς δὲ ὢν ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἑκάστης τῶν ἄλλων, ἆρʼ οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι δικαίως πολλῷ χειμῶνι χρήσεται, ἅτε οἶμαι ἄνευ κυβερνήτου
147bδιατελῶν ἐν πελάγει, χρόνον οὐ μακρὸν βίου θέων; ὥστε συμβαίνειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὃ λέγει κατηγορῶν πού τινος, ὡς ἄρα πολλὰ μὲν ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακῶς δέ, φησίν, ἠπίστατο πάντα.
147bΑΛ. καὶ τί δή ποτε συμβαίνει τὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν δοκεῖ πρὸς λόγον εἰρηκέναι.
147bΣΩ. καὶ μάλα γε πρὸς λόγον· ἀλλʼ αἰνίττεται, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ οὗτος καὶ ἇλλοι δὲ ποιηταὶ σχεδόν τι πάντες. ἔστιν τε γὰρ φύσει ποιητικὴ ἡ σύμπασα αἰνιγματώδης καὶ
147cοὐ τοῦ προστυχόντος ἀνδρὸς γνωρίσαι· ἔτι τε πρὸς τῷ φύσει τοιαύτη εἶναι, ὅταν λάβηται ἀνδρὸς φθονεροῦ τε καὶ μὴ βουλομένου ἡμῖν ἐνδείκνυσθαι ἀλλʼ ἀποκρύπτεσθαι ὅτι μάλιστα τὴν αὑτοῦ σοφίαν, ὑπερφυῶς δὴ τὸ χρῆμα ὡς δύσγνωστον φαίνεται, ὅτι ποτὲ νοοῦσιν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν. οὐ γὰρ δήπου Ὅμηρόν γε τὸν θειότατόν τε καὶ σοφώτατον ποιητὴν ἀγνοεῖν δοκεῖς ὡς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν ἐπίστασθαι κακῶς—ἐκεῖνος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λέγων τὸν Μαργίτην πολλὰ
147dμὲν ἐπίστασθαι, κακῶς δέ, φησί, πάντα ἠπίστατο—ἀλλʼ αἰνίττεται οἶμαι παράγων τὸ κακῶς μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἠπίστατο ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι· γίγνεται οὖν συντεθὲν ἔξω μὲν τοῦ μέτρου, ἔστι δʼ ὅ γε βούλεται, ὡς πολλὰ μὲν ἠπίστατο ἔργα, κακὸν δʼ ἦν ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῷ πάντα ταῦτα. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι εἴπερ ἦν αὐτῷ κακὸν τὸ πολλὰ εἰδέναι, φαῦλός τις ὢν ἐτύγχανεν, εἴπερ γε πιστεύειν δεῖ τοῖς προειρημένοις λόγοις.
147eΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἦ χαλεπῶς γʼ ἂν ἄλλοις τισὶ πιστεύσαιμι λόγοις, εἴπερ μηδὲ τούτοις.
147eΣΩ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ σοι δοκεῖ.
147eΑΛ. πάλιν αὖ μοι δοκεῖ.
Section 147
146eSoc. Hence the state or soul that is to live aright must hold fast to this knowledge, exactly as a sick man does to a doctor, or as he who would voyage safely does to a pilot. For without this,
147athe more briskly it is wafted by fortune either to the acquisition of wealth or to bodily strength or aught else of the sort, the greater will be the mistakes in which these things, it would seem, must needs involve it. And he who has acquired the so-called mastery of learning and arts, but is destitute of this knowledge and impelled by this or that one among those others, is sure to meet with much rough weather, as he truly deserves; since, I imagine, he must continue without a pilot on the high seas, and has only the brief span of his life in which to run his course.
147bSo that his case aptly fits the saying of the poet, in which he complains of somebody or other that Full many crafts he knew: but stillHe knew them all so very ill.
147bAlc. Why, how on earth is the poet’s saying apposite, Socrates? For to my mind it has nothing to do with the point.
147bSoc. It is very much to the point: but he, good sir, like almost every other poet, speaks in riddles. For poetry as a whole is by nature
147cinclined to riddling, and it is not every man who can apprehend it. And furthermore, besides having this natural tendency, when it gets hold of a grudging person who wishes not to show forth to us his own wisdom but to conceal it as much as possible, we find it an extraordinarily difficult matter to make out whatever this or that one of them may mean. For surely you do not suppose that Homer, divinest and wisest of poets, did not know it was impossible to know ill; for it is he who says of Margites that he knew many things,
147dbut knew them all ill: but it is a riddle, I think, in which he has made ill stand for evil, and knew for to know. So if we put it together, letting the meter go, indeed, but grasping his meaning, we get this: Full many crafts he knew, but it was evil for him to know them all. Then clearly, if it was evil for him to know many things, he was in fact a paltry fellow, assuming we are to believe what we have previously argued.
147dAlc. But I think we may, Socrates: at least, if I cannot believe those arguments of ours, I shall find it hard to trust any others.
147dSoc. And you are right in so thinking.
147dAlc. I repeat that I think so.
Section 148
147eΣΩ. ἀλλὰ φέρε πρὸς Διός—ὁρᾷς γὰρ δήπου τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅση τε καὶ οἵα, ταύτης δὲ καὶ σύ μοι δοκεῖς κεκοινωνηκέναι· μεταβαλλόμενός γέ τοι ἄνω καὶ κάτω οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν παύῃ, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἂν μάλιστά σοι δόξῃ, τοῦτο καὶ ἐκδεδυκέναι αὖ
148aκαὶ οὐκέτι ὡσαύτως δοκεῖν—εἰ οὖν σοί γʼ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐμφανὴς γενόμενος ὁ θεὸς πρὸς ὃν τυγχάνεις πορευόμενος ἐρωτήσειε, πρὶν ὁτιοῦν εὔξασθαί σε, εἰ ἐξαρκέσει σοι ἐκείνων τι γενέσθαι ὧνπερ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ἐλέγετο, εἴτε καὶ αὐτῷ σοι ἐπιτρέψειεν εὔξασθαι, τί ποτʼ ἂν οἴει ἢ τῶν παρʼ ἐκείνου διδομένων λαμβάνων ἢ αὐτὸς εὐξάμενος γενέσθαι τοῦ καιροῦ τυχεῖν;
148aΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐθὲν ἂν ἔχοιμί σοι εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτως· ἀλλὰ μάργον τί μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι,
148bκαὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολλῆς φυλακῆς, ὅπως μὴ λήσει τις αὑτὸν εὐχόμενος μὲν κακά, δοκῶν δὲ τἀγαθά, ἔπειτʼ ὀλίγον ἐπισχών, ὅπερ καὶ σὺ ἔλεγες, παλινῳδῇ, ἀνευχόμενος ἅττʼ ἂν τὸ πρῶτον εὔξηται.
148bΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐχὶ εἰδώς τι πλέον ἡμῶν ὁ ποιητής, οὗ καὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου ἐπεμνήσθην, τὰ δειλὰ καὶ εὐχομένοις ἀπαλέξειν ἐκέλευεν;
148bΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
148bΣΩ. τοῦτον μὲν τοίνυν, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι
148cτὸν ποιητὴν ἐζηλωκότες, εἴτε καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτως ἐπεσκεμμένοι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ ἑκάστοτε παραπλησίαν εὐχὴν εὔχονται, τὰ καλὰ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τοὺς θεοὺς διδόναι κελεύοντες αὖ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς· πλείω δʼ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐκείνων εὐξαμένων ἀκούσειεν. τοιγαροῦν εἰς τὸ παρῆκον τοῦ χρόνου οὐδένων ἧττον εὐτυχεῖς εἰσιν ἄνθρωποι· εἰ δʼ ἄρα καὶ συμβέβηκεν αὐτοῖς ὥστε μὴ πάντα εὐτυχεῖν, ἀλλʼ οὖν οὐ διὰ
148dτὴν ἐκείνων εὐχήν, ἐπὶ τοῖς θεοῖς δʼ ἐστὶν ὥστε οἶμαι καὶ διδόναι ἅττʼ ἄν τις εὐχόμενος τυγχάνῃ καὶ τἀναντία τούτων. βούλομαι δέ σοι καὶ ἕτερόν τι διηγήσασθαι, ὅ ποτε ἤκουσα τινῶν, ὡς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Λακεδαιμονίοις διαφορᾶς γενομένης συνέβαινεν ἀεὶ τῇ πόλει ἡμῶν ὥστε καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν ὁπότε μάχη γένοιτο δυστυχεῖν καὶ μηδέποτε δύνασθαι κρατῆσαι· τοὺς οὖν Ἀθηναίους ἀγανακτοῦντας τῷ πράγματι καὶ ἀπορουμένους τίνι
148eχρὴ μηχανῇ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀποτροπὴν εὑρεῖν, βουλευομένοις αὐτοῖς δοκεῖν κράτιστον εἶναι πέμψαντας πρὸς Ἄμμωνα ἐκεῖνον ἐπερωτᾶν· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις τάδε, ἀνθʼ ὅτου ποτὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις οἱ θεοὶ μᾶλλον νίκην διδόασιν ἢ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς, οἳ πλείστας, φάναι, μὲν θυσίας καὶ καλλίστας τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἄγομεν, ἀναθήμασί τε κεκοσμήκαμεν τὰ ἱερὰ αὐτῶν ὡς οὐδένες ἄλλοι, πομπάς τε πολυτελεστάτας καὶ σεμνοτάτας ἐδωρούμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς ἀνʼ ἕκαστον ἔτος, καὶ
149aἐτελοῦμεν χρήματα ὅσα οὐδʼ ἇλλοι σύμπαντες Ἕλληνες·
Section 148
147dSoc. But come now, in Heaven’s name—for I suppose you see how great and strange is our perplexity, in which you, as it seems to me, have your share; for you change about from this side to that without settling down for a moment, but as soon as you are firmly convinced of a thing you seem to slip out of it again and
148acease to hold the same view—well, if the god to whom you are going should even now appear to you and ask before you uttered any prayer, whether you would be content to obtain one of those things which were mentioned at the beginning, or whether he should leave you to pray as you were, how do you suppose you would make the best of your chance—by accepting his offer, or by praying for something on your own account?
148aAlc. Well, by the gods, I could not answer your question, Socrates, offhand. Why, I take it to be a fatuous request,
148bwhen it is really a case for great caution lest one pray unawares for what is evil while thinking it to be one’s good, and then after a little while, as you were saying, one change one’s tune and retract all one’s former prayers.
148bSoc. And did not the poet whom I quoted at the beginning of our discussion know more than we, when he bade us pray for the averting of what is grievous, even though we pray for it?
148bAlc. I think so.
148bSoc. Then it is their admiration of this poet, Alcibiades,
148cor perhaps the result of their own study, that causes the Spartans to offer a similar prayer whether the occasion be private or public—that the gods will give them for their own benefit the beautiful as well as the good: more than this no one can ever hear them pray for. The consequence is that to the present time they have been just as fortunate as any other people; and if it has befallen them to be not invariably fortunate, it was anyhow not owing to their prayer.
148dIt rests with the gods, I conceive, to give us either what we may pray for or the reverse. And I would like to give you an account of something else, which I once heard from some of my seniors. A quarrel having arisen between the Athenians and the Spartans, it befell our city to be always unsuccessful in every battle by land and sea, and she could never win a victory. So the Athenians, in their annoyance at this result, and at a loss for some means of finding a deliverance from the trouble they were in,
148etook counsel together and decided that the best thing they could do was to send and inquire of Ammon ; and moreover, to ask also for what reason the gods granted victory to the Spartans rather than to themselves: for we—such was the message—offer up to them more and finer sacrifices than any of the Greeks, and have adorned their temples with votive emblems as no other people have done, and presented to the gods the costliest and stateliest processions year by year, and spent more money thus than
149aall the rest of the Greeks together.
Section 149
149aΣΩ. Λακεδαιμονίοις δέ, φάναι, οὐδεπώποτʼ ἐμέλησεν οὐδὲν τούτων, ἀλλʼ οὕτως ὀλιγώρως διάκεινται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς, ὥστε καὶ ἀνάπηρα θύουσιν ἑκάστοτε καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὐκ ὀλίγῳ ἐνδεεστέρως τιμῶσιν ἤπερ ἡμεῖς, χρήματα οὐδὲν ἐλάττω κεκτημένοι τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως. ἐπεὶ δὴ εἰρηκέναι ταῦτα καὶ ἐπερωτῆσαι τί χρὴ πράττοντας αὐτοὺς τῶν παρόντων κακῶν ἀπαλλαγὴν εὑρεῖν, ἄλλο μὲν οὐθὲν ἀποκριθῆναι τὸν
149bπροφήτην—τὸν γὰρ θεὸν οὐκ ἐᾶν δῆλον ὅτι—καλέσαντα δὲ αὐτόν, Ἀθηναίοις, φάναι, τάδε λέγει Ἄμμων· φησὶν ἂν βούλεσθαι αὑτῷ τὴν Λακεδαιμονίων εὐφημίαν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σύμπαντα τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἱερά. τοσαῦτα εἰπεῖν, οὐκέτι περαιτέρω. τήν γʼ οὖν εὐφημίαν οὐκ ἄλλην τινά μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν ὁ θεὸς ἢ τὴν εὐχὴν αὐτῶν· ἔστι γὰρ τῷ ὄντι πολὺ
149cδιαφέρουσα τῶν ἄλλων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες οἱ μὲν χρυσόκερως βοῦς παραστησάμενοι, ἕτεροι δʼ ἀναθήμασι δωρούμενοι τοὺς θεούς, εὔχονται ἅττʼ ἂν τύχῃ ταῦτα, ἄντε ἀγαθὰ ἄντε κακά· βλασφημούντων οὖν αὐτῶν ἀκούοντες οἱ θεοὶ οὐκ ἀποδέχονται τὰς πολυτελεῖς ταυτασὶ πομπάς τε καὶ θυσίας. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μοι πολλῆς φυλακῆς δεῖσθαι καὶ σκέψεως ὅτι ποτὲ ῥητέον ἐστὶ καὶ μή.εὑρήσεις δὲ καὶ παρʼ Ὁμήρῳ ἕτερα παραπλήσια τούτοις
149dεἰρημένα. φησὶν γὰρ τοὺς Τρῶας ἔπαυλιν ποιουμένους ἔρδειν ἀθανάτοισι τεληέσσας ἑκατόμβας· τὴν δὲ κνῖσαν ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου τοὺς ἀνέμους φέρειν οὐρανὸν εἴσω ἡδεῖαν· τῆς δʼ οὔ τι θεοὺς μάκαρας δατέεσθαι, οὐδʼ ἐθέλειν· μάλα γάρ σφιν ἀπήχθετο Ἴλιος ἱρὴ
149eκαὶ Πρίαμος καὶ λαὸς ἐυμμελίω Πριάμοιο· ὥστε οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς ἦν προύργου θύειν τε καὶ δῶρα τελεῖν μάτην, θεοῖς ἀπηχθημένους. οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ τῶν θεῶν ὥστε ὑπὸ δώρων παράγεσθαι οἷον κακὸν τοκιστήν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμεῖς εὐήθη λόγον λέγομεν, ἀξιοῦντες Λακεδαιμονίων ταύτῃ περιεῖναι. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δεινὸν εἴη εἰ πρὸς τὰ δῶρα καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἀποβλέπουσιν ἡμῶν οἱ θεοὶ ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν, ἄν τις ὅσιος καὶ δίκαιος ὢν
150aτυγχάνῃ.
Section 149
149aSoc. But the Spartans have never taken any such pains, and indeed are so neglectful in their behavior to the gods, that they make a practice of sacrificing defective victims, and generally are very much behind us in the honors that they pay, though the wealth they possess is quite equal to that of our city. When they had so spoken, and added the question, what they should do in order to find a deliverance from the trouble they were in,
149bthe prophet’s only answer — evidently it was all that the god allowed—was to call them to him and say: Thus saith Ammon to the Athenians: I would rather have the reverent reserve of the Spartans than all the ritual of the Greeks. So much he said, and not a word further. Now by reverent reserve I suppose the god could only mean their prayer, since in fact it differs greatly from those that are generally offered.
149cFor the Greeks in general either lead up bulls with gilded horns, or else present the gods with votive emblems, and pray for any odd thing, whether it be good or bad: so when the gods hear their irreverent speech they reject all these costly processions and sacrifices. Whereas I think we ought to be very cautious, and fully consider what is to be said and what is not. And in Homer too you will find other tales of a similar sort. For he relates how the Trojans,
149din making their bivouac, Sacrificed to the immortals perfect hecatombs, and how the winds bore the sweet savour from the plain into heaven: But the blessed gods partook not of it, nor would have it, For deep was their hate against holy Ilium,
149eAnd Priam, and the folk of Priam of the good ashen spear. So it was nothing to their purpose to sacrifice and pay tribute of gifts in vain, when they were hated by the gods. For it is not, I imagine, the way of the gods to be seduced with gifts, like a base insurer. And indeed it is but silly talk of ours, if we claim to surpass the Spartans on this score. For it would be a strange thing if the gods had regard to our gifts and sacrifices instead of our souls, and the piety and
150ajustice that may be found in any of us.
Section 150
150aΣΩ. πολλῷ γε μᾶλλον οἶμαι ἢ πρὸς τὰς πολυτελεῖς ταύτας πομπάς τε καὶ θυσίας, ἃς οὐδὲν κωλύει πολλὰ μὲν εἰς θεούς, πολλὰ δʼ εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἡμαρτηκότας καὶ ἰδιώτην καὶ πόλιν ἔχειν ἀνʼ ἕκαστον ἔτος τελεῖν· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐ δωροδόκοι ὄντες, καταφρονοῦσιν ἁπάντων τούτων, ὥς φησιν ὁ θεὸς καὶ θεῶν προφήτης. κινδυνεύει γοῦν καὶ παρὰ θεοῖς καὶ παρʼ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσι δικαιοσύνη τε
150bκαὶ φρόνησις διαφερόντως τετιμῆσθαι· φρόνιμοι δὲ καὶ δίκαιοι οὐκ ἄλλοι τινές εἰσιν τῶν εἰδότων ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν καὶ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους. βουλοίμην δʼ ἂν καὶ σοῦ πυθέσθαι ὅτι ποτʼ ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα.
150bΑΛ. ἀλλʼ ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄλλῃ πῃ δοκεῖ ἢ ᾗπερ σοί τε καὶ τῷ θεῷ· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν εἰκὸς εἴη ἀντίψηφον ἐμὲ τῷ θεῷ γενέσθαι.
150bΣΩ. οὐκοῦν μέμνησαι ἐν πολλῇ ἀπορίᾳ φάσκων εἶναι,
150cὅπως μὴ λάθῃς σεαυτὸν εὐχόμενος κακά, δοκῶν δὲ ἀγαθά;
150cΑΛ. ἔγωγε.
150cΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς οὐκ ἀσφαλές σοί ἐστιν ἐλθεῖν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐξομένῳ, ἵνα μηδʼ ἂν οὕτω τύχῃ, βλασφημοῦντός σου ἀκούων οὐθὲν ἀποδέξηται τῆς θυσίας ταύτης, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ ἕτερόν τι προσαπολαύσῃς. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ βέλτιστον εἶναι ἡσυχίαν ἔχειν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων εὐχῇ διὰ τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν—τοῦτο γὰρ κάλλιστον τῶν ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ γε ὀνομάτων—οὐκ ἂν οἶμαί σε ἐθέλειν χρῆσθαι.
150dἀναγκαῖον οὖν ἐστι περιμένειν ἕως ἄν τις μάθῃ ὡς δεῖ πρὸς θεοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους διακεῖσθαι.
150dΑΛ. πότε οὖν παρέσται ὁ χρόνος οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τίς ὁ παιδεύσων; ἥδιστα γὰρ ἄν μοι δοκῶ ἰδεῖν τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον τίς ἐστιν.
150dΣΩ. οὗτος ᾧ μέλει περὶ σοῦ. ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μοι, ὥσπερ τῷ Διομήδει φησὶν τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν Ὅμηρος ἀπὸ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ἀφελεῖν τὴν ἀχλύν, ὄφρʼ εὖ γιγνώσκοι ἠμὲν θεὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἄνδρα,
150eοὕτω καὶ σοὶ δεῖν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πρῶτον τὴν ἀχλὺν ἀφελόντα, ἣ νῦν παροῦσα τυγχάνει, τὸ τηνικαῦτʼ ἤδη προσφέρειν διʼ ὧν μέλλεις γνώσεσθαι ἠμὲν κακὸν ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκεῖς δυνηθῆναι.
150eΑΛ. ἀφαιρείτω, εἴτε βούλεται τὴν ἀχλὺν εἴτε ἄλλο τι· ὡς ἐγὼ παρεσκεύασμαι μηθὲν ἂν φυγεῖν τῶν ὑπʼ ἐκείνου προσταττομένων, ὅστις ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἅνθρωπος, εἴ γε μέλλοιμι βελτίων γενέσθαι.
Section 150
150aSoc. Far rather at these, I believe, do they look than at those costly processions and sacrifices which are offered, it well may be, by individual and state, year in, year out, though they may have offended greatly against the gods, or as greatly against their neighbors. But the gods are not to be won by bribes, and so they despise all these things, as Ammon and the holy prophet say. Certainly it would seem that justice and wisdom are held in especial honor both by the gods and by men of intelligence;
150band wise and just are they alone who know what acts and words to use towards gods and men. But I should like now to hear what may be your opinion on the subject.
150bAlc. Why, Socrates, it in no wise differs from yours and the god’s; for indeed it would not be fitting for me to record my vote against the god.
150bSoc. And you remember you professed to be in great perplexity lest you should pray unawares for evil,
150cwhile supposing it to be good?
150cAlc. I do.
150cSoc. You see, then, how unsafe it is for you to approach the god with your prayers, for it may chance that when he hears your irreverent speech he will reject your sacrifice altogether, and you may perhaps be accorded some other bad thing as well. In my opinion, therefore, it is best to hold your peace: for I expect you will not consent to use the Spartan’s prayer, you have such a romantic spirit—to give it the fairest of folly’s names.
150dIt is necessary, therefore, to bide one’s time until one can learn how one should behave towards gods and men.
150dAlc. Well, when will that time arrive, Socrates, and who is to be my instructor? For I feel I should very much like to see who the man is,
150dSoc. It is he who is concerned about you. But I think, as Homer relates how Athena removed the mist from the eyes of Diomede,That be might well discern both god and man,
150eso you too must first have the mist removed which now enwraps your soul, and then you will be ready to receive the means whereby you will discern both evil and good. For at present I do not think you could do so.
150eAlc. Let him remove the mist or whatever else he likes to call it: for I am prepared to obey every one of his commands, without shirking, whoever the man may be, so long as I am to be the better for them.
Section 151
151aΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν κἀκεῖνος θαυμαστὴν ὅσην περὶ σὲ προθυμίαν ἔχει.
151aΑΛ. εἰς τότε τοίνυν καὶ τὴν θυσίαν ἀναβάλλεσθαι κράτιστον εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ.
151aΣΩ. καὶ ὀρθῶς γέ σοι δοκεῖ· ἀσφαλέστερον γάρ ἐστιν ἢ παρακινδυνεύειν τοσοῦτον κίνδυνον.
151aΑΛ. ἀλλὰ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ μὴν τουτονὶ τὸν στέφανον, ἐπειδή μοι δοκεῖς καλῶς συμβεβουλευκέναι, σοὶ
151bπεριθήσω· τοῖς θεοῖς δὲ καὶ στεφάνους καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ νομιζόμενα τότε δώσομεν, ὅταν ἐκείνην τὴν ἡμέραν ἐλθοῦσαν ἴδω. ἥξει δʼ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ τούτων θελόντων.
151bΣΩ. ἀλλὰ δέχομαι καὶ τοῦτο, καὶ ἄλλο δὲ ἄν τι τῶν παρὰ σοῦ δοθέντων ἡδέως ἴδοιμι δεξάμενον ἐμαυτόν. ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ὁ Κρέων Εὐριπίδῃ πεποίηται τὸν Τειρεσίαν ἰδὼν ἔχοντα τὰ στέφη καὶ ἀκούσας ἀπὸ τῶν πολεμίων ἀπαρχὰς αὐτὸν εἰληφέναι διὰ τὴν τέχνην, οἰωνὸν ἐθέμην, φησί, καλλίνικα σὰ στέφη· ἐν γὰρ κλύδωνι κείμεθʼ, ὥσπερ οἶσθα σύ· οὕτω δὲ κἀγὼ παρὰ σοῦ τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οἰωνὸν τίθεμαι.
151cδοκῶ δέ μοι οὐκ ἐν ἐλάττονι κλύδωνι τοῦ Κρέοντος εἶναι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν καλλίνικος γενέσθαι τῶν σῶν ἐραστῶν.
Section 151
150eSoc. I tell you, he on his part is prodigiously anxious to help you.
150eAlc. Then I think it best to defer the sacrifice also till the time comes.
150eSoc. And you are quite right: for that is safer than running so serious a risk.
150eAlc. But how say you, Socrates? Look now, I will crown you with this garland, as I consider you have given me such good advice; and to the gods
151bwe shall offer both garlands and all the other customary things when I see that day has come. And come it will ere long, if they are willing.
151bSoc. Well, I accept this gift; and anything else besides, that you may give me, I shall be only too happy to accept. And as Euripides has made Creon say when he sees Teiresias wearing his wreaths, and hears that he has obtained them, on account of his art, as first-fruits of the spoils of war: As omen good I take thy victor’s wreaths;For in the waves we labour, as you know,—
151cso do I take this opinion of yours as a good omen. For I consider I am no less wave-tossed than Creon, and would like to come off victorious over your lovers.