Contents — 8 sections
Section 132
I entered the grammar school of the teacher Dionysius, and saw there the young men who are accounted the most comely in form and of distinguished family, and their lovers. Now it chanced that two of the young people were disputing, but about what, I did not clearly overhear: it appeared, however, that they were disputing either about Anaxagoras or about Oenopides; at any rate, they appeared to be drawing circles,
132band they were imitating certain inclinations with their arms, bending to it and taking it most earnestly. Then I—for I was sitting beside the lover of one of the pair—nudged him with my elbow and asked him what on earth the two youngsters were so earnest about, and I said: Is it then something great and fine, in which they are so earnestly immersed?
132bGreat and fine, indeed! he replied: why, these fellows are prating about the heavenly bodies, and babbling philosophy.
132cThen I, surprised at his answer, said: Young man, do you consider philosophizing to be shameful? Else, why do you speak so sharply?
132cThen the other youth—for he chanced to be sitting near him, as his rival in love—when he heard my question and his rival’s answer, said: You do yourself no good, Socrates, by pressing this fellow with a further question, as to whether he considers philosophizing to be shameful. Do you not know that he has spent the whole of his life in practising the neckhold, and stuffing himself, and sleeping? So why did you suppose he would make any other reply than that philosophy is shameful?
132dNow this one of the two lovers had spent his time on humane studies, whereas the other, whom he was abusing, had spent his on athletics. So I decided that I had best relinquish the other, whom I had been questioning, since he did not even himself set up to be experienced in words, but only in deeds; and that I should interrogate the one who set up to be wiser, in order that so far as I was able I might get some benefit from him. I said therefore: I addressed my question to both in common; but if you think you could answer more creditably than he, I put the same question to you as I did to him: do you consider philosophizing to be honorable or not?
Section 133
132dThen the two striplings, overhearing us speak somewhat like this, were silent, and ceasing from their own contention they became listeners to ours. What their lovers’ sensations were, I do not know, but I myself, at any rate, was staggered; for every time I am staggered by handsome young people. It seemed to me, however, that my young friend too was in as great a flutter as myself; but nevertheless he answered me in a most ambitious spirit: Why, of course, Socrates, he said, if I should ever consider philosophizing to be shameful, I should not account myself so much as a man,
133bnor anyone else either who was disposed to think so. Here he pointed to his rival lover, and spoke with a loud voice, in order that his favorite might hear every word.
133bThen I remarked: So philosophizing seems to you to be honorable?
133bQuite so, he said.
133bWell now, I said; does it seem to you possible to know whether anything is honorable or shameful without knowing what it is fundamentally?
133bNo, he said.
133cThen do you know, I went on, what philosophizing is?
133cCertainly I do, said he.
133cThen what is it? I asked.
133cWhy, just what Solon called it; you know it was Solon who said:And ever, as I older grow, I learn yet more and more;—and I agree with him that a man who intends to philosophize should in this way be ever learning something or other, whether he be younger or older, in order that he may learn as many things as possible in his life. Now at first I felt there was something in his reply, but then, on second thoughts, I asked him whether he considered philosophy to be much learning.
133dTo which he answered: Certainly.
133dAnd do you consider philosophy to be merely honorable, I asked, or good as well?
133dGood as well, he said: very much so.
133dThen do you observe this as peculiar to philosophy, or do you find it similarly in everything else? For example, do you consider the love of athletics to be not merely honorable, but good as well, or do you not?
133dWhereupon he, most slily, gave a double answer: To him my statement must be neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honorable and good:
133efor I consider this the right view.
133eThen I asked him: Well now, in athletics, do you consider that much exercise is love of athletics?
133eTo which he replied: Certainly, just as in philosophizing I consider much learning to be philosophy.
133eThen I said: And do you then consider that the lovers of athletics desire anything else than that which will cause them to be in good bodily condition?
133eOnly that, he replied.
133eAnd does much exercise, I asked, cause them to be in good bodily condition?
Section 134
133eYes, for how, he replied, could one be in good bodily condition through little exercise?
133eHere I felt it was time to stir up the lover of athletics, in order that he might give me the support of his athletic experience; so I proceeded to ask him: And you then, pray, why are you silent, excellent sir, while your friend here is speaking thus? Do you agree that men are in good bodily condition through much exercise, or is it rather through moderate exercise?
133eFor my part, Socrates, he said, I thought even a pig—
134bas the saying is—would have known that moderate exercise causes them to be in good bodily condition, so why should not a fellow who is sleepless and unfed, with unchafed neck and slender, care-worn frame! And when he had said this the boys were delighted and laughed their approval, while the other lover blushed.
134bThen I said to him: Well, do you now concede that it is neither much, nor little, but moderate exercise that causes men to be in good bodily condition? Or do you bid defiance to the two of us on this point?
134cTo which he answered: Against him I should be only too glad to fight it out, and I am certain I should prove able to support the theory I have put forward, even had I put forward a weaker one; for he is naught. But with you I do not aim at winning an unscrupulous success; and so I admit that not a great but a moderate amount of athletics causes good condition in men.
134cAnd what of food? Moderate or much? I asked.
134cThe same applied to food, he admitted.
134dThen I went on and tried to compel him also to admit that everything else connected with the body when most beneficial, was the moderate thing, not the much or the little; and he admitted that it was the moderate thing.
134dAnd now, I said, as regards the soul; are moderate or immoderate things beneficial, as adjuncts of it?
134dModerate things, he replied.
134dAnd are studies among the adjuncts of the soul?
134dHe admitted they were.
134dSo among these also it is the moderate that are beneficial, and not the much?
134dHe agreed.
134dThen whom should we be justified in asking what sort of exercise or food is moderate for the body?
134dThe three of us agreed that it must be a doctor or a trainer.
134eAnd whom should we ask about the moderate measure in the sowing of seed?
134eIn that matter, we agreed, it must be a farmer.
134eAnd whom should we be justified in asking as to the moderate degree and kind, in regard to the sowing and planting of studies in the soul?
Section 135
134eAt this point we all began to be full of perplexity;
135athen I, mocking at them, asked: Do you mind, since we are in perplexity, if we ask these boys here? or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer said the suitors were, and do not think it fit there should be someone else who will string the bow?
135aThen, as it seemed to me that they were losing their zeal for the argument, I tried to pursue the inquiry in another way, and said: But what, as nearly as we can guess, are the kinds of learning which the philosopher should learn, since he is not to learn all things or many things?
135bAt this the wiser one interjected: The finest and most suitable kinds of learning are those which will bring him the most reputation for philosophy; and he will get most reputation if he appears well versed in all the arts, or if not in all, in as many of them, and those the most considerable, as he can, by learning so much of them as befits a free man to learn, that is, what belongs to the understanding rather than the handiwork of each.
135bWell now, do you mean, I asked, in the same way as in carpentry? For there, you know, you can buy a carpenter for five
135cor six minae, but a first-rate architect cannot be got for even ten thousand drachmae; few such, indeed, could be found throughout the whole of Greece. Is it something of this sort that you mean? When he heard me say this, he admitted that something like this was what he himself meant.
135cI next asked him if it was not impossible for the same person to learn in this way merely two of the arts, not to speak of many or the principal ones; to which he replied: Do not conceive me, Socrates,
135dto be stating that the philosopher must have accurate knowledge of each of the arts, like the actual adept in any of them; I mean only so far as may be expected of a free and educated man: that is, he should be able to follow the explanations of the craftsman more readily than the rest of the company, and to contribute an opinion of his own which will make him appear the cleverest and most accomplished of the company who may at any time be present at some verbal or practical exposition of the arts.
135dThen, as I was still unsettled in my mind as to the drift of his words, I asked him: Do I quite grasp the sort of man whom you mean by the philosopher?
135eFor you seem to me to mean someone like the all-round athletes in contest with the runners or the wrestlers: the former yield, you know, to the latter in their particular exercises, and are their inferiors in these, but are superior to the usual sort of athletes and beat them.
Section 136
135eI daresay it may be something of this sort that you would suggest as the effect produced by philosophy on those who make it their pursuit: they yield to those who are first-rate
136ain an understanding of the arts, but in taking the second place they surpass the rest; and in this way the man who has studied philosophy comes just next to the top in everything. That is the kind of person whom you appear to me to indicate.
136aYou are quite right, it seems to me, Socrates, he said, in your conception of the philosopher’s position, with your comparison of him to the all-round athlete. For it is precisely his nature not to be enslaved to any business, or to work out anything exactly, so as to let his application to that one matter make him deficient in the rest,
136bas the craftsmen do, but to have a moderate contact with all of them.
136bWell, after this answer I was eager to know clearly what he meant, so I inquired of him whether he conceived of good men as useful or useless.
136bUseful, I should say, Socrates, he replied.
136bThen if good men are useful, are wicked men useless?
136bHe agreed that they were.
136bAgain, do you consider that philosophers are useful persons or not?
136cHe agreed that they were useful; nay, more, that he considered they were most useful of all.
136cCome now, let us make out, if what you say is true, where these second-best men are also useful to us: for clearly the philosopher is inferior to any particular adept in the arts.
136cHe agreed.
136cWell now, I went on, if you yourself, or one of your friends for whom you feel great concern, should have fallen sick, would you fetch that second-best man into the house with a view to obtaining health, or would you summon a doctor?
136dFor my part, I should have both, he replied.
136dPlease do not say both, I said, but which of the two you would prefer and also summon first.
136dNo one, he replied,would make any question but that the doctor should be preferred and also summoned first.
136dAnd again, if you were in a ship that was making rough weather, to which would you rather entrust yourself and yours, the pilot or the philosopher?
136dI should choose the pilot.
136dAnd so it will be in everything else: so long as there is some craftsman, the philosopher will not be useful?
136dApparently, he replied.
136eSo now we find that the philosopher is a useless person? For I suppose we always have craftsmen; and we have agreed that good men are useful, and bad ones useless.
136eHe was obliged to agree to this.
136eThen what follows? Am I to ask you, or will it be too ill-mannered?
136eAsk whatever you please.
Section 137
136eWell, my aim, I said, is merely to recall our agreements upon
137awhat has been stated. The matter stands somewhat like this. We agreed that philosophy is an honorable thing, and that philosophers are good; and that good men are useful, and wicked men useless: but then again we agreed that philosophers, so long as we have craftsmen, are useless, and that we always do have craftsmen. Has not all this been agreed?
137aYes, to be sure, he replied.
137aThen we agreed, it seems, by your account—if philosophizing means having knowledge of the arts in the way you describe—that philosophers are wicked and useless so long as there are arts
137bamong mankind. But I expect they are not so really, my friend, and that philosophizing is not just having a concernment in the arts or spending one’s life in meddlesome stooping and prying and accumulation of learning, but something else; because I imagined that this life was actually a disgrace, and that people who concerned themselves with the arts were called sordid. But we shall know more definitely whether this statement of mine is true, if you will answer me this: What men know how to punish horses rightly?
137cIs it those who make them into the best horses, or some other men?
137cThose who make them into the best horses.
137cOr again, is it not the men who know how to make dogs into the best dogs that know also how to punish them rightly?
137cYes.
137cThen it is the same art that makes them into the best dogs and punishes them rightly?
137cIt appears so to me, he replied.
137cAgain, is the art that makes them into the best ones and punishes them rightly the same as that which knows the good and the bad ones, or is it some other?
137cThe same, he said.
137cThen in the case of men also will you be prepared to agree that the art
137dwhich makes them into the best men is that which punishes them rightly and distinguishes the good and the bad ones?
137dCertainly, he said.
137dAnd that which does this to one, does it also to many, and that which does it to many, does it also to one?
137dYes.
137dAnd so it is also with horses and everything else?
137dI agree.
137dThen what is the knowledge which rightly punishes the licentious and law-breaking people in our cities? Is it not judicature?
137dYes.
137dAnd is it any other art than this that you call justice?
137dNo, only this.
137eAnd that whereby they punish rightly is that whereby they know the good and bad people?
137eIt is.
137eAnd whoever knows one will know many also?
137eYes.
137eAnd whoever does not know many will not know one?
137eI agree.
137eThen if one were a horse, and did not know the good and wicked horses, would one not know which sort one was oneself?
137eI think not.
137eAnd if one were an ox and did not know the wicked and good oxen, would one not know which sort one was oneself?
137eThat is so, he said.
137eAnd so it would be, if one were a dog?
137eHe agreed.
Section 138
137eWell now, when one is a man, and does not know the good and bad men, one surely cannot know whether one is good or wicked oneself, since one is a man also oneself?
137eHe granted this.
137eAnd is not knowing oneself being temperate, or not being temperate?
137eNot being temperate.
137eSo knowing oneself is being temperate?
137eI agree, he said.
137eSo this is the message, it seems, of the Delphic inscription—that one is to practise temperance and justice.
137eIt seems so.
137eAnd it is by this same art that we know also how to punish rightly?
137eYes.
137eThen that whereby we know how to punish rightly
138bis justice, and that whereby we know how to distinguish our own and others’ quality is temperance?
138bIt seems so, he said.
138bThen justice and temperance are the same thing?
138bApparently.
138bAnd further, it is thus, you know, that cities are well ordered—when the wrongdoers pay the penalty.
138bThat is true, he said.
138bHence this is also statecraft.
138bHe concurred.
138bAgain, when one man governs a city rightly, is he not called a despot and king?
138bI agree.
138bAnd he governs by a kingly and despotic art?
138bThat is so.
138bAnd these arts are the same as the former?
138bApparently.
138cAgain, when a man singly governs a house aright, what is he called? Is he not a house-manager and master?
138cYes.
138cThen would he also govern his house well by justice, or by some other art?
138cBy justice.
138cHence they are all the same, it seems,—king, despot, statesman, house-manager, master, and the temperate man and the just man; and it is all one art,—the kingly, the despotic, the statesman’s, the master’s, the house-manager’s, and justice and temperance.
138cIt is so, apparently, he said.
138dThen, if it is disgraceful in the philosopher to be unable, when a doctor speaks about the sick, either to follow his remarks or to contribute anything of his own to what is being said or done, and to be in the same case when any other of the craftsmen speaks, is it not disgraceful that he should be unable, when it is a judge or a king or some other of the persons whom we have just instanced, either to follow their words or contribute anything to their business?
138dIt must indeed be disgraceful, Socrates, to have nothing to contribute to subjects of such great importance!
138eAre we then to say, I asked, that in these matters also he is to be an all-round athlete, a second-rate man, taking the second place in all the subjects of this art—he, the philosopher—and is to be useless so long as there is one of these persons; or that, first of all, he is to entrust his own house to nobody else and is not to take the second place in it, but is himself to judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well managed?
138eHe granted me that it must be so.
Section 139
138eSecondly, I presume, whether his friends entrust him with an arbitration, or the state charges him to determine
139aor judge any matter, it is disgraceful for him, my good friend, in such cases, to be found in the second or third place, and not to lead?
139aI agree.
139aHence we see, my excellent sir, that philosophizing is very far from being much learning and that affair of busying oneself with the arts.
139aOn my saying this the cultivated youth was silent, feeling ashamed for what he had said before, while the unlearned one said it was as I stated; and the rest of the company praised the argument.
Contents — 8 sections
Section 132
132aεἰς Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ εἰσῆλθον, καὶ εἶδον αὐτόθι τῶν τε νέων τοὺς ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ πατέρων εὐδοκίμων, καὶ τούτων ἐραστάς. ἐτυγχανέτην οὖν δύο τῶν μειρακίων ἐρίζοντε, περὶ ὅτου δέ, οὐ σφόδρα κατήκουον. ἐφαινέσθην μέντοι ἢ περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου
132bἢ περὶ Οἰνοπίδου ἐρίζειν· κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν ἐφαινέσθην καὶ ἐγκλίσεις τινὰς ἐμιμοῦντο τοῖν χεροῖν ἐπικλίνοντε καὶ μάλʼ ἐσπουδακότε. κἀγώ—καθήμην γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἐραστὴν τοῦ ἑτέρου αὐτοῖν—κινήσας οὖν αὐτὸν τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἠρόμην ὅτι ποτὲ οὕτως ἐσπουδακότε τὼ μειρακίω εἴτην, καὶ εἶπον· ἦ που μέγα τι καὶ καλόν ἐστι περὶ ὃ τοσαύτην σπουδὴν πεποιημένω ἐστόν;
132bὁ δʼ εἶπε, ποῖον, ἔφη, μέγα καὶ καλόν; ἀδολεσχοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὗτοί γε περὶ τῶν μετεώρων καὶ φλυαροῦσι φιλοσοφοῦντες.
132cκαὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἶπον· ὦ νεανία, αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν; ἢ τί οὕτως χαλεπῶς λέγεις;
132cκαὶ ὁ ἕτερος—πλησίον γὰρ καθήμενος ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῦ, ἀντεραστὴς ὤν—ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ τε ἐρομένου κἀκείνου ἀποκρινομένου, οὐ πρὸς σοῦ γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ποιεῖς τὸ καὶ ἀνερέσθαι τοῦτον εἰ αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖται φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα τοῦτον ὅτι τραχηλιζόμενος καὶ ἐμπιμπλάμενος καὶ καθεύδων πάντα τὸν βίον διατετέλεκεν; ὥστε σὺ τί αὐτὸν ᾤου ἀποκρινεῖσθαι ἀλλʼ ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρόν ἐστι φιλοσοφία;
132dἦν δὲ οὗτος μὲν τοῖν ἐρασταῖν περὶ μουσικὴν διατετριφώς, ὁ δʼ ἕτερος, ὃν ἐλοιδόρει, περὶ γυμναστικήν. καί μοι ἔδοξε χρῆναι τὸν μὲν ἕτερον ἀφιέναι, τὸν ἐρωτώμενον, ὅτι οὐδʼ αὐτὸς προσεποιεῖτο περὶ λόγων ἔμπειρος εἶναι ἀλλὰ περὶ ἔργων, τὸν δὲ σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον εἶναι διερωτῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ εἴ τι δυναίμην παρʼ αὐτοῦ ὠφεληθείην. εἶπον οὖν ὅτι εἰς κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐρώτημα ἠρόμην· εἰ δὲ σὺ οἴει τοῦδε κάλλιον ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι, σὲ ἐρωτῶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅπερ καὶ τοῦτον, εἰ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καλὸν εἶναι ἢ οὔ.
Section 133
133aσχεδὸν οὖν ταῦτα λεγόντων ἡμῶν ἐπακούσαντε τὼ μειρακίω ἐσιγησάτην, καὶ αὐτὼ παυσαμένω τῆς ἔριδος ἡμῶν ἀκροαταὶ ἐγενέσθην. καὶ ὅτι μὲν οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἔπαθον οὐκ οἶδα, αὐτὸς δʼ οὖν ἐξεπλάγην· ἀεὶ γάρ ποτε ὑπὸ τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν ἐκπλήττομαι. ἐδόκει μέντοι μοι καὶ ὁ ἕτερος οὐχ ἧττον ἐμοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἀπεκρίνατό γέ μοι καὶ μάλα φιλοτίμως. ὁπότε γάρ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
133bτὸ φιλοσοφεῖν αἰσχρὸν ἡγησαίμην εἶναι, οὐδʼ ἂν ἄνθρωπον νομίσαιμι ἐμαυτὸν εἶναι, οὐδʼ ἄλλον τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενος εἰς τὸν ἀντεραστήν, καὶ λέγων μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ, ἵνʼ αὐτοῦ κατακούοι τὰ παιδικά.
133bκαὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, καλὸν ἄρα δοκεῖ σοι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν;
133bπάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
133bτί οὖν, ἐγὼ ἔφην· ἦ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τʼ εἶναι εἰδέναι πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ εἰδείη τις τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅτι ἔστιν;
133bοὐκ ἔφη.
133cοἶσθʼ ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔστιν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν;
133cπάνυ γε, ἔφη.
133cτί οὖν ἔστιν; ἔφην ἐγώ.
133cτί δʼ ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ τὸ Σόλωνος; Σόλων γάρ που εἶπε—γηράσκω δʼ αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος·καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως ἀεὶ χρῆναι ἕν γέ τι μανθάνειν τὸν μέλλοντα φιλοσοφήσειν, καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ πρεσβύτερον, ἵνʼ ὡς πλεῖστα ἐν τῷ βίῳ μάθῃ. καί μοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔδοξε τὶ εἰπεῖν, ἔπειτά πως ἐννοήσας ἠρόμην αὐτὸν εἰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολυμαθίαν ἡγοῖτο.
133dκἀκεῖνος, πάνυ, ἔφη.
133dἡγῇ δὲ δὴ καλὸν εἶναι μόνον τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἢ καὶ ἀγαθόν; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
133dκαὶ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, πάνυ.
133dπότερον οὖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τι τοῦτο ἴδιον ἐνορᾷς, ἢ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἷον φιλογυμναστίαν οὐ μόνον ἡγῇ καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὔ;
133dὁ δὲ καὶ μάλα εἰρωνικῶς εἶπε δύο· πρὸς μὲν τόνδε μοι εἰρήσθω ὅτι οὐδέτερα· πρὸς μέντοι σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
133eὁμολογῶ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ ὀρθῶς.
133eἠρώτησα οὖν ἐγώ, ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις τὴν πολυπονίαν φιλογυμναστίαν ἡγῇ εἶναι;
133eκἀκεῖνος ἔφη, πάνυ γε, ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν τὴν πολυμαθίαν φιλοσοφίαν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι.
133eκἀγὼ εἶπον, ἡγῇ δὲ δὴ τοὺς φιλογυμναστοῦντας ἄλλου του ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ τούτου, ὅτι ποιήσει αὐτοὺς εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα;
133eτούτου, ἔφη.
133eἦ οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι τὸ σῶμα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ποιοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν;
Section 134
134aπῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀπό γε ὀλίγων πόνων τὸ σῶμά τις εὖ ἔχοι;
134aκαί μοι ἔδοξεν ἤδη ἐνταῦθα κινητέος εἶναι ὁ φιλογυμναστής, ἵνα μοι βοηθήσῃ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς γυμναστικῆς· κἄπειτα ἠρόμην αὐτόν, σὺ δὲ δὴ τί σιγᾷς ἡμῖν, ὦ λῷστε, τούτου ταῦτα λέγοντος; ἢ καὶ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εὖ τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν πόνων, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων;
134aἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ᾤμην τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο κἂν ὗν γνῶναι ὅτι οἱ μέτριοι πόνοι εὖ ποιοῦσιν ἔχειν τὰ
134bσώματα, πόθεν δὴ οὐχὶ ἄνδρα γε ἄγρυπνόν τε καὶ ἄσιτον καὶ ἀτριβῆ τὸν τράχηλον ἔχοντα καὶ λεπτὸν ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν; καὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα εἰπόντος ἥσθη τὰ μειράκια καὶ ἐπεγέλασεν, ὁ δʼ ἕτερος ἠρυθρίασε.
134bκαὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί οὖν; σὺ ἤδη συγχωρεῖς μήτε πολλοὺς μήτε ὀλίγους πόνους εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν τὰ σώματα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετρίους; ἢ διαμάχῃ δυοῖν ὄντοιν νῷν περὶ τοῦ λόγου;
134cκἀκεῖνος, πρὸς μὲν τοῦτον, ἔφη, κἂν πάνυ ἡδέως διαγωνισαίμην, καὶ εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι ἱκανὸς ἂν γενοίμην βοηθῆσαι τῇ ὑποθέσει ἣν ὑπεθέμην, καὶ εἰ ταύτης ἔτι φαυλοτέραν ὑπεθέμην—οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι—πρὸς μέντοι σὲ οὐδὲν δέομαι παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν, ἀλλʼ ὁμολογῶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλὰ τὰ μέτρια γυμνάσια τὴν εὐεξίαν ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.
134cτί δὲ τὰ σιτία; τὰ μέτρια ἢ τὰ πολλά; ἔφην ἐγώ.
134cκαὶ τὰ σιτία ὡμολόγει.
134dἔτι δὲ κἀγὼ προσηνάγκαζον αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὠφελιμώτατα εἶναι τὰ μέτρια ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ μηδὲ τὰ ὀλίγα· καί μοι ὡμολόγει τὰ μέτρια.
134dτί δʼ, ἔφην, τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν; τὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ ἢ τὰ ἄμετρα τῶν προσφερομένων;
134dτὰ μέτρια, ἔφη.
134dοὐκοῦν ἓν τῶν προσφερομένων ψυχῇ ἐστι καὶ τὰ μαθήματα;
134dὡμολόγει.
134dκαὶ τούτων ἄρα τὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ πολλά;
134dσυνέφη.
134eτίνα οὖν ἐρόμενοι ἂν δικαίως ἐροίμεθα ὁποῖοι μέτριοι πόνοι καὶ σιτία πρὸς τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν;
134eὡμολογοῦμεν μὲν τρεῖς ὄντες, ὅτι ἰατρὸν ἢ παιδοτρίβην.
134eτίνα δʼ ἂν περὶ σπερμάτων σπορᾶς ὁπόσον μέτριον;
134eκαὶ τούτου τὸν γεωργὸν ὡμολογοῦμεν.
134eτίνα δὲ περὶ μαθημάτων εἰς ψυχὴν φυτεύσεώς τε καὶ σπορᾶς ἐρωτῶντες δικαίως ἂν ἐροίμεθα ὁπόσα καὶ ὁποῖα μέτρια;
Section 135
135aτοὐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες· κἀγὼ προσπαίζων αὐτοὺς ἠρόμην, βούλεσθε, ἔφην, ἐπειδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐσμέν, ἐρώμεθα ταυτὶ τὰ μειράκια; ἢ ἴσως αἰσχυνόμεθα, ὥσπερ ἔφη τοὺς μνηστῆρας Ὅμηρος, μὴ ἀξιούντων εἶναί τινα ἄλλον ὅστις ἐντενεῖ τὸ τόξον;
135aἐπειδὴ οὖν μοι ἐδόκουν ἀθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν, καὶ εἶπον, ποῖα δὲ μάλιστα ἄττα τοπάζομεν εἶναι τῶν μαθημάτων ἃ δεῖ τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ οὐχὶ πάντα οὐδὲ πολλά;
135bὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ σοφώτερος εἶπεν ὅτι κάλλιστα ταῦτʼ εἴη τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ προσήκοντα ἀφʼ ὧν ἂν πλείστην δόξαν ἔχοι τις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν· πλείστην δʼ ἂν ἔχοι δόξαν, εἰ δοκοίη τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος εἶναι πασῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς πλείστων γε καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀξιολόγων, μαθὼν αὐτῶν ταῦτα ἃ προσήκει τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μαθεῖν, ὅσα συνέσεως ἔχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας.
135bἆρʼ οὖν οὕτω λέγεις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τεκτονικῇ;
135cκαὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τέκτονα μὲν ἂν πρίαιο πέντε ἢ ἓξ μνῶν, ἄκρον ἀρχιτέκτονα δὲ οὐδʼ ἂν μυρίων δραχμῶν· ὀλίγοι γε μὴν κἂν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι γίγνοιντο. ἆρα μή τι τοιοῦτον λέγεις; καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας μου συνεχώρει καὶ αὐτὸς λέγειν τοιοῦτον.
135cἠρόμην δʼ αὐτὸν εἰ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἴη δύο μόνας τέχνας οὕτω μαθεῖν τὸν αὐτόν, μὴ ὅτι πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας· ὁ δέ, μὴ οὕτως μου, ἔφη, ὑπολάβῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγοντος ὅτι δεῖ ἑκάστην τῶν τεχνῶν τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα ἐπίστασθαι
135dἀκριβῶς ὥσπερ αὐτὸν τὸν τὴν τέχνην ἔχοντα, ἀλλʼ ὡς εἰκὸς ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερόν τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον, ἐπακολουθῆσαί τε τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων, καὶ αὐτὸν ξυμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην, ὥστε δοκεῖν χαριέστατον εἶναι καὶ σοφώτατον τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις τε καὶ πραττομένοις περὶ τὰς τέχνας.
135dκἀγώ, ἔτι γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἠμφεγνόουν τὸν λόγον ὅτι ἐβούλετο,
135eἆρʼ ἐννοῶ, ἔφην, οἷον λέγεις τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οἷοι ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ εἰσὶν οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἆθλα καὶ δεύτεροί εἰσι πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δʼ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτούς.
Section 136
135eτάχʼ ἂν ἴσως τοιοῦτόν τι λέγοις καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα· τῶν μὲν
136aπρώτων εἰς σύνεσιν περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐλλείπεσθαι, τὰ δευτερεῖα δʼ ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων περιεῖναι, καὶ οὕτως γίγνεσθαι περὶ πάντα ὕπακρόν τινα ἄνδρα τὸν πεφιλοσοφηκότα· τοιοῦτόν τινά μοι δοκεῖς ἐνδείκνυσθαι.
136aκαλῶς γέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνῃ ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλῳ. ἔστιν γὰρ ἀτεχνῶς τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι, μηδʼ εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι, ὥστε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων
136bἀπολελεῖφθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοί, ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι.
136bμετὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐγὼ προθυμούμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγοι, ἐπυνθανόμην αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πότερον χρησίμους ἢ ἀχρήστους εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνοι.
136bχρησίμους δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη.
136bἆρʼ οὖν, εἴπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ χρήσιμοι, οἱ πονηροὶ ἄχρηστοι;
136bὡμολόγει.
136bτί δέ; τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας χρησίμους ἡγῇ ἢ οὔ;
136cὁ δὲ ὡμολόγει χρησίμους, καὶ πρός γε ἔφη χρησιμωτάτους εἶναι ἡγεῖσθαι.
136cφέρε δὴ γνῶμεν, εἰ σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ποῦ καὶ χρήσιμοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ ὕπακροι οὗτοι; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἑκάστου γε τῶν τὰς τέχνας ἐχόντων φαυλότερός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος.
136cὡμολόγει.
136cφέρε δὴ σύ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ τύχοις ἢ αὐτὸς ἀσθενήσας ἢ τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σῶν περὶ ὧν σὺ σπουδὴν μεγάλην ἔχεις, πότερον ὑγείαν βουλόμενος κτήσασθαι τὸν ὕπακρον ἐκεῖνον εἰσάγοις ἂν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ τὸν ἰατρὸν λάβοις;
136dἀμφοτέρους ἔγωγʼ ἄν, ἔφη.
136dμή μοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀμφοτέρους λέγε, ἀλλʼ ὁπότερον μᾶλλόν τε καὶ πρότερον.
136dοὐδεὶς ἄν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἀμφισβητήσειεν, ὡς οὐχὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον.
136dτί δʼ; ἐν νηὶ χειμαζομένῃ ποτέρῳ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπιτρέποις σαυτόν τε καὶ τὰ σεαυτοῦ, τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ;
136dτῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἔγωγε.
136dοὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα πάνθʼ οὕτως, ἕως ἄν τις δημιουργὸς ᾖ, οὐ χρήσιμός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος;
136dφαίνεται, ἔφη.
136eοὐκοῦν νῦν ἄχρηστός τις ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος; εἰσὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀεί που δημιουργοί· ὡμολογήσαμεν δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς ἀχρήστους.
136eἠναγκάζετο ὁμολογεῖν.
136eτί οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο; ἔρωμαί σε ἢ ἀγροικότερόν ἐστιν ἐρέσθαι—
136eἐροῦ ὅτι βούλει.
Section 137
136eοὐδὲν δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ζητῶ ἄλλο ἢ ἀνομολογήσασθαι τὰ
137aεἰρημένα. ἔχει δέ πως ὡδί. ὡμολογήσαμεν καλὸν εἶναι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ φιλοσόφους ἀγαθούς, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς χρησίμους, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς ἀχρήστους· αὖθις δʼ αὖ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἕως ἂν οἱ δημιουργοὶ ὦσιν, ἀχρήστους εἶναι, δημιουργοὺς δὲ ἀεὶ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ὡμολόγηται;
137aπάνυ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
137aὡμολογοῦμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατά γε τὸν σὸν λόγον, εἴπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστι περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ὃν σὺ λέγεις τὸν τρόπον, πονηροὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι καὶ
137bἀχρήστους, ἕως ἂν ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέχναι ὦσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ φίλε, ἔχωσι, μηδʼ ᾖ τοῦτο φιλοσοφεῖν, περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακέναι, οὐδὲ πολυπραγμονοῦντα κυπτάζοντα ζῆν οὐδὲ πολυμαθοῦντα, ἀλλʼ ἄλλο τι, ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ ᾤμην καὶ ὄνειδος εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ βαναύσους καλεῖσθαι τοὺς περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακότας. ὧδε δὲ σαφέστερον εἰσόμεθα εἰ ἄρα ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐὰν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνῃ· τίνες ἵππους ἐπίστανται
137cκολάζειν ὀρθῶς; πότερον οἵπερ βελτίστους ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἄλλοι;
137cοἵπερ βελτίστους.
137cτί δέ; κύνας οὐχ οἳ βελτίστους ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν, οὗτοι καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπίστανται;
137cναί.
137cἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς;
137cφαίνεταί μοι, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
137cτί δέ; πότερον ἥπερ βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς, ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ καὶ γιγνώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς μοχθηρούς, ἢ ἑτέρα τις;
137cἡ αὐτή, ἔφη.
137cἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ κατʼ ἀνθρώπους τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν,
137dἥπερ βελτίστους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ, ταύτην εἶναι καὶ τὴν κολάζουσαν ὀρθῶς καὶ διαγιγνώσκουσαν τοὺς χρηστούς τε καὶ μοχθηρούς;
137dπάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.
137dοὐκοῦν καὶ ἥτις ἕνα, καὶ πολλούς, καὶ ἥτις πολλούς, καὶ ἕνα;
137dναί.
137dκαὶ καθʼ ἵππων δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων οὕτως;
137dφημί.
137dτίς οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἥτις τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀκολασταίνοντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας ὀρθῶς κολάζει; οὐχ ἡ δικαστική;
137dναί.
137dἦ ἄλλην οὖν τινα καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἢ ταύτην;
137dοὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταύτην.
137eοὐκοῦν ᾗπερ κολάζουσιν ὀρθῶς, ταύτῃ καὶ γιγνώσκουσι τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηρούς;
137eταύτῃ.
137eὅστις δὲ ἕνα γιγνώσκει, καὶ πολλοὺς γνώσεται;
137eναί.
137eκαὶ ὅστις γε πολλοὺς ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ ἕνα;
137eφημί.
137eεἰ ἄρα ἵππος ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἵππους, κἂν ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τίς ἐστιν;
137eφημί.
137eκαὶ εἰ βοῦς ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ χρηστοὺς βοῦς, κἂν αὑτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τίς ἐστιν;
137eναί, ἔφη.
137eοὕτω δὴ καὶ εἰ κύων;
137eὡμολόγει.
Section 138
138aτί δʼ; ἐπειδὰν ἄνθρωπός τις ὢν ἀγνοῇ τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηροὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἆρʼ οὐχ αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖ πότερον χρηστός ἐστιν ἢ πονηρός, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν;
138aσυνεχώρει.
138aτὸ δὲ αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖν σωφρονεῖν ἐστιν ἢ μὴ σωφρονεῖν;
138aμὴ σωφρονεῖν.
138aτὸ ἑαυτὸν ἄρα γιγνώσκειν ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν;
138aφημί, ἔφη.
138aτοῦτʼ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα παρακελεύεται, σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην.
138aἔοικεν.
138aτῇ αὐτῇ δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα;
138aναί.
138bοὐκοῦν ᾗ μὲν κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα, δικαιοσύνη αὕτη ἐστίν, ᾗ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους, σωφροσύνη;
138bἔοικεν, ἔφη.
138bταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη;
138bφαίνεται.
138bκαὶ μὴν οὕτω γε καὶ αἱ πόλεις εὖ οἰκοῦνται, ὅταν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δίκην διδῶσιν.
138bἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.
138bκαὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρα αὑτή ἐστιν.
138bσυνεδόκει.
138bτί δὲ ὅταν εἷς ἀνὴρ ὀρθῶς πόλιν διοικῇ, ὄνομά γε τούτῳ οὐ τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς;
138bφημί.
138bοὐκοῦν βασιλικῇ τε καὶ τυραννικῇ τέχνῃ διοικεῖ;
138bοὕτως.
138bκαὶ αὗται ἄρʼ αἱ αὐταὶ τέχναι εἰσὶν ἐκείναις;
138bφαίνονται.
138cτί δʼ ὅταν εἷς ὢν ἀνὴρ οἰκίαν διοικῇ ὀρθῶς, τί ὄνομα τούτῳ ἐστίν; οὐκ οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης;
138cναί.
138cπότερον οὖν καὶ οὗτος δικαιοσύνῃ εὖ ἂν τὴν οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ κἄλλῃ τινὶ τέχνῃ;
138cδικαιοσύνῃ.
138cἔστιν ἄρα ταὐτόν, ὡς ἔοικε, βασιλεύς, τύραννος, πολιτικός, οἰκονόμος, δεσπότης, σώφρων, δίκαιος. καὶ μία τέχνη ἐστὶν βασιλική, τυραννική, πολιτική, δεσποτική, οἰκονομική, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη.
138cφαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως.
138dπότερον οὖν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ, ὅταν μὲν ἰατρὸς περὶ τῶν καμνόντων τι λέγῃ, αἰσχρὸν μήθʼ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι μηδὲν περὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, καὶ ὁπόταν ἄλλος τις τῶν δημιουργῶν, ὡσαύτως· ὅταν δὲ δικαστὴς ἢ βασιλεὺς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν νυνδὴ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν περὶ τούτων μήτε ἕπεσθαι δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν;
138dπῶς δʼ οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε τοσούτων πραγμάτων μηδὲν ἔχειν συμβάλλεσθαι;
138eπότερον οὖν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα λέγωμεν, ἔφην, πένταθλον αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὕπακρον, καὶ ταύτης μὲν τὰ δευτερεῖα ἔχοντα πάντων τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ ἀχρεῖον εἶναι ἕως ἂν τούτων τις ᾖ, ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἐπιτρεπτέον οὐδὲ τὰ δευτερεῖα ἐν τούτῳ ἑκτέον, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς, εἰ μέλλει εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ἡ οἰκία;
138eσυνεχώρει δή μοι.
Section 139
138eἔπειτά γε δήπου ἐάντε οἱ φίλοι αὐτῷ διαίτας ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἐάντε ἡ πόλις τι προστάττῃ διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν,
139aαἰσχρὸν ἐν τούτοις, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον καὶ μὴ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι;
139aδοκεῖ μοι.
139aπολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμαθία τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία.
139aεἰπόντος δʼ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ὁ μὲν σοφὸς αἰσχυνθεὶς τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐσίγησεν, ὁ δὲ ἀμαθὴς ἔφη ἐκείνως εἶναι· καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπῄνεσαν τὰ εἰρημένα.
Section 132
132aεἰς Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ εἰσῆλθον, καὶ εἶδον αὐτόθι τῶν τε νέων τοὺς ἐπιεικεστάτους δοκοῦντας εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ πατέρων εὐδοκίμων, καὶ τούτων ἐραστάς. ἐτυγχανέτην οὖν δύο τῶν μειρακίων ἐρίζοντε, περὶ ὅτου δέ, οὐ σφόδρα κατήκουον. ἐφαινέσθην μέντοι ἢ περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου
132bἢ περὶ Οἰνοπίδου ἐρίζειν· κύκλους γοῦν γράφειν ἐφαινέσθην καὶ ἐγκλίσεις τινὰς ἐμιμοῦντο τοῖν χεροῖν ἐπικλίνοντε καὶ μάλʼ ἐσπουδακότε. κἀγώ—καθήμην γὰρ παρὰ τὸν ἐραστὴν τοῦ ἑτέρου αὐτοῖν—κινήσας οὖν αὐτὸν τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἠρόμην ὅτι ποτὲ οὕτως ἐσπουδακότε τὼ μειρακίω εἴτην, καὶ εἶπον· ἦ που μέγα τι καὶ καλόν ἐστι περὶ ὃ τοσαύτην σπουδὴν πεποιημένω ἐστόν;
132bὁ δʼ εἶπε, ποῖον, ἔφη, μέγα καὶ καλόν; ἀδολεσχοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὗτοί γε περὶ τῶν μετεώρων καὶ φλυαροῦσι φιλοσοφοῦντες.
132cκαὶ ἐγὼ θαυμάσας αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν εἶπον· ὦ νεανία, αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν; ἢ τί οὕτως χαλεπῶς λέγεις;
132cκαὶ ὁ ἕτερος—πλησίον γὰρ καθήμενος ἐτύγχανεν αὐτοῦ, ἀντεραστὴς ὤν—ἀκούσας ἐμοῦ τε ἐρομένου κἀκείνου ἀποκρινομένου, οὐ πρὸς σοῦ γε, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ποιεῖς τὸ καὶ ἀνερέσθαι τοῦτον εἰ αἰσχρὸν ἡγεῖται φιλοσοφίαν εἶναι. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα τοῦτον ὅτι τραχηλιζόμενος καὶ ἐμπιμπλάμενος καὶ καθεύδων πάντα τὸν βίον διατετέλεκεν; ὥστε σὺ τί αὐτὸν ᾤου ἀποκρινεῖσθαι ἀλλʼ ἢ ὅτι αἰσχρόν ἐστι φιλοσοφία;
132dἦν δὲ οὗτος μὲν τοῖν ἐρασταῖν περὶ μουσικὴν διατετριφώς, ὁ δʼ ἕτερος, ὃν ἐλοιδόρει, περὶ γυμναστικήν. καί μοι ἔδοξε χρῆναι τὸν μὲν ἕτερον ἀφιέναι, τὸν ἐρωτώμενον, ὅτι οὐδʼ αὐτὸς προσεποιεῖτο περὶ λόγων ἔμπειρος εἶναι ἀλλὰ περὶ ἔργων, τὸν δὲ σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον εἶναι διερωτῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ εἴ τι δυναίμην παρʼ αὐτοῦ ὠφεληθείην. εἶπον οὖν ὅτι εἰς κοινὸν μὲν τὸ ἐρώτημα ἠρόμην· εἰ δὲ σὺ οἴει τοῦδε κάλλιον ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι, σὲ ἐρωτῶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὅπερ καὶ τοῦτον, εἰ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν καλὸν εἶναι ἢ οὔ.
Section 132
I entered the grammar school of the teacher Dionysius, and saw there the young men who are accounted the most comely in form and of distinguished family, and their lovers. Now it chanced that two of the young people were disputing, but about what, I did not clearly overhear: it appeared, however, that they were disputing either about Anaxagoras or about Oenopides; at any rate, they appeared to be drawing circles,
132band they were imitating certain inclinations with their arms, bending to it and taking it most earnestly. Then I—for I was sitting beside the lover of one of the pair—nudged him with my elbow and asked him what on earth the two youngsters were so earnest about, and I said: Is it then something great and fine, in which they are so earnestly immersed?
132bGreat and fine, indeed! he replied: why, these fellows are prating about the heavenly bodies, and babbling philosophy.
132cThen I, surprised at his answer, said: Young man, do you consider philosophizing to be shameful? Else, why do you speak so sharply?
132cThen the other youth—for he chanced to be sitting near him, as his rival in love—when he heard my question and his rival’s answer, said: You do yourself no good, Socrates, by pressing this fellow with a further question, as to whether he considers philosophizing to be shameful. Do you not know that he has spent the whole of his life in practising the neckhold, and stuffing himself, and sleeping? So why did you suppose he would make any other reply than that philosophy is shameful?
132dNow this one of the two lovers had spent his time on humane studies, whereas the other, whom he was abusing, had spent his on athletics. So I decided that I had best relinquish the other, whom I had been questioning, since he did not even himself set up to be experienced in words, but only in deeds; and that I should interrogate the one who set up to be wiser, in order that so far as I was able I might get some benefit from him. I said therefore: I addressed my question to both in common; but if you think you could answer more creditably than he, I put the same question to you as I did to him: do you consider philosophizing to be honorable or not?
Section 133
133aσχεδὸν οὖν ταῦτα λεγόντων ἡμῶν ἐπακούσαντε τὼ μειρακίω ἐσιγησάτην, καὶ αὐτὼ παυσαμένω τῆς ἔριδος ἡμῶν ἀκροαταὶ ἐγενέσθην. καὶ ὅτι μὲν οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἔπαθον οὐκ οἶδα, αὐτὸς δʼ οὖν ἐξεπλάγην· ἀεὶ γάρ ποτε ὑπὸ τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν ἐκπλήττομαι. ἐδόκει μέντοι μοι καὶ ὁ ἕτερος οὐχ ἧττον ἐμοῦ ἀγωνιᾶν· οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ ἀπεκρίνατό γέ μοι καὶ μάλα φιλοτίμως. ὁπότε γάρ τοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες,
133bτὸ φιλοσοφεῖν αἰσχρὸν ἡγησαίμην εἶναι, οὐδʼ ἂν ἄνθρωπον νομίσαιμι ἐμαυτὸν εἶναι, οὐδʼ ἄλλον τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον, ἐνδεικνύμενος εἰς τὸν ἀντεραστήν, καὶ λέγων μεγάλῃ τῇ φωνῇ, ἵνʼ αὐτοῦ κατακούοι τὰ παιδικά.
133bκαὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, καλὸν ἄρα δοκεῖ σοι τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν;
133bπάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη.
133bτί οὖν, ἐγὼ ἔφην· ἦ δοκεῖ σοι οἷόν τʼ εἶναι εἰδέναι πρᾶγμα ὁτιοῦν εἴτε καλὸν εἴτε αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, ὃ μὴ εἰδείη τις τὴν ἀρχὴν ὅτι ἔστιν;
133bοὐκ ἔφη.
133cοἶσθʼ ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι ἔστιν τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν;
133cπάνυ γε, ἔφη.
133cτί οὖν ἔστιν; ἔφην ἐγώ.
133cτί δʼ ἄλλο γε ἢ κατὰ τὸ Σόλωνος; Σόλων γάρ που εἶπε—γηράσκω δʼ αἰεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος·καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ οὕτως ἀεὶ χρῆναι ἕν γέ τι μανθάνειν τὸν μέλλοντα φιλοσοφήσειν, καὶ νεώτερον ὄντα καὶ πρεσβύτερον, ἵνʼ ὡς πλεῖστα ἐν τῷ βίῳ μάθῃ. καί μοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔδοξε τὶ εἰπεῖν, ἔπειτά πως ἐννοήσας ἠρόμην αὐτὸν εἰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πολυμαθίαν ἡγοῖτο.
133dκἀκεῖνος, πάνυ, ἔφη.
133dἡγῇ δὲ δὴ καλὸν εἶναι μόνον τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἢ καὶ ἀγαθόν; ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
133dκαὶ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, πάνυ.
133dπότερον οὖν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τι τοῦτο ἴδιον ἐνορᾷς, ἢ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἷον φιλογυμναστίαν οὐ μόνον ἡγῇ καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν; ἢ οὔ;
133dὁ δὲ καὶ μάλα εἰρωνικῶς εἶπε δύο· πρὸς μὲν τόνδε μοι εἰρήσθω ὅτι οὐδέτερα· πρὸς μέντοι σέ, ὦ Σώκρατες,
133eὁμολογῶ καὶ καλὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀγαθόν· ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ ὀρθῶς.
133eἠρώτησα οὖν ἐγώ, ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς γυμνασίοις τὴν πολυπονίαν φιλογυμναστίαν ἡγῇ εἶναι;
133eκἀκεῖνος ἔφη, πάνυ γε, ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν τὴν πολυμαθίαν φιλοσοφίαν ἡγοῦμαι εἶναι.
133eκἀγὼ εἶπον, ἡγῇ δὲ δὴ τοὺς φιλογυμναστοῦντας ἄλλου του ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ τούτου, ὅτι ποιήσει αὐτοὺς εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα;
133eτούτου, ἔφη.
133eἦ οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι τὸ σῶμα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ποιοῦσιν εὖ ἔχειν;
Section 133
132dThen the two striplings, overhearing us speak somewhat like this, were silent, and ceasing from their own contention they became listeners to ours. What their lovers’ sensations were, I do not know, but I myself, at any rate, was staggered; for every time I am staggered by handsome young people. It seemed to me, however, that my young friend too was in as great a flutter as myself; but nevertheless he answered me in a most ambitious spirit: Why, of course, Socrates, he said, if I should ever consider philosophizing to be shameful, I should not account myself so much as a man,
133bnor anyone else either who was disposed to think so. Here he pointed to his rival lover, and spoke with a loud voice, in order that his favorite might hear every word.
133bThen I remarked: So philosophizing seems to you to be honorable?
133bQuite so, he said.
133bWell now, I said; does it seem to you possible to know whether anything is honorable or shameful without knowing what it is fundamentally?
133bNo, he said.
133cThen do you know, I went on, what philosophizing is?
133cCertainly I do, said he.
133cThen what is it? I asked.
133cWhy, just what Solon called it; you know it was Solon who said:And ever, as I older grow, I learn yet more and more;—and I agree with him that a man who intends to philosophize should in this way be ever learning something or other, whether he be younger or older, in order that he may learn as many things as possible in his life. Now at first I felt there was something in his reply, but then, on second thoughts, I asked him whether he considered philosophy to be much learning.
133dTo which he answered: Certainly.
133dAnd do you consider philosophy to be merely honorable, I asked, or good as well?
133dGood as well, he said: very much so.
133dThen do you observe this as peculiar to philosophy, or do you find it similarly in everything else? For example, do you consider the love of athletics to be not merely honorable, but good as well, or do you not?
133dWhereupon he, most slily, gave a double answer: To him my statement must be neither; but to you, Socrates, I acknowledge it to be both honorable and good:
133efor I consider this the right view.
133eThen I asked him: Well now, in athletics, do you consider that much exercise is love of athletics?
133eTo which he replied: Certainly, just as in philosophizing I consider much learning to be philosophy.
133eThen I said: And do you then consider that the lovers of athletics desire anything else than that which will cause them to be in good bodily condition?
133eOnly that, he replied.
133eAnd does much exercise, I asked, cause them to be in good bodily condition?
Section 134
134aπῶς γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, ἀπό γε ὀλίγων πόνων τὸ σῶμά τις εὖ ἔχοι;
134aκαί μοι ἔδοξεν ἤδη ἐνταῦθα κινητέος εἶναι ὁ φιλογυμναστής, ἵνα μοι βοηθήσῃ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς γυμναστικῆς· κἄπειτα ἠρόμην αὐτόν, σὺ δὲ δὴ τί σιγᾷς ἡμῖν, ὦ λῷστε, τούτου ταῦτα λέγοντος; ἢ καὶ σοὶ δοκοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εὖ τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν πόνων, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων;
134aἐγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, ᾤμην τὸ λεγόμενον δὴ τοῦτο κἂν ὗν γνῶναι ὅτι οἱ μέτριοι πόνοι εὖ ποιοῦσιν ἔχειν τὰ
134bσώματα, πόθεν δὴ οὐχὶ ἄνδρα γε ἄγρυπνόν τε καὶ ἄσιτον καὶ ἀτριβῆ τὸν τράχηλον ἔχοντα καὶ λεπτὸν ὑπὸ μεριμνῶν; καὶ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα εἰπόντος ἥσθη τὰ μειράκια καὶ ἐπεγέλασεν, ὁ δʼ ἕτερος ἠρυθρίασε.
134bκαὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί οὖν; σὺ ἤδη συγχωρεῖς μήτε πολλοὺς μήτε ὀλίγους πόνους εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν τὰ σώματα τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μετρίους; ἢ διαμάχῃ δυοῖν ὄντοιν νῷν περὶ τοῦ λόγου;
134cκἀκεῖνος, πρὸς μὲν τοῦτον, ἔφη, κἂν πάνυ ἡδέως διαγωνισαίμην, καὶ εὖ οἶδʼ ὅτι ἱκανὸς ἂν γενοίμην βοηθῆσαι τῇ ὑποθέσει ἣν ὑπεθέμην, καὶ εἰ ταύτης ἔτι φαυλοτέραν ὑπεθέμην—οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι—πρὸς μέντοι σὲ οὐδὲν δέομαι παρὰ δόξαν φιλονικεῖν, ἀλλʼ ὁμολογῶ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ ἀλλὰ τὰ μέτρια γυμνάσια τὴν εὐεξίαν ἐμποιεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.
134cτί δὲ τὰ σιτία; τὰ μέτρια ἢ τὰ πολλά; ἔφην ἐγώ.
134cκαὶ τὰ σιτία ὡμολόγει.
134dἔτι δὲ κἀγὼ προσηνάγκαζον αὐτὸν ὁμολογεῖν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὠφελιμώτατα εἶναι τὰ μέτρια ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ μηδὲ τὰ ὀλίγα· καί μοι ὡμολόγει τὰ μέτρια.
134dτί δʼ, ἔφην, τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν; τὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ ἢ τὰ ἄμετρα τῶν προσφερομένων;
134dτὰ μέτρια, ἔφη.
134dοὐκοῦν ἓν τῶν προσφερομένων ψυχῇ ἐστι καὶ τὰ μαθήματα;
134dὡμολόγει.
134dκαὶ τούτων ἄρα τὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ πολλά;
134dσυνέφη.
134eτίνα οὖν ἐρόμενοι ἂν δικαίως ἐροίμεθα ὁποῖοι μέτριοι πόνοι καὶ σιτία πρὸς τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν;
134eὡμολογοῦμεν μὲν τρεῖς ὄντες, ὅτι ἰατρὸν ἢ παιδοτρίβην.
134eτίνα δʼ ἂν περὶ σπερμάτων σπορᾶς ὁπόσον μέτριον;
134eκαὶ τούτου τὸν γεωργὸν ὡμολογοῦμεν.
134eτίνα δὲ περὶ μαθημάτων εἰς ψυχὴν φυτεύσεώς τε καὶ σπορᾶς ἐρωτῶντες δικαίως ἂν ἐροίμεθα ὁπόσα καὶ ὁποῖα μέτρια;
Section 134
133eYes, for how, he replied, could one be in good bodily condition through little exercise?
133eHere I felt it was time to stir up the lover of athletics, in order that he might give me the support of his athletic experience; so I proceeded to ask him: And you then, pray, why are you silent, excellent sir, while your friend here is speaking thus? Do you agree that men are in good bodily condition through much exercise, or is it rather through moderate exercise?
133eFor my part, Socrates, he said, I thought even a pig—
134bas the saying is—would have known that moderate exercise causes them to be in good bodily condition, so why should not a fellow who is sleepless and unfed, with unchafed neck and slender, care-worn frame! And when he had said this the boys were delighted and laughed their approval, while the other lover blushed.
134bThen I said to him: Well, do you now concede that it is neither much, nor little, but moderate exercise that causes men to be in good bodily condition? Or do you bid defiance to the two of us on this point?
134cTo which he answered: Against him I should be only too glad to fight it out, and I am certain I should prove able to support the theory I have put forward, even had I put forward a weaker one; for he is naught. But with you I do not aim at winning an unscrupulous success; and so I admit that not a great but a moderate amount of athletics causes good condition in men.
134cAnd what of food? Moderate or much? I asked.
134cThe same applied to food, he admitted.
134dThen I went on and tried to compel him also to admit that everything else connected with the body when most beneficial, was the moderate thing, not the much or the little; and he admitted that it was the moderate thing.
134dAnd now, I said, as regards the soul; are moderate or immoderate things beneficial, as adjuncts of it?
134dModerate things, he replied.
134dAnd are studies among the adjuncts of the soul?
134dHe admitted they were.
134dSo among these also it is the moderate that are beneficial, and not the much?
134dHe agreed.
134dThen whom should we be justified in asking what sort of exercise or food is moderate for the body?
134dThe three of us agreed that it must be a doctor or a trainer.
134eAnd whom should we ask about the moderate measure in the sowing of seed?
134eIn that matter, we agreed, it must be a farmer.
134eAnd whom should we be justified in asking as to the moderate degree and kind, in regard to the sowing and planting of studies in the soul?
Section 135
135aτοὐντεῦθεν ἤδη ἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες· κἀγὼ προσπαίζων αὐτοὺς ἠρόμην, βούλεσθε, ἔφην, ἐπειδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐσμέν, ἐρώμεθα ταυτὶ τὰ μειράκια; ἢ ἴσως αἰσχυνόμεθα, ὥσπερ ἔφη τοὺς μνηστῆρας Ὅμηρος, μὴ ἀξιούντων εἶναί τινα ἄλλον ὅστις ἐντενεῖ τὸ τόξον;
135aἐπειδὴ οὖν μοι ἐδόκουν ἀθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν, καὶ εἶπον, ποῖα δὲ μάλιστα ἄττα τοπάζομεν εἶναι τῶν μαθημάτων ἃ δεῖ τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα μανθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ οὐχὶ πάντα οὐδὲ πολλά;
135bὑπολαβὼν οὖν ὁ σοφώτερος εἶπεν ὅτι κάλλιστα ταῦτʼ εἴη τῶν μαθημάτων καὶ προσήκοντα ἀφʼ ὧν ἂν πλείστην δόξαν ἔχοι τις εἰς φιλοσοφίαν· πλείστην δʼ ἂν ἔχοι δόξαν, εἰ δοκοίη τῶν τεχνῶν ἔμπειρος εἶναι πασῶν, εἰ δὲ μή, ὡς πλείστων γε καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀξιολόγων, μαθὼν αὐτῶν ταῦτα ἃ προσήκει τοῖς ἐλευθέροις μαθεῖν, ὅσα συνέσεως ἔχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας.
135bἆρʼ οὖν οὕτω λέγεις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ τεκτονικῇ;
135cκαὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ τέκτονα μὲν ἂν πρίαιο πέντε ἢ ἓξ μνῶν, ἄκρον ἀρχιτέκτονα δὲ οὐδʼ ἂν μυρίων δραχμῶν· ὀλίγοι γε μὴν κἂν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησι γίγνοιντο. ἆρα μή τι τοιοῦτον λέγεις; καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας μου συνεχώρει καὶ αὐτὸς λέγειν τοιοῦτον.
135cἠρόμην δʼ αὐτὸν εἰ οὐκ ἀδύνατον εἴη δύο μόνας τέχνας οὕτω μαθεῖν τὸν αὐτόν, μὴ ὅτι πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας· ὁ δέ, μὴ οὕτως μου, ἔφη, ὑπολάβῃς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς λέγοντος ὅτι δεῖ ἑκάστην τῶν τεχνῶν τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα ἐπίστασθαι
135dἀκριβῶς ὥσπερ αὐτὸν τὸν τὴν τέχνην ἔχοντα, ἀλλʼ ὡς εἰκὸς ἄνδρα ἐλεύθερόν τε καὶ πεπαιδευμένον, ἐπακολουθῆσαί τε τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι διαφερόντως τῶν παρόντων, καὶ αὐτὸν ξυμβάλλεσθαι γνώμην, ὥστε δοκεῖν χαριέστατον εἶναι καὶ σοφώτατον τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις τε καὶ πραττομένοις περὶ τὰς τέχνας.
135dκἀγώ, ἔτι γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἠμφεγνόουν τὸν λόγον ὅτι ἐβούλετο,
135eἆρʼ ἐννοῶ, ἔφην, οἷον λέγεις τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οἷοι ἐν τῇ ἀγωνίᾳ εἰσὶν οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας ἢ τοὺς παλαιστάς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἆθλα καὶ δεύτεροί εἰσι πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δʼ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι καὶ νικῶσιν αὐτούς.
Section 135
134eAt this point we all began to be full of perplexity;
135athen I, mocking at them, asked: Do you mind, since we are in perplexity, if we ask these boys here? or perhaps we are ashamed, as Homer said the suitors were, and do not think it fit there should be someone else who will string the bow?
135aThen, as it seemed to me that they were losing their zeal for the argument, I tried to pursue the inquiry in another way, and said: But what, as nearly as we can guess, are the kinds of learning which the philosopher should learn, since he is not to learn all things or many things?
135bAt this the wiser one interjected: The finest and most suitable kinds of learning are those which will bring him the most reputation for philosophy; and he will get most reputation if he appears well versed in all the arts, or if not in all, in as many of them, and those the most considerable, as he can, by learning so much of them as befits a free man to learn, that is, what belongs to the understanding rather than the handiwork of each.
135bWell now, do you mean, I asked, in the same way as in carpentry? For there, you know, you can buy a carpenter for five
135cor six minae, but a first-rate architect cannot be got for even ten thousand drachmae; few such, indeed, could be found throughout the whole of Greece. Is it something of this sort that you mean? When he heard me say this, he admitted that something like this was what he himself meant.
135cI next asked him if it was not impossible for the same person to learn in this way merely two of the arts, not to speak of many or the principal ones; to which he replied: Do not conceive me, Socrates,
135dto be stating that the philosopher must have accurate knowledge of each of the arts, like the actual adept in any of them; I mean only so far as may be expected of a free and educated man: that is, he should be able to follow the explanations of the craftsman more readily than the rest of the company, and to contribute an opinion of his own which will make him appear the cleverest and most accomplished of the company who may at any time be present at some verbal or practical exposition of the arts.
135dThen, as I was still unsettled in my mind as to the drift of his words, I asked him: Do I quite grasp the sort of man whom you mean by the philosopher?
135eFor you seem to me to mean someone like the all-round athletes in contest with the runners or the wrestlers: the former yield, you know, to the latter in their particular exercises, and are their inferiors in these, but are superior to the usual sort of athletes and beat them.
Section 136
135eτάχʼ ἂν ἴσως τοιοῦτόν τι λέγοις καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα· τῶν μὲν
136aπρώτων εἰς σύνεσιν περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐλλείπεσθαι, τὰ δευτερεῖα δʼ ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων περιεῖναι, καὶ οὕτως γίγνεσθαι περὶ πάντα ὕπακρόν τινα ἄνδρα τὸν πεφιλοσοφηκότα· τοιοῦτόν τινά μοι δοκεῖς ἐνδείκνυσθαι.
136aκαλῶς γέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνῃ ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλῳ. ἔστιν γὰρ ἀτεχνῶς τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι, μηδʼ εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι, ὥστε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων
136bἀπολελεῖφθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοί, ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι.
136bμετὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐγὼ προθυμούμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγοι, ἐπυνθανόμην αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πότερον χρησίμους ἢ ἀχρήστους εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνοι.
136bχρησίμους δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη.
136bἆρʼ οὖν, εἴπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ χρήσιμοι, οἱ πονηροὶ ἄχρηστοι;
136bὡμολόγει.
136bτί δέ; τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας χρησίμους ἡγῇ ἢ οὔ;
136cὁ δὲ ὡμολόγει χρησίμους, καὶ πρός γε ἔφη χρησιμωτάτους εἶναι ἡγεῖσθαι.
136cφέρε δὴ γνῶμεν, εἰ σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ποῦ καὶ χρήσιμοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ ὕπακροι οὗτοι; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἑκάστου γε τῶν τὰς τέχνας ἐχόντων φαυλότερός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος.
136cὡμολόγει.
136cφέρε δὴ σύ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ τύχοις ἢ αὐτὸς ἀσθενήσας ἢ τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σῶν περὶ ὧν σὺ σπουδὴν μεγάλην ἔχεις, πότερον ὑγείαν βουλόμενος κτήσασθαι τὸν ὕπακρον ἐκεῖνον εἰσάγοις ἂν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ τὸν ἰατρὸν λάβοις;
136dἀμφοτέρους ἔγωγʼ ἄν, ἔφη.
136dμή μοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀμφοτέρους λέγε, ἀλλʼ ὁπότερον μᾶλλόν τε καὶ πρότερον.
136dοὐδεὶς ἄν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἀμφισβητήσειεν, ὡς οὐχὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον.
136dτί δʼ; ἐν νηὶ χειμαζομένῃ ποτέρῳ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπιτρέποις σαυτόν τε καὶ τὰ σεαυτοῦ, τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ;
136dτῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἔγωγε.
136dοὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα πάνθʼ οὕτως, ἕως ἄν τις δημιουργὸς ᾖ, οὐ χρήσιμός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος;
136dφαίνεται, ἔφη.
136eοὐκοῦν νῦν ἄχρηστός τις ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος; εἰσὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀεί που δημιουργοί· ὡμολογήσαμεν δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς ἀχρήστους.
136eἠναγκάζετο ὁμολογεῖν.
136eτί οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο; ἔρωμαί σε ἢ ἀγροικότερόν ἐστιν ἐρέσθαι—
136eἐροῦ ὅτι βούλει.
Section 136
135eI daresay it may be something of this sort that you would suggest as the effect produced by philosophy on those who make it their pursuit: they yield to those who are first-rate
136ain an understanding of the arts, but in taking the second place they surpass the rest; and in this way the man who has studied philosophy comes just next to the top in everything. That is the kind of person whom you appear to me to indicate.
136aYou are quite right, it seems to me, Socrates, he said, in your conception of the philosopher’s position, with your comparison of him to the all-round athlete. For it is precisely his nature not to be enslaved to any business, or to work out anything exactly, so as to let his application to that one matter make him deficient in the rest,
136bas the craftsmen do, but to have a moderate contact with all of them.
136bWell, after this answer I was eager to know clearly what he meant, so I inquired of him whether he conceived of good men as useful or useless.
136bUseful, I should say, Socrates, he replied.
136bThen if good men are useful, are wicked men useless?
136bHe agreed that they were.
136bAgain, do you consider that philosophers are useful persons or not?
136cHe agreed that they were useful; nay, more, that he considered they were most useful of all.
136cCome now, let us make out, if what you say is true, where these second-best men are also useful to us: for clearly the philosopher is inferior to any particular adept in the arts.
136cHe agreed.
136cWell now, I went on, if you yourself, or one of your friends for whom you feel great concern, should have fallen sick, would you fetch that second-best man into the house with a view to obtaining health, or would you summon a doctor?
136dFor my part, I should have both, he replied.
136dPlease do not say both, I said, but which of the two you would prefer and also summon first.
136dNo one, he replied,would make any question but that the doctor should be preferred and also summoned first.
136dAnd again, if you were in a ship that was making rough weather, to which would you rather entrust yourself and yours, the pilot or the philosopher?
136dI should choose the pilot.
136dAnd so it will be in everything else: so long as there is some craftsman, the philosopher will not be useful?
136dApparently, he replied.
136eSo now we find that the philosopher is a useless person? For I suppose we always have craftsmen; and we have agreed that good men are useful, and bad ones useless.
136eHe was obliged to agree to this.
136eThen what follows? Am I to ask you, or will it be too ill-mannered?
136eAsk whatever you please.
Section 137
136eοὐδὲν δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ζητῶ ἄλλο ἢ ἀνομολογήσασθαι τὰ
137aεἰρημένα. ἔχει δέ πως ὡδί. ὡμολογήσαμεν καλὸν εἶναι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ φιλοσόφους ἀγαθούς, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς χρησίμους, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς ἀχρήστους· αὖθις δʼ αὖ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἕως ἂν οἱ δημιουργοὶ ὦσιν, ἀχρήστους εἶναι, δημιουργοὺς δὲ ἀεὶ εἶναι. οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ὡμολόγηται;
137aπάνυ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
137aὡμολογοῦμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατά γε τὸν σὸν λόγον, εἴπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστι περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ὃν σὺ λέγεις τὸν τρόπον, πονηροὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι καὶ
137bἀχρήστους, ἕως ἂν ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέχναι ὦσιν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ φίλε, ἔχωσι, μηδʼ ᾖ τοῦτο φιλοσοφεῖν, περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακέναι, οὐδὲ πολυπραγμονοῦντα κυπτάζοντα ζῆν οὐδὲ πολυμαθοῦντα, ἀλλʼ ἄλλο τι, ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ ᾤμην καὶ ὄνειδος εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ βαναύσους καλεῖσθαι τοὺς περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακότας. ὧδε δὲ σαφέστερον εἰσόμεθα εἰ ἄρα ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐὰν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνῃ· τίνες ἵππους ἐπίστανται
137cκολάζειν ὀρθῶς; πότερον οἵπερ βελτίστους ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἄλλοι;
137cοἵπερ βελτίστους.
137cτί δέ; κύνας οὐχ οἳ βελτίστους ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν, οὗτοι καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπίστανται;
137cναί.
137cἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς;
137cφαίνεταί μοι, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
137cτί δέ; πότερον ἥπερ βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς, ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ καὶ γιγνώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς μοχθηρούς, ἢ ἑτέρα τις;
137cἡ αὐτή, ἔφη.
137cἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ κατʼ ἀνθρώπους τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν,
137dἥπερ βελτίστους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ, ταύτην εἶναι καὶ τὴν κολάζουσαν ὀρθῶς καὶ διαγιγνώσκουσαν τοὺς χρηστούς τε καὶ μοχθηρούς;
137dπάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.
137dοὐκοῦν καὶ ἥτις ἕνα, καὶ πολλούς, καὶ ἥτις πολλούς, καὶ ἕνα;
137dναί.
137dκαὶ καθʼ ἵππων δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων οὕτως;
137dφημί.
137dτίς οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἥτις τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀκολασταίνοντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας ὀρθῶς κολάζει; οὐχ ἡ δικαστική;
137dναί.
137dἦ ἄλλην οὖν τινα καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἢ ταύτην;
137dοὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταύτην.
137eοὐκοῦν ᾗπερ κολάζουσιν ὀρθῶς, ταύτῃ καὶ γιγνώσκουσι τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηρούς;
137eταύτῃ.
137eὅστις δὲ ἕνα γιγνώσκει, καὶ πολλοὺς γνώσεται;
137eναί.
137eκαὶ ὅστις γε πολλοὺς ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ ἕνα;
137eφημί.
137eεἰ ἄρα ἵππος ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἵππους, κἂν ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τίς ἐστιν;
137eφημί.
137eκαὶ εἰ βοῦς ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ χρηστοὺς βοῦς, κἂν αὑτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τίς ἐστιν;
137eναί, ἔφη.
137eοὕτω δὴ καὶ εἰ κύων;
137eὡμολόγει.
Section 137
136eWell, my aim, I said, is merely to recall our agreements upon
137awhat has been stated. The matter stands somewhat like this. We agreed that philosophy is an honorable thing, and that philosophers are good; and that good men are useful, and wicked men useless: but then again we agreed that philosophers, so long as we have craftsmen, are useless, and that we always do have craftsmen. Has not all this been agreed?
137aYes, to be sure, he replied.
137aThen we agreed, it seems, by your account—if philosophizing means having knowledge of the arts in the way you describe—that philosophers are wicked and useless so long as there are arts
137bamong mankind. But I expect they are not so really, my friend, and that philosophizing is not just having a concernment in the arts or spending one’s life in meddlesome stooping and prying and accumulation of learning, but something else; because I imagined that this life was actually a disgrace, and that people who concerned themselves with the arts were called sordid. But we shall know more definitely whether this statement of mine is true, if you will answer me this: What men know how to punish horses rightly?
137cIs it those who make them into the best horses, or some other men?
137cThose who make them into the best horses.
137cOr again, is it not the men who know how to make dogs into the best dogs that know also how to punish them rightly?
137cYes.
137cThen it is the same art that makes them into the best dogs and punishes them rightly?
137cIt appears so to me, he replied.
137cAgain, is the art that makes them into the best ones and punishes them rightly the same as that which knows the good and the bad ones, or is it some other?
137cThe same, he said.
137cThen in the case of men also will you be prepared to agree that the art
137dwhich makes them into the best men is that which punishes them rightly and distinguishes the good and the bad ones?
137dCertainly, he said.
137dAnd that which does this to one, does it also to many, and that which does it to many, does it also to one?
137dYes.
137dAnd so it is also with horses and everything else?
137dI agree.
137dThen what is the knowledge which rightly punishes the licentious and law-breaking people in our cities? Is it not judicature?
137dYes.
137dAnd is it any other art than this that you call justice?
137dNo, only this.
137eAnd that whereby they punish rightly is that whereby they know the good and bad people?
137eIt is.
137eAnd whoever knows one will know many also?
137eYes.
137eAnd whoever does not know many will not know one?
137eI agree.
137eThen if one were a horse, and did not know the good and wicked horses, would one not know which sort one was oneself?
137eI think not.
137eAnd if one were an ox and did not know the wicked and good oxen, would one not know which sort one was oneself?
137eThat is so, he said.
137eAnd so it would be, if one were a dog?
137eHe agreed.
Section 138
138aτί δʼ; ἐπειδὰν ἄνθρωπός τις ὢν ἀγνοῇ τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηροὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἆρʼ οὐχ αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖ πότερον χρηστός ἐστιν ἢ πονηρός, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν;
138aσυνεχώρει.
138aτὸ δὲ αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖν σωφρονεῖν ἐστιν ἢ μὴ σωφρονεῖν;
138aμὴ σωφρονεῖν.
138aτὸ ἑαυτὸν ἄρα γιγνώσκειν ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν;
138aφημί, ἔφη.
138aτοῦτʼ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα παρακελεύεται, σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην.
138aἔοικεν.
138aτῇ αὐτῇ δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα;
138aναί.
138bοὐκοῦν ᾗ μὲν κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα, δικαιοσύνη αὕτη ἐστίν, ᾗ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους, σωφροσύνη;
138bἔοικεν, ἔφη.
138bταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη;
138bφαίνεται.
138bκαὶ μὴν οὕτω γε καὶ αἱ πόλεις εὖ οἰκοῦνται, ὅταν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δίκην διδῶσιν.
138bἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.
138bκαὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρα αὑτή ἐστιν.
138bσυνεδόκει.
138bτί δὲ ὅταν εἷς ἀνὴρ ὀρθῶς πόλιν διοικῇ, ὄνομά γε τούτῳ οὐ τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς;
138bφημί.
138bοὐκοῦν βασιλικῇ τε καὶ τυραννικῇ τέχνῃ διοικεῖ;
138bοὕτως.
138bκαὶ αὗται ἄρʼ αἱ αὐταὶ τέχναι εἰσὶν ἐκείναις;
138bφαίνονται.
138cτί δʼ ὅταν εἷς ὢν ἀνὴρ οἰκίαν διοικῇ ὀρθῶς, τί ὄνομα τούτῳ ἐστίν; οὐκ οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης;
138cναί.
138cπότερον οὖν καὶ οὗτος δικαιοσύνῃ εὖ ἂν τὴν οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ κἄλλῃ τινὶ τέχνῃ;
138cδικαιοσύνῃ.
138cἔστιν ἄρα ταὐτόν, ὡς ἔοικε, βασιλεύς, τύραννος, πολιτικός, οἰκονόμος, δεσπότης, σώφρων, δίκαιος. καὶ μία τέχνη ἐστὶν βασιλική, τυραννική, πολιτική, δεσποτική, οἰκονομική, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη.
138cφαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως.
138dπότερον οὖν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ, ὅταν μὲν ἰατρὸς περὶ τῶν καμνόντων τι λέγῃ, αἰσχρὸν μήθʼ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι μηδὲν περὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, καὶ ὁπόταν ἄλλος τις τῶν δημιουργῶν, ὡσαύτως· ὅταν δὲ δικαστὴς ἢ βασιλεὺς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν νυνδὴ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν περὶ τούτων μήτε ἕπεσθαι δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν;
138dπῶς δʼ οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε τοσούτων πραγμάτων μηδὲν ἔχειν συμβάλλεσθαι;
138eπότερον οὖν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα λέγωμεν, ἔφην, πένταθλον αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὕπακρον, καὶ ταύτης μὲν τὰ δευτερεῖα ἔχοντα πάντων τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ ἀχρεῖον εἶναι ἕως ἂν τούτων τις ᾖ, ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἐπιτρεπτέον οὐδὲ τὰ δευτερεῖα ἐν τούτῳ ἑκτέον, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς, εἰ μέλλει εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ἡ οἰκία;
138eσυνεχώρει δή μοι.
Section 138
137eWell now, when one is a man, and does not know the good and bad men, one surely cannot know whether one is good or wicked oneself, since one is a man also oneself?
137eHe granted this.
137eAnd is not knowing oneself being temperate, or not being temperate?
137eNot being temperate.
137eSo knowing oneself is being temperate?
137eI agree, he said.
137eSo this is the message, it seems, of the Delphic inscription—that one is to practise temperance and justice.
137eIt seems so.
137eAnd it is by this same art that we know also how to punish rightly?
137eYes.
137eThen that whereby we know how to punish rightly
138bis justice, and that whereby we know how to distinguish our own and others’ quality is temperance?
138bIt seems so, he said.
138bThen justice and temperance are the same thing?
138bApparently.
138bAnd further, it is thus, you know, that cities are well ordered—when the wrongdoers pay the penalty.
138bThat is true, he said.
138bHence this is also statecraft.
138bHe concurred.
138bAgain, when one man governs a city rightly, is he not called a despot and king?
138bI agree.
138bAnd he governs by a kingly and despotic art?
138bThat is so.
138bAnd these arts are the same as the former?
138bApparently.
138cAgain, when a man singly governs a house aright, what is he called? Is he not a house-manager and master?
138cYes.
138cThen would he also govern his house well by justice, or by some other art?
138cBy justice.
138cHence they are all the same, it seems,—king, despot, statesman, house-manager, master, and the temperate man and the just man; and it is all one art,—the kingly, the despotic, the statesman’s, the master’s, the house-manager’s, and justice and temperance.
138cIt is so, apparently, he said.
138dThen, if it is disgraceful in the philosopher to be unable, when a doctor speaks about the sick, either to follow his remarks or to contribute anything of his own to what is being said or done, and to be in the same case when any other of the craftsmen speaks, is it not disgraceful that he should be unable, when it is a judge or a king or some other of the persons whom we have just instanced, either to follow their words or contribute anything to their business?
138dIt must indeed be disgraceful, Socrates, to have nothing to contribute to subjects of such great importance!
138eAre we then to say, I asked, that in these matters also he is to be an all-round athlete, a second-rate man, taking the second place in all the subjects of this art—he, the philosopher—and is to be useless so long as there is one of these persons; or that, first of all, he is to entrust his own house to nobody else and is not to take the second place in it, but is himself to judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well managed?
138eHe granted me that it must be so.
Section 139
138eἔπειτά γε δήπου ἐάντε οἱ φίλοι αὐτῷ διαίτας ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἐάντε ἡ πόλις τι προστάττῃ διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν,
139aαἰσχρὸν ἐν τούτοις, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον καὶ μὴ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι;
139aδοκεῖ μοι.
139aπολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμαθία τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία.
139aεἰπόντος δʼ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ὁ μὲν σοφὸς αἰσχυνθεὶς τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐσίγησεν, ὁ δὲ ἀμαθὴς ἔφη ἐκείνως εἶναι· καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπῄνεσαν τὰ εἰρημένα.
Section 139
138eSecondly, I presume, whether his friends entrust him with an arbitration, or the state charges him to determine
139aor judge any matter, it is disgraceful for him, my good friend, in such cases, to be found in the second or third place, and not to lead?
139aI agree.
139aHence we see, my excellent sir, that philosophizing is very far from being much learning and that affair of busying oneself with the arts.
139aOn my saying this the cultivated youth was silent, feeling ashamed for what he had said before, while the unlearned one said it was as I stated; and the rest of the company praised the argument.