Contents — 8 sections
Fragment B1
In the beginning any discourse, it seems to me that one should make one’s starting-point something indisputable, and one’s expression simple and dignified. R. P. 207.
Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophy_ (4th ed., 1930), Ch. X, §II, fr. 1 (Diels's arrangement).
Fragment B2
My view is, to sum it all up, that all things are differentiations of the same thing, and are the same thing. And this is obvious ; for, if the things which are now in this world — earth, and water, and air and fire, and the other things which we see of Successions, that he had “ heard " Anaximenes is due to the usual confusion. He was doubtless, like Anaxagoras, " an associate of the philosophy of Anaximenes.” Cf. Chap. VI. § 122. * Aristoph. Clouds, 227 sqq,, where Sokrates speaks of '* mixing his subtle thought with the kindred air," and especially the words plq; I i\K€i wpbs abrv iKfidSa Trjs tftpovrLSos, For the see Beare, P* 59 - » SimpL Phys, p, 151, 24 (R. P. 207 a). * Simplicius says lipsi 4 >virtd\ 6 yovs, but he adds that Diogenes called them <ro<t>i(rral, which is the older word. This is, so far, in favour of the genuineness of the work. ® Diels gives this as £r. 6 {Vors. 51 b 6). I have omitted it, as it really belongs to the history of Medicine. existing in this world — if any one of these things, I say, were different from any other, different, that is, by having a substance peculiar to itself ; and if it were not the same thing that is often changed and differentiated, then things could not in any way mix with one another, nor could they do one another good or harm. Neither could a plant grow out of the earth, nor any animal nor anything else come into being unless things were composed in such a way as to be the same. But all these things arise from the same thing ; they are differentiated and take different forms at different times, and return again to the same thing. R. P. 208.
Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophy_ (4th ed., 1930), Ch. X, §II, fr. 2 (Diels's arrangement).
Fragment B3
For it would not be possible for it without intelligence to be so divided, as to keep the measures of all things, of winter and summer, of day and night, of rains and winds and fair weather. And any one who cares to reflect will find that everything else is disposed in the best possible manner.- R. P. 210.
Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophy_ (4th ed., 1930), Ch. X, §II, fr. 3 (Diels's arrangement).
Fragment B4
And, further, there are still the following great proofs. Men and all other animals live upon air by breathing it, and this is their soul and their intelligence, as will be clearly shown in this work ; while, when this is taken away, they die, and their intelligence fails. R. P. 210.
Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophy_ (4th ed., 1930), Ch. X, §II, fr. 4 (Diels's arrangement).
Fragment B5
And my view is, that that which has intelligence is what men call air, and that all things have their course steered by it, and that it has power over all things. For this very thing I hold to be a god, and to reach everywhere, and to dispose everything, and to be in eveiything ; and there is not an3rthing which does not partake in it. Yet no single thing partakes in it just in the same way as another ; but there are many modes both of air and of intelligence. For it undergoes many transformations, warmer and colder, drier and moister, more stable and in swifter motion, and it has many other differentiations in it, and an infinite number of colours and savours. And the soul of all living things is the same, namy, air warmer than that outside us and in which we are, but much colder than that near the sun. And this warmth is not alike in any two kinds of living creatures. certain correction. It is confirmed by the statement of Theophrastos that Diogenes caUed the air within us " a small portion of the god (de Sens. 42) ; and by Philodemos {Dox. p. 536), where we read that Diogenes prais Homer, rbv a4pa yiip atrrby Ala vofjJitip alv, iireidij irdv cldivai rbv Ala Tiiyei (c£. Cic. Nat. D. i. 12, 29). nor, for the matter of that, in any two men ; but it does not . differ much, only so far as is compatible with their being alike. At the same time, it is not possible for any of the things which are differentiated to be exactly like one another till they all once more become the same.
Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophy_ (4th ed., 1930), Ch. X, §II, fr. 5 (Diels's arrangement).
Fragment B6
Since, then, differentiation is multiform, living creatures are multiform and many, and they are like one another neither ■ in appearance nor in intelligence, because of the multitude of differentiations. At the same time, they all live, and see, and hear by the same thing, and they all have their intelligence from the same source. R. P. 211.
Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophy_ (4th ed., 1930), Ch. X, §II, fr. 6 (Diels's arrangement).
Fragment B7
And this itself is an eternal and undying body, but of those things some come into being and some pass away.
Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophy_ (4th ed., 1930), Ch. X, §II, fr. 7 (Diels's arrangement).
Fragment B8
But this, too, appears to me to be obvious, that it is both great, and mighty, and eternal, and undying, and of great knowledge. R. P. 209.
Burnet, _Early Greek Philosophy_ (4th ed., 1930), Ch. X, §II, fr. 8 (Diels's arrangement).