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Plato for Beginners: the Apology

Plato · 26 sections, Stephanus 17a–42a · Greek beside a fresh literal English translation

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The English below is a new literal translation written for this page; it is not the translation on the main Apology page, which is Fowler’s (Loeb, 1913).

Greek: Burnet’s Oxford text, via Perseus (Scaife). English: fresh and literal, sentence by sentence, so a beginner can follow the Greek. Notes: short reading notes under each passage, adapted from 91 new scholia-style notes on the Apology. Hard words: a dotted Greek word can be tapped to reveal its gloss in place — lemma, one short meaning, and a link to the full LSJ entry. The word list is a computed seed (rare words in this dialogue, outside the most frequent Greek lemmas, plus forms the dictionary leaves unmatched), offered for striking and adding to.

See the full text with Fowler’s English on the main Apology page.

Contents — 26 sections (Stephanus 17a–42a)
  1. Section 17 · 17a–17d
  2. Section 18 · 17d–18e
  3. Section 19 · 18e–19e
  4. Section 20 · 19e–20e
  5. Section 21 · 20e–22a
  6. Section 22 · 22a–22e
  7. Section 23 · 22e–23e
  8. Section 24 · 23e–24e
  9. Section 25 · 24e–25e
  10. Section 26 · 25e–26e
  11. Section 27 · 27a–28a
  12. Section 28 · 28a–29a
  13. Section 29 · 29a–29e
  14. Section 30 · 29e–31a
  15. Section 31 · 31a–32a
  16. Section 32 · 32a–33a
  17. Section 33 · 33a–34a
  18. Section 34 · 34a–35a
  19. Section 35 · 35a–35d
  20. Section 36 · 35e–36e
  21. Section 37 · 36e–37e
  22. Section 38 · 37e–38e
  23. Section 39 · 38e–39e
  24. Section 40 · 39e–40e
  25. Section 41 · 40e–41e
  26. Section 42 · 41e–42a

Section 17 · 17a–17d

ὅτι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα· ἐγὼ δʼ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην, οὕτω πιθανῶς ἔλεγον. καίτοι ἀληθές γε ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν εἰρήκασιν. μάλιστα δὲ αὐτῶν ἓν ἐθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν ὧν ἐψεύσαντο, τοῦτο ἐν ᾧ ἔλεγον ὡς χρῆν ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατηθῆτε

ὡς δεινοῦ ὄντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μὴ αἰσχυνθῆναι ὅτι αὐτίκα ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὰν μηδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν φαίνωμαι δεινὸς λέγειν, τοῦτό μοι ἔδοξεν αὐτῶν ἀναισχυντότατον εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἄρα δεινὸν καλοῦσιν οὗτοι λέγειν τὸν τἀληθῆ λέγοντα· εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο λέγουσιν, ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἶναι ῥήτωρ. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἤ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν, ὑμεῖς δέ μου ἀκούσεσθε πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν—οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους, ὥσπερ οἱ τούτων,

ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ἀλλʼ ἀκούσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὀνόμασιν—πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἃ λέγω—καὶ μηδεὶς ὑμῶν προσδοκησάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δήπου πρέποι, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῇδε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ὥσπερ μειρακίῳ πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι καὶ παρίεμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούητέ μου ἀπολογουμένου διʼ ὧνπερ εἴωθα λέγειν καὶ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἐπὶ τῶν τραπεζῶν, ἵνα ὑμῶν πολλοὶ ἀκηκόασι, καὶ ἄλλοθι, μήτε

θαυμάζειν μήτε θορυβεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα. ἔχει γὰρ οὑτωσί. νῦν ἐγὼ πρῶτον ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβέβηκα, ἔτη γεγονὼς ἑβδομήκοντα· ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ξένως ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως.

What you, men of Athens, have suffered at the hands of my accusers, I do not know; but I, for my part, was myself almost made to forget myself by them, so persuasively did they speak. And yet, so to speak, they have said nothing true. But most of all I wondered at one thing among the many things they lied about, this: in which they said that you ought to be on guard lest you be deceived by me

as being clever at speaking. For their not being ashamed that they will at once be refuted by me in deed, when I show myself to be in no way at all clever at speaking — this seemed to me to be the most shameless thing about them, unless indeed they call clever at speaking the man who speaks the truth; for if this is what they mean, I would agree that I am an orator, though not after their fashion. These men, then, as I say, have said either something true or nothing true, but from me you will hear the whole truth — not, however, by Zeus, men of Athens, speeches made beautiful, as theirs are,

with words and names made ornate, but you will hear things said at random with the words that happen to come to me — for I believe that what I say is just — and let none of you expect otherwise; for indeed it would not, I suppose, be fitting, men, at this age of mine to come before you making up speeches like a young lad. And indeed, men of Athens, I beg and entreat this of you above all: if you hear me defending myself with the same words with which I am accustomed to speak, both in the marketplace at the bankers' tables, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, neither

to wonder nor to make an uproar on account of this. For the matter stands thus: now I have come before the court for the first time, being seventy years old; so I am utterly a stranger to the manner of speaking here.

Notes

Section 18 · 17d–18e

ὥσπερ οὖν ἄν, εἰ τῷ ὄντι ξένος ἐτύγχανον ὤν, συνεγιγνώσκετε δήπου ἄν μοι εἰ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ

ἔλεγον ἐν οἷσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὥς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἐᾶν—ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν εἴη—αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μή· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή, ῥήτορος δὲ τἀληθῆ λέγειν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιός εἰμι ἀπολογήσασθαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτά μου ψευδῆ κατηγορημένα καὶ τοὺς πρώτους κατηγόρους, ἔπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ ὕστερον καὶ τοὺς

ὑστέρους. >ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατήγοροι γεγόνασι πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς λέγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μᾶλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἄνυτον, καίπερ ὄντας καὶ τούτους δεινούς· ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνοι δεινότεροι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἳ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παίδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἔπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ μᾶλλον οὐδὲν ἀληθές, ὡς ἔστιν τις Σωκράτης σοφὸς ἀνήρ, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς πάντα ἀνεζητηκὼς καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω

ποιῶν. οὗτοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οἱ ταύτην τὴν φήμην κατασκεδάσαντες, οἱ δεινοί εἰσίν μου κατήγοροι· οἱ γὰρ ἀκούοντες ἡγοῦνται τοὺς ταῦτα ζητοῦντας οὐδὲ θεοὺς νομίζειν. ἔπειτά εἰσιν οὗτοι οἱ κατήγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἤδη κατηγορηκότες, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν ᾗ ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες ὄντες ἔνιοι ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνῶς ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὐδενός. ὃ δὲ πάντων ἀλογώτατον, ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ

ὀνόματα οἷόν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, πλὴν εἴ τις κωμῳδοποιὸς τυγχάνει ὤν. ὅσοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ χρώμενοι ὑμᾶς ἀνέπειθον—οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι ἄλλους πείθοντες—οὗτοι πάντες ἀπορώτατοί εἰσιν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οἷόν τʼ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖ οὐδʼ ἐλέγξαι οὐδένα, ἀλλʼ ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ σκιαμαχεῖν ἀπολογούμενόν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν μηδενὸς ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιώσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, διττούς μου τοὺς κατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἑτέρους μὲν τοὺς ἄρτι κατηγορήσαντας, ἑτέρους δὲ

τοὺς πάλαι οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἰήθητε δεῖν πρὸς ἐκείνους πρῶτόν με ἀπολογήσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκείνων πρότερον ἠκούσατε κατηγορούντων καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶνδε τῶν ὕστερον.

Just as, then, if I really happened to be a foreigner, you would surely make allowance for me if I spoke in that language and in that manner

in which I was brought up, so too now I ask this of you as just, as it seems to me: to let the manner of speaking go — for it may perhaps be worse, or it may perhaps be better — but to look at this very thing and to pay attention to this, whether I speak justly or not; for this is the excellence of a judge, but of a speaker, to speak the truth. First, then, I am bound to defend myself, men of Athens, against the first false charges against me and the first accusers, and then against the later ones and the

later ones. For many accusers of mine have arisen before you, and already many years ago, and saying nothing true, whom I fear more than those around Anytus, although these too are clever; but those others are cleverer, men, who took hold of the many of you from childhood and persuaded you and accused me, saying nothing more true, that there is a certain Socrates, a wise man, a thinker about the things in the sky and one who has investigated all the things under the earth and who makes the weaker argument the stronger

argument. These men, men of Athens, who have spread abroad this report, are the clever accusers of mine; for those who hear them suppose that those who investigate these things do not even believe in gods. And then these accusers are many and have already been accusing for a long time, and moreover they speak to you at this age in which you would most believe them, when some of you were children and youths, accusing utterly in a case with no one defending. But what is most unreasonable of all is that it is not even possible to know and to say their

names, except if one happens to be a comic poet. But those who used envy and slander to persuade you — and some of them, themselves persuaded, persuading others — these are all the hardest to deal with; for it is not possible either to bring any of them up here or to refute anyone, but it is necessary, just as if fighting shadows, to defend oneself and to refute, with no one answering. Consider, then, you too, as I say, that my accusers have become twofold, some the ones who have just now accused, others

the ones long ago of whom I speak, and suppose that I must defend myself first against those; for you heard those accusing earlier, and much more than these later ones.

Notes

Section 19 · 18e–19e

εἶεν· ἀπολογητέον δή, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρητέον

ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τὴν διαβολὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἔσχετε ταύτην ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ. βουλοίμην μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως γενέσθαι, εἴ τι ἄμεινον καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ἐμοί, καὶ πλέον τί με ποιῆσαι ἀπολογούμενον· οἶμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλεπὸν εἶναι, καὶ οὐ πάνυ με λανθάνει οἷόν ἐστιν. ὅμως τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω ὅπῃ τῷ θεῷ φίλον, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.ἀναλάβωμεν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστὶν ἐξ ἧς

ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ᾗ δὴ καὶ πιστεύων Μέλητός με ἐγράψατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην. εἶεν· τί δὴ λέγοντες διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ὥσπερ οὖν κατηγόρων τὴν ἀντωμοσίαν δεῖ ἀναγνῶναι αὐτῶν· Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω

ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους ταὐτὰ ταῦτα διδάσκων. τοιαύτη τίς ἐστιν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἑωρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περιφερόμενον, φάσκοντά τε ἀεροβατεῖν καὶ ἄλλην πολλὴν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦντα, ὧν ἐγὼ οὐδὲν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πέρι ἐπαΐω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτιμάζων λέγω τὴν τοιαύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἴ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφός ἐστιν—μή πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φεύγοιμι— ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

μάρτυρας δὲ αὖ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξιῶ ὑμᾶς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὅσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου—πολλοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν οἱ τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν— φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλοις εἰ πώποτε ἢ μικρὸν ἢ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ὑμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων διαλεγομένου, καὶ ἐκ τούτου γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαῦτʼ ἐστὶ καὶ τἆλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδέ γʼ εἴ τινος ἀκηκόατε ὡς ἐγὼ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρήματα

πράττομαι, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτό γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἴ τις οἷός τʼ εἴη παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους ὥσπερ Γοργίας τε ὁ Λεοντῖνος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖος καὶ Ἱππίας ὁ Ἠλεῖος.

Very well; I must defend myself, men of Athens, and I must try

to remove from you the slander which you have held for a long time, in so short a time as this. I would wish, then, that this should happen in this way, if it is better both for you and for me, and that I should achieve more by defending myself; but I think it is difficult, and it does not at all escape me what sort of thing it is. Yet let this go wherever it is dear to the god, but I must obey the law and defend myself. Let us take up, then, from the beginning what the charge is from which

my slander has arisen, the one in which Meletus too, believing, wrote this indictment against me. Very well; what then were the slanderers saying when they slandered? Just as, then, the sworn statement of the accusers must be read: 'Socrates does wrong and busies himself, investigating the things under the earth and the things in the sky and making the weaker argument the stronger

argument and teaching others these same things.' Such is its character; for you yourselves saw these things in the comedy of Aristophanes, a certain Socrates there being carried about, claiming to walk on air and talking much other nonsense, about which I know nothing, neither great nor small. And I do not say this as dishonouring such knowledge, if anyone is wise about such things — lest I be prosecuted by Meletus in so many lawsuits — but indeed for me, men of Athens, I have no share in these things.

But I offer the many of you as witnesses, and I ask you to teach and tell one another, as many of you as have ever heard me conversing — and many of you are such — tell one another, then, whether anyone of you has ever heard me conversing about such things, either small or great, and from this you will know that such too are the other things that the many say about me. But indeed there is nothing of these things, nor, if you have heard that I try to educate men and take money,

is even this true. Since this too seems to me to be a fine thing, if anyone should be able to educate men, just as Gorgias the Leontine and Prodicus the Cean and Hippias the Elean.

Notes

Section 20 · 19e–20e

τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὦ ἄνδρες, οἷός τʼ ἐστὶν ἰὼν εἰς ἑκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους—οἷς ἔξεστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα συνεῖναι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται—τούτους πείθουσι

τὰς ἐκείνων συνουσίας ἀπολιπόντας σφίσιν συνεῖναι χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάριν προσειδέναι. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄλλος ἀνήρ ἐστι Πάριος ἐνθάδε σοφὸς ὃν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ἐπιδημοῦντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὼν ἀνδρὶ ὃς τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ σύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου· τοῦτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην—ἐστὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ δύο ὑεῖ— ὦ Καλλία, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ μέν σου τὼ ὑεῖ πώλω ἢ μόσχω ἐγενέσθην, εἴχομεν ἂν αὐτοῖν ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν καὶ μισθώσασθαι ὃς

ἔμελλεν αὐτὼ καλώ τε κἀγαθὼ ποιήσειν τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετήν, ἦν δʼ ἂν οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἱππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· νῦν δʼ ἐπειδὴ ἀνθρώπω ἐστόν, τίνα αὐτοῖν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβεῖν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν; οἶμαι γάρ σε ἐσκέφθαι διὰ τὴν τῶν ὑέων κτῆσιν. ἔστιν τις, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἢ οὔ; πάνυ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς. τίς, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ποδαπός, καὶ πόσου διδάσκει; Εὔηνος, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνῶν. καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὔηνον ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς

ἔχοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἂν εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλʼ οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.ὑπολάβοι ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἴσως· ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ σὸν τί ἐστι πρᾶγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαί σοι αὗται γεγόνασιν; οὐ γὰρ δήπου σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττότερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαύτη φήμη τε καὶ λόγος γέγονεν, εἰ μή τι ἔπραττες ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἱ πολλοί. λέγε οὖν ἡμῖν τί

ἐστιν, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοσχεδιάζωμεν. ταυτί μοι δοκεῖ δίκαια λέγειν ὁ λέγων, κἀγὼ ὑμῖν πειράσομαι ἀποδεῖξαι τί ποτʼ ἐστὶν τοῦτο ὃ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκεν τό τε ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή. καὶ ἴσως μὲν δόξω τισὶν ὑμῶν παίζειν· εὖ μέντοι ἴστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐρῶ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, διʼ οὐδὲν ἀλλʼ ἢ διὰ σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἔσχηκα. ποίαν δὴ σοφίαν ταύτην; ἥπερ ἐστὶν ἴσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία· τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός. οὗτοι δὲ τάχʼ ἄν, οὓς ἄρτι

ἔλεγον, μείζω τινὰ ἢ κατʼ ἄνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφοὶ εἶεν, ἢ οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτὴν ἐπίσταμαι, ἀλλʼ ὅστις φησὶ ψεύδεταί τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καί μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μὴ θορυβήσητε, μηδʼ ἐὰν δόξω τι ὑμῖν μέγα λέγειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον ὃν ἂν λέγω, ἀλλʼ εἰς ἀξιόχρεων ὑμῖν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίσω. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δή τίς ἐστιν σοφία καὶ οἵα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖς. Χαιρεφῶντα γὰρ ἴστε που.

For each of these men, men, is able, going into each of the cities, to persuade the young men — to whom it is open to associate for free with whichever of their own citizens they wish — these men they persuade

to leave the company of those men and to associate with them, giving them money and owing them thanks besides. And indeed there is another wise man here, a Parian, whom I perceived to be staying here; for I happened to approach a man who has paid money to sophists more than all the others together, Callias the son of Hipponicus; this man, then, I asked — for he has two sons — 'Callias,' I said, 'if your two sons had been born colts or calves, we would have had an overseer to take for them and to hire, who'

would make them fine and good in the excellence that belongs to them, and this man would be either one of the horse-trainers or one of the farmers; but now, since they are men, whom do you have in mind to take as overseer for them? Who is skilled in such excellence, the human and political excellence? For I suppose you have considered it, on account of your possession of sons. Is there such a man,' I said, 'or not?' 'Very much so,' he said. 'Who,' I said, 'and from where, and how much does he teach for?' 'Evenus,' he said, 'Socrates, a Parian, for five minae.' And I congratulated Evenus, if he truly

possesses this art and teaches it so fittingly. I at any rate would myself both adorn myself and be proud if I knew these things; but I do not know them, men of Athens. One of you, then, perhaps might interject: 'But, Socrates, what is your business? From where have these slanders against you arisen? For surely, if you were not busying yourself with something more out of the ordinary than the rest, so great a report and talk would not then have arisen, unless you were doing something different from the many. Tell us, then, what'

it is, so that we do not improvise about you.' This seems to me to be just, what the speaker says, and I shall try to show you what ever this is that has made for me both the name and the slander. Listen, then. And perhaps I shall seem to some of you to be joking; yet know well that I shall tell you the whole truth. For I, men of Athens, have got this name through nothing else but through a certain wisdom. What wisdom, then, is this? The one which is perhaps human wisdom; for in truth I run the risk of being wise in this. But these men, whom I just now

mentioned, might be wise in a wisdom greater than human, or I do not know what to say; for I do not know it myself, but whoever says so both lies and speaks in slander of me. And do not make an uproar at me, men of Athens, not even if I seem to say something great to you; for I shall not say my own account, whatever I say, but I shall refer the speaker to you as one worthy of credit. For of my wisdom, if there is any and of what sort, I shall offer you as witness the god at Delphi. For you know Chaerephon, I suppose.

Notes

Section 21 · 20e–22a

οὗτος

ἐμός τε ἑταῖρος ἦν ἐκ νέου καὶ ὑμῶν τῷ πλήθει ἑταῖρός τε καὶ συνέφυγε τὴν φυγὴν ταύτην καὶ μεθʼ ὑμῶν κατῆλθε. καὶ ἴστε δὴ οἷος ἦν Χαιρεφῶν, ὡς σφοδρὸς ἐφʼ ὅτι ὁρμήσειεν. καὶ δή ποτε καὶ εἰς Δελφοὺς ἐλθὼν ἐτόλμησε τοῦτο μαντεύσασθαι—καί, ὅπερ λέγω, μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες—ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος. ἀνεῖλεν οὖν ἡ Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ οὑτοσὶ μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος τετελεύτηκεν.

σκέψασθε δὴ ὧν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονεν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὑτωσί· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεός, καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήπου ψεύδεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ. καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν τί ποτε λέγει· ἔπειτα μόγις πάνυ ἐπὶ ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ τοιαύτην τινὰ ἐτραπόμην. ἦλθον ἐπί τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς

ἐνταῦθα εἴπερ που ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὑτοσὶ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερός ἐστι, σὺ δʼ ἐμὲ ἔφησθα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον—ὀνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δέ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς ὃν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτόν τι ἔπαθον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ—ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δʼ οὔ· κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δʼ οὔ.

ἐντεῦθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθόμην καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν παρόντων· πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δʼ οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι, ἀλλʼ οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ οἴομαι εἰδέναι. ἐντεῦθεν ἐπʼ ἄλλον ᾖα τῶν ἐκείνου δοκούντων σοφωτέρων εἶναι καί

μοι ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἔδοξε, καὶ ἐνταῦθα κἀκείνῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθόμην. μετὰ ταῦτʼ οὖν ἤδη ἐφεξῆς ᾖα, αἰσθανόμενος μὲν λυπούμενος καὶ δεδιὼς ὅτι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὅμως δὲ ἀναγκαῖον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖσθαι—ἰτέον οὖν, σκοποῦντι τὸν χρησμὸν τί λέγει, ἐπὶ ἅπαντας τούς τι

δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι.

This man

was a companion of mine from youth, and a companion of the multitude of you, and he shared in this exile with you and came back with you. And you know what sort of man Chaerephon was, how vehement in whatever he set out upon. And once, going to Delphi, he dared to ask this oracle — and, as I say, do not make an uproar, men — for he asked whether anyone was wiser than I. The Pythia then answered that no one was wiser. And concerning these things his brother here will bear witness to you, since that man has died.

Consider, then, for what reason I say these things; for I am about to teach you from where the slander against me has arisen. For when I heard these things I reflected in this way: 'What ever is the god saying, and what ever is he hinting at? For I am conscious in myself of being wise in nothing, neither great nor small; what ever, then, is he saying when he calls me wisest? For surely he is not lying; for it is not lawful for him.' And for a long time I was at a loss as to what ever he is saying; then, with very great difficulty, I turned to an inquiry of this sort. I went to one of those who seem to be wise, in order that

there, if anywhere, I might refute the oracle and show to the oracle that this man here is wiser than I, and you said I was. Examining this man — for I have no need to say his name, but he was one of the politicians, towards whom I, examining him, suffered something of this sort, men of Athens, and conversing with him — this man seemed to me to seem wise to many other men and most of all to himself, but not to be so; and then I tried to show him that he supposed he was wise, but was not.

From this, then, I became hateful to this man and to many of those present; but going away to myself I reasoned that I am wiser than this man; for neither of us, it seems, knows anything fine and good, but this man supposes he knows something, not knowing, while I, just as I do not know, so too I do not suppose; so I seem, at any rate, to be wiser than this man in this very small thing, that the things I do not know I do not even suppose I know. From there I went to another of those who seemed to be wiser than that man, and

the same things seemed to me there, and there I became hateful to that man too and to many others. After this, then, I went on in order, perceiving it with grief and fear that I was becoming hateful, yet nevertheless it seemed necessary to hold the god's business of the greatest account — so I had to go, examining what the oracle says, to all those who

seem to know something.

Notes

Section 22 · 22a–22e

καὶ νὴ τὸν κύνα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι— δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τἀληθῆ λέγειν—ἦ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθόν τι τοιοῦτον· οἱ μὲν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμοῦντες ἔδοξάν μοι ὀλίγου δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου ἐνδεεῖς εἶναι ζητοῦντι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἄλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαυλότεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι εἶναι ἄνδρες πρὸς τὸ φρονίμως ἔχειν. δεῖ δὴ ὑμῖν τὴν ἐμὴν πλάνην ἐπιδεῖξαι ὥσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος ἵνα μοι καὶ ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία γένοιτο. μετὰ γὰρ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ᾖα ἐπὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς τούς τε τῶν τραγῳδιῶν καὶ τοὺς τῶν

διθυράμβων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὡς ἐνταῦθα ἐπʼ αὐτοφώρῳ καταληψόμενος ἐμαυτὸν ἀμαθέστερον ἐκείνων ὄντα. ἀναλαμβάνων οὖν αὐτῶν τὰ ποιήματα ἅ μοι ἐδόκει μάλιστα πεπραγματεῦσθαι αὐτοῖς, διηρώτων ἂν αὐτοὺς τί λέγοιεν, ἵνʼ ἅμα τι καὶ μανθάνοιμι παρʼ αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τἀληθῆ· ὅμως δὲ ῥητέον. ὡς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαντες οἱ παρόντες ἂν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐπεποιήκεσαν. ἔγνων οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν

ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι λέγουσι μὲν πολλὰ καὶ καλά, ἴσασιν δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. τοιοῦτόν τί μοι ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες, καὶ ἅμα ᾐσθόμην αὐτῶν διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τἆλλα σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ἃ οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῇα οὖν καὶ ἐντεῦθεν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰόμενος περιγεγονέναι ᾧπερ καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν. τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ᾖα· ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ

συνῄδη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, τούτους δέ γʼ ᾔδη ὅτι εὑρήσοιμι πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ τούτου μὲν οὐκ ἐψεύσθην, ἀλλʼ ἠπίσταντο ἃ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἠπιστάμην καί μου ταύτῃ σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ταὐτόν μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἁμάρτημα ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ δημιουργοί—διὰ τὸ τὴν τέχνην καλῶς ἐξεργάζεσθαι ἕκαστος ἠξίου καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μέγιστα σοφώτατος εἶναι—καὶ αὐτῶν αὕτη ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκείνην τὴν σοφίαν

ἀποκρύπτειν· ὥστε με ἐμαυτὸν ἀνερωτᾶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ πότερα δεξαίμην ἂν οὕτως ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν, μήτε τι σοφὸς ὢν τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθὴς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἢ ἀμφότερα ἃ ἐκεῖνοι ἔχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρινάμην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοῖ ὥσπερ ἔχω ἔχειν.

And by the Dog, men of Athens — for I must tell you the truth — indeed I did undergo something of this sort: those who were most in repute seemed to me, when I inquired according to the god, to fall short of the most by a little, while others who seemed more worthless seemed to be more decent men as regards being sensible. So I must show you my wandering, as if I were toiling at certain labours, so that the oracle might become unrefuted for me. For after the politicians I went to the poets, both those of tragedies and those of

dithyrambs and the others, thinking that here I would catch myself in the act being less learned than they. So taking up their poems, the ones that seemed to me most worked over by them, I would ask them what they were saying, so that at the same time I might also learn something from them. Now I am ashamed to tell you the truth, men — yet it must be spoken. For, so to speak, nearly all those present would have spoken better about the things they themselves had made than they did. So I recognized again, and in a short time, this too about the poets, that they did not make what they make by wisdom,

but by a certain nature and by being inspired, just as the diviners and the oracle-singers; for these too say many fine things, but know nothing of what they say. Some such experience as this the poets too seemed to me to have undergone, and at the same time I perceived that they, because of their poetry, supposed themselves to be wisest of men in other things too, which they were not. So I went away from there too, supposing that I had the advantage over them in the same respect in which I had over the politicians. In the end, then, I went to the craftsmen; for I

was conscious to myself that I knew practically nothing, so to speak, but I knew that I would find these men knowing many fine things. And in this I was not deceived, but they did know what I did not know, and in this respect they were wiser than I. But, men of Athens, they seemed to me to have the same fault as the poets — the good craftsmen too — because each one, in working his craft well, claimed to be wisest also in the other greatest things, and this failure of theirs hid that wisdom;

so that I asked myself, on behalf of the oracle, whether I would accept being as I am, neither wise with their wisdom nor ignorant with their ignorance, or having both the things that they have. And I answered to myself and to the oracle that it was profitable for me to be as I am.

Notes

Section 23 · 22e–23e

ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι,

πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαί μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἷαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπʼ αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι· οἴονται γάρ με ἑκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τινὸς ἀξία ἐστὶν καὶ οὐδενός. καὶ φαίνεται τοῦτον λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ

τῷ ἐμῷ ὀνόματι, ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι ὅτι οὗτος ὑμῶν, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενὸς ἄξιός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτʼ οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιιὼν ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεὸν καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν τινα οἴωμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε τι τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαί μοι σχολὴ γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλʼ ἐν

πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες—οἷς μάλιστα σχολή ἐστιν, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων—αὐτόματοι, χαίρουσιν ἀκούοντες ἐξεταζομένων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν· κἄπειτα οἶμαι εὑρίσκουσι πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὀλίγα ἢ οὐδέν. ἐντεῦθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπʼ αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὀργίζονται, οὐχ αὑτοῖς,

καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς ἐστι μιαρώτατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐρωτᾷ ὅτι ποιῶν καὶ ὅτι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν ἀλλʼ ἀγνοοῦσιν, ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοὺς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ οἴομαι οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοιεν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάδηλοι γίγνονται προσποιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἅτε οὖν οἶμαι φιλότιμοι

ὄντες καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοί, καὶ συντεταμένως καὶ πιθανῶς λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν ὑμῶν τὰ ὦτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες.

From this inquiry, then, men of Athens,

many enmities have come to be against me, and enmities of the harshest and heaviest sort, so that many slanders have come to be from them, and this name is spoken of me, that I am wise; for each time those present suppose that I myself am wise in the very things in which I refute someone else. But the truth is, men, the god is likely really wise, and in this oracle he says this, that human wisdom is worth little or nothing. And he seems to say this not of Socrates, but to use

my name, making me an example, just as if he were to say that this one of you, men, is wisest, whoever, just as Socrates, has recognized that he is truly worth nothing with respect to wisdom. These things, then, I still even now go around seeking and searching out, according to the god, if among citizens and strangers I suppose anyone to be wise; and whenever he does not seem so to me, I come to the god's aid and show that he is not wise. And on account of this occupation, no leisure has come to me to do anything of the city's affairs worth mentioning, nor of my household affairs, but I am in

enormous poverty on account of service to the god. And besides these things, the young men follow me — those who have most leisure, the sons of the richest — of their own accord, and they delight in hearing men being examined, and they themselves often imitate me, and then they attempt to examine others; and then, I suppose, they find a great abundance of men who suppose they know something, but know little or nothing. From this, then, those examined by them are angry with me, not with themselves,

and they say that Socrates is some most polluted fellow and corrupts the young; and whenever someone asks them, by doing what and by teaching what, they have nothing to say, but they do not know, and so that they may not seem to be at a loss, they say these ready-made things against all who philosophize, that the things aloft and the things under the earth, and not believing in gods, and making the weaker argument the stronger. For the truth, I suppose, they would not want to say, that it is becoming clear that they pretend to know, but know nothing. Since, then, as I suppose, they are ambitious

and vehement and many, and speak concertedly and persuasively about me, they have filled your ears, both long ago and vehemently, by slandering me.

Notes

Section 24 · 23e–24e

ἐκ τούτων καὶ Μέλητός μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων, Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀχθόμενος, Ἄνυτος δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ

τῶν πολιτικῶν, Λύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ τῶν ῥητόρων· ὥστε, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, θαυμάζοιμʼ ἂν εἰ οἷός τʼ εἴην ἐγὼ ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἐξελέσθαι ἐν οὕτως ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ οὕτω πολλὴν γεγονυῖαν. ταῦτʼ ἔστιν ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τἀληθῆ, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενος ἐγὼ λέγω οὐδʼ ὑποστειλάμενος. καίτοι οἶδα σχεδὸν ὅτι αὐτοῖς τούτοις ἀπεχθάνομαι, ὃ καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἴτια

ταῦτά ἐστιν. καὶ ἐάντε νῦν ἐάντε αὖθις ζητήσητε ταῦτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε. περὶ μὲν οὖν ὧν οἱ πρῶτοί μου κατήγοροι κατηγόρουν αὕτη ἔστω ἱκανὴ ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς· πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ φιλόπολιν, ὥς φησι, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταῦτα πειράσομαι ἀπολογήσασθαι. αὖθις γὰρ δή, ὥσπερ ἑτέρων τούτων ὄντων κατηγόρων, λάβωμεν αὖ τὴν τούτων ἀντωμοσίαν. ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις

νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἔγκλημα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν· τούτου δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἓν ἕκαστον ἐξετάσωμεν.φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν με διαφθείροντα. ἐγὼ δέ γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀδικεῖν φημι Μέλητον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥᾳδίως εἰς ἀγῶνα καθιστὰς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ πραγμάτων προσποιούμενος σπουδάζειν καὶ κήδεσθαι ὧν οὐδὲν τούτῳ πώποτε ἐμέλησεν· ὡς δὲ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, πειράσομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι. καί μοι δεῦρο, ὦ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἄλλο τι ἢ

περὶ πλείστου ποιῇ ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἔσονται;ἔγωγε.ἴθι δή νυν εἰπὲ τούτοις, τίς αὐτοὺς βελτίους ποιεῖ; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οἶσθα, μέλον γέ σοι. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείροντα ἐξευρών, ὡς φῄς, ἐμέ, εἰσάγεις τουτοισὶ καὶ κατηγορεῖς· τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἴθι εἰπὲ καὶ μήνυσον αὐτοῖς τίς ἐστιν. —ὁρᾷς, ὦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σιγᾷς καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίτοι οὐκ αἰσχρόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ἱκανὸν τεκμήριον οὗ δὴ ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλʼ εἰπέ, ὠγαθέ, τίς αὐτοὺς ἀμείνους ποιεῖ;οἱ νόμοι.

ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἄνθρωπος, ὅστις πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους;οὗτοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί.πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Μέλητε; οἵδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἷοί τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν;μάλιστα.πότερον ἅπαντες, ἢ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δʼ οὔ;ἅπαντες.εὖ γε νὴ τὴν Ἥραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὠφελούντων.

From these men Meletus attacked me, and Anytus and Lycon — Meletus, being aggrieved on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the craftsmen and

the politicians, and Lycon on behalf of the orators; so that, just as I said at the beginning, I would wonder if I were able to take away this slander from you in so short a time, when it has become so great. These are the truths for you, men of Athens, and I speak them to you having hidden from you neither great nor small, nor having held anything back. And yet I know almost certainly that by these very things I am hated, which is also a proof that I speak the truth and that this is the slander against me and that these are

its causes. And whether you inquire into these things now or again later, you will find it so. Concerning the things, then, of which my first accusers accused me, let this be a sufficient defence before you; but against Meletus, the good and city-loving man, as he says, and the later accusers, I will try to defend myself after this. For again, just as if these were other accusers, let us take up again their sworn charge. And it runs somehow as follows: he says Socrates does wrong in corrupting the young and in not believing in the gods whom the city

believes in, but in other new divine beings. The charge, then, is of this sort; but let us examine each point of this charge. For he says I do wrong by corrupting the young. But I, men of Athens, say Meletus does wrong, because he jests in earnest, lightly bringing men into a trial, pretending to be in earnest about and to care for matters about which he never cared at all; and that this is so, I will try to show you too. Come here, Meletus, tell me: do you hold anything other than

that you make it of the greatest account that the young be as good as possible? 'I do.' Come now, tell these men, who makes them better? For it is clear that you know, since it matters to you. For having found the corrupter, as you say — me — you bring me before these men and accuse me; but the one who makes them better, come, tell and declare to them who he is. — Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and have nothing to say? And yet does it not seem shameful to you, and a sufficient proof of what I say, that you have never cared about it? But tell, good sir, who makes them better? 'The laws.'

'But that is not what I ask, best of men, but what man, who knows first of all even this very thing, the laws?' 'These men, Socrates, the judges.' 'How do you mean, Meletus? Are these men able to educate the young and make them better?' 'Very much so.' 'Whether all of them, or some of them and others not?' 'All.' 'You speak well, by Hera, and you speak of a great abundance of benefactors.'

Notes

Section 25 · 24e–25e

τί δὲ δή; οἱ δὲ ἀκροαταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν

ἢ οὔ;καὶ οὗτοι.τί δέ, οἱ βουλευταί;καὶ οἱ βουλευταί.ἀλλʼ ἄρα, ὦ Μέλητε, μὴ οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείρουσι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ κἀκεῖνοι βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἅπαντες;κἀκεῖνοι.πάντες ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοὺς κἀγαθοὺς ποιοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις;πάνυ σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω.πολλήν γέ μου κατέγνωκας δυστυχίαν. καί μοι ἀπόκριναι· ἦ καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν; οἱ μὲν

βελτίους ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντες ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἷς δέ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἢ τοὐναντίον τούτου πᾶν εἷς μέν τις ὁ βελτίους οἷός τʼ ὢν ποιεῖν ἢ πάνυ ὀλίγοι, οἱ ἱππικοί, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ἐάνπερ συνῶσι καὶ χρῶνται ἵπποις, διαφθείρουσιν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ζῴων; πάντως δήπου, ἐάντε σὺ καὶ Ἄνυτος οὐ φῆτε ἐάντε φῆτε· πολλὴ γὰρ ἄν τις εὐδαιμονία εἴη περὶ τοὺς νέους εἰ εἷς μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἱ δʼ ἄλλοι

ὠφελοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Μέλητε, ἱκανῶς ἐπιδείκνυσαι ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδέν σοι μεμέληκεν περὶ ὧν ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις.ἔτι δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπέ, ὦ πρὸς Διὸς Μέλητε, πότερόν ἐστιν οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς; ὦ τάν, ἀπόκριναι· οὐδὲν γάρ τοι χαλεπὸν ἐρωτῶ. οὐχ οἱ μὲν πονηροὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω αὑτῶν ὄντας, οἱ δʼ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν τι;πάνυ γε.

ἔστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν συνόντων βλάπτεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ὠφελεῖσθαι; ἀποκρίνου, ὦ ἀγαθέ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελεύει ἀποκρίνεσθαι. ἔσθʼ ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι;οὐ δῆτα.φέρε δή, πότερον ἐμὲ εἰσάγεις δεῦρο ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νέους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα;ἑκόντα ἔγωγε.τί δῆτα, ὦ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ ἐμοῦ σοφώτερος εἶ τηλικούτου ὄντος τηλικόσδε ὤν, ὥστε σὺ μὲν ἔγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακόν τι ἐργάζονται ἀεὶ τοὺς μάλιστα πλησίον

ἑαυτῶν, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθόν, ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἥκω ὥστε καὶ τοῦτʼ ἀγνοῶ, ὅτι ἐάν τινα μοχθηρὸν ποιήσω τῶν συνόντων, κινδυνεύσω κακόν τι λαβεῖν ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακὸν ἑκὼν ποιῶ, ὡς φῂς σύ;

But what then? Do the hearers make them better

or not? 'These too.' What about the councillors? 'The councillors too.' But then, Meletus, do those in the assembly, the assemblymen, corrupt the young? Or do those too make them better, all of them? 'Those too.' Then all Athenians, it seems, make them noble and good except me, and I alone corrupt them. Is this what you say? 'I say these things very vehemently.' You have condemned me to great misfortune! And answer me: does it also seem to you to be so in the case of horses, that those who

make them better are all men, and the one who corrupts them is one man? Or the whole opposite of this, that the one able to make them better is one man, or very few, the horsemen, while the many, if they associate with horses and use them, corrupt them? Is it not so, Meletus, both in the case of horses and in the case of all other animals? It is certainly so, whether you and Anytus deny it or affirm it; for it would be great good fortune concerning the young if one man alone corrupted them, and the others

benefit them. But, Meletus, you show sufficiently that you never gave thought to the young, and you clearly display your own neglect, that you have cared nothing about the things concerning which you bring me in. But further, tell us, by Zeus, Meletus, whether it is better to live among good citizens or bad? My good man, answer; for I ask nothing difficult. Do not the bad do some evil to those always nearest to them, and the good some good? 'Very much so.'

Is there, then, anyone who wishes to be harmed by his companions rather than benefited? Answer, good sir; for the law commands you to answer. Is there anyone who wishes to be harmed? 'Certainly not.' Come then, do you bring me here as corrupting the young and making them worse voluntarily or involuntarily? 'Voluntarily, I say.' What then, Meletus? Are you so much wiser than I, you being so young and I so old, that you have recognized that the bad always do some evil to those most near

to themselves, and the good some good, while I have come to such a depth of ignorance that I do not even know this, that if I make any of my companions worthless, I risk receiving some evil from him, so that I do this great evil voluntarily, as you say?

Notes

Section 26 · 25e–26e

ταῦτα ἐγώ σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὦ Μέλητε, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα· ἀλλʼ ἢ οὐ διαφθείρω, ἢ εἰ διαφθείρω,

ἄκων, ὥστε σύ γε κατʼ ἀμφότερα ψεύδῃ. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοιούτων ἁμαρτημάτων οὐ δεῦρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἰδίᾳ λαβόντα διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἐὰν μάθω, παύσομαι ὅ γε ἄκων ποιῶ. σὺ δὲ συγγενέσθαι μέν μοι καὶ διδάξαι ἔφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεῦρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἷ νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεομένους ἀλλʼ οὐ μαθήσεως. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο μὲν ἤδη δῆλον

οὑγὼ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτῳ τούτων οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν πώποτε ἐμέλησεν. ὅμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς με φῂς διαφθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἢ δῆλον δὴ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν γραφὴν ἣν ἐγράψω θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζειν οὓς ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἕτερα δὲ δαιμόνια καινά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω;πάνυ μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω.πρὸς αὐτῶν τοίνυν, ὦ Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν ὧν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, εἰπὲ ἔτι σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν

τουτοισί. ἐγὼ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον λέγεις διδάσκειν με νομίζειν εἶναί τινας θεούς—καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἶναι θεοὺς καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν ἄθεος οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀδικῶ —οὐ μέντοι οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις ἀλλὰ ἑτέρους, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἑτέρους, ἢ παντάπασί με φῂς οὔτε αὐτὸν νομίζειν θεοὺς τούς τε ἄλλους ταῦτα διδάσκειν.ταῦτα λέγω, ὡς τὸ παράπαν οὐ νομίζεις θεούς.

ὦ θαυμάσιε Μέλητε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἄρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι;μὰ Δίʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐπεὶ τὸν μὲν ἥλιον λίθον φησὶν εἶναι, τὴν δὲ σελήνην γῆν.Ἀναξαγόρου οἴει κατηγορεῖν, ὦ φίλε Μέλητε; καὶ οὕτω καταφρονεῖς τῶνδε καὶ οἴει αὐτοὺς ἀπείρους γραμμάτων εἶναι ὥστε οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαζομενίου γέμει τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρʼ ἐμοῦ μανθάνουσιν, ἃ ἔξεστιν ἐνίοτε εἰ πάνυ πολλοῦ δραχμῆς

ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πριαμένοις Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν προσποιῆται ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἄτοπα ὄντα; ἀλλʼ, ὦ πρὸς Διός, οὑτωσί σοι δοκῶ; οὐδένα νομίζω θεὸν εἶναι;οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία οὐδʼ ὁπωστιοῦν.ἄπιστός γʼ εἶ, ὦ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὑτοσί, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάνυ εἶναι ὑβριστὴς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ὕβρει τινὶ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ νεότητι γράψασθαι.

In these things I am not persuaded by you, Meletus, and I suppose no other man is either; but either I do not corrupt them, or if I corrupt them,

involuntarily, so that you lie in both cases. But if I corrupt them involuntarily, the law does not bring such errors in here, but it is to take the man aside privately and teach and admonish him; for it is clear that if I learn, I shall stop doing what I do involuntarily. But you shunned meeting with me and teaching me, and did not wish to, but you bring me in here, where the law is to bring in those who need punishment, not learning. But, men of Athens, this much is already clear

what I was saying, that Meletus never cared, great or small, about these things. But nevertheless, tell us, how do you say I corrupt the young, Meletus? Or is it not clear that, according to the indictment you wrote, it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods whom the city believes in, but in other new divine beings? Is it not this that you say, that I corrupt them by teaching it? 'Very decidedly I say this.' Then, Meletus, by these very gods about whom the argument now is, speak still more clearly, both to me and to these men

here. For I cannot learn whether you say that I teach men to believe that there are some gods — and I myself then believe that there are gods, and I am not altogether godless, nor do I do wrong in this way — yet not the ones the city believes in, but others, and this is what you charge me with, that I believe in others; or whether you say that I altogether do not believe in gods myself, and teach this to others. 'I say this, that you do not believe in gods at all.'

O marvellous Meletus, why do you say these things? Do I then not even believe the sun or the moon to be gods, as other men do? 'By Zeus, judges, since he says the sun is a stone and the moon earth.' Do you suppose you are accusing Anaxagoras, my dear Meletus? And do you so despise these men and suppose them so unversed in letters that they do not know that the books of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae are full of these sayings? And indeed the young learn these things from me, things which they can sometimes buy for a drachma at most from the orchestra

and laugh at Socrates, if he pretends they are his own, especially since they are so strange? But, by Zeus, is this how I seem to you? That I believe no god to be? 'No, by Zeus, not in any way at all.' You are not to be believed, Meletus, and in these things, as it seems to me, not even by yourself. For this man seems to me, men of Athens, to be very insolent and unrestrained, and quite simply to have written this indictment in a spirit of insolence and unrestraint and youthfulness.

Notes

Section 27 · 27a–28a

ἔοικεν γὰρ ὥσπερ αἴνιγμα συντιθέντι διαπειρωμένῳ ἆρα γνώσεται Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαριεντιζομένου καὶ ἐναντίʼ ἐμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ εἴποι· ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τοῦτό ἐστι παίζοντος.συνεπισκέψασθε δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ᾗ μοι φαίνεται ταῦτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὦ Μέλητε. ὑμεῖς δέ, ὅπερ

κατʼ ἀρχὰς ὑμᾶς παρῃτησάμην, μέμνησθέ μοι μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰωθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποιῶμαι.ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων, ὦ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματʼ εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβείτω· ἔσθʼ ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἱππικὰ δὲ πράγματα; ἢ αὐλητὰς μὲν οὐ νομίζει εἶναι, αὐλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν· εἰ μὴ σὺ βούλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἐγὼ σοὶ λέγω καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τουτοισί. ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπόκριναι·

ἔσθʼ ὅστις δαιμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματʼ εἶναι, δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει;οὐκ ἔστιν.ὡς ὤνησας ὅτι μόγις ἀπεκρίνω ὑπὸ τουτωνὶ ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκοῦν δαιμόνια μὲν φῄς με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἴτʼ οὖν καινὰ εἴτε παλαιά, ἀλλʼ οὖν δαιμόνιά γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ διωμόσω ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαιμόνια νομίζω, καὶ δαίμονας δήπου πολλὴ ἀνάγκη νομίζειν μέ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; ἔχει δή· τίθημι γάρ σε ὁμολογοῦντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνῃ. τοὺς δὲ

δαίμονας οὐχὶ ἤτοι θεούς γε ἡγούμεθα ἢ θεῶν παῖδας; φῂς ἢ οὔ;πάνυ γε.οὐκοῦν εἴπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῄς, εἰ μὲν θεοί τινές εἰσιν οἱ δαίμονες, τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη ὃ ἐγώ φημί σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριεντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὐχ ἡγούμενον φάναι με θεοὺς αὖ ἡγεῖσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι· εἰ δʼ αὖ οἱ δαίμονες θεῶν παῖδές εἰσιν νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἔκ τινων ἄλλων ὧν δὴ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν ἀνθρώπων θεῶν μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο εἶναι, θεοὺς δὲ μή; ὁμοίως γὰρ

ἂν ἄτοπον εἴη ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἵππων μὲν παῖδας ἡγοῖτο ἢ καὶ ὄνων, τοὺς ἡμιόνους, ἵππους δὲ καὶ ὄνους μὴ ἡγοῖτο εἶναι. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Μέλητε, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως σὺ ταῦτα οὐχὶ ἀποπειρώμενος ἡμῶν ἐγράψω τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην ἢ ἀπορῶν ὅτι ἐγκαλοῖς ἐμοὶ ἀληθὲς ἀδίκημα· ὅπως δὲ σύ τινα πείθοις ἂν καὶ σμικρὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα ἀνθρώπων, ὡς οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔστιν καὶ δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ αὖ τοῦ αὐτοῦ μήτε

δαίμονας μήτε θεοὺς μήτε ἥρωας, οὐδεμία μηχανή ἐστιν.

For he seems like a man putting together a riddle and testing whether Socrates the wise, indeed, will recognize that I am joking and saying things opposite to myself, or whether I shall deceive him and the others who are listening. For this man seems to me to say opposite things to himself in the indictment, just as if he were to say: 'Socrates does wrong by not believing in gods, but by believing in gods.' And yet this is the act of a man at play. Now join with me in examining, men, in what way he seems to me to say these things; and you, Meletus, answer us. And you, men, what

I begged of you at the beginning, remember for me not to make an uproar if I make my arguments in my accustomed way. Is there any man, Meletus, who believes that human things exist, but does not believe in men? Let him answer, men, and let him not make an uproar in one way and another. Is there anyone who does not believe in horses, but believes in things to do with horses? Or who does not believe that flute-players exist, but believes in things to do with flute-playing? There is not, best of men; if you do not wish to answer, I say it to you and to these others here. But at least answer the next thing:

Is there anyone who believes that daimonic things exist, but does not believe in daimons? There is not. How you have profited by answering only with difficulty, compelled by these men here. Then you say that I both believe in daimonic things and teach them, whether new or old -- at any rate I do believe in daimonic things, according to your account, and you swore to these very things in the counter-indictment. But if I believe in daimonic things, then surely it is a great necessity for me to believe in daimons too; is it not so? It is so, indeed; for I take you to be agreeing, since you do not answer. But the daimons

do we not hold to be either gods or children of gods? Do you say so, or not? Very much so. Then if I hold that daimons exist, as you say -- if the daimons are certain gods, this would be what I say you are riddling and joking at, saying that I, while not holding that gods exist, hold again that gods exist, since I hold that daimons exist; but if, on the other hand, the daimons are certain bastard children of gods, from nymphs or from certain others from whom they are also said to come, what man would hold that there are children of gods, but no gods? For it would be equally

absurd, just as if someone were to hold that there are children of horses or of asses, the mules, but hold that there are no horses and asses. But, Meletus, there is no way that you did not write this indictment either testing us or being at a loss as to what true wrongdoing you could charge me with; but as for persuading any man, even one with a little sense, that it is possible for the same man both to hold that daimonic and divine things exist, and again for the same man to hold neither

daimons nor gods nor heroes, there is no device at all.

Notes

Section 28 · 28a–29a

ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἀδικῶ κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἱκανὰ καὶ ταῦτα· ὃ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἔλεγον, ὅτι πολλή μοι ἀπέχθεια γέγονεν καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι ἀληθές ἐστιν. καὶ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ ἐμὲ αἱρεῖ, ἐάνπερ αἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἄνυτος ἀλλʼ ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολή τε καὶ φθόνος. ἃ δὴ πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς

ἄνδρας ᾕρηκεν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ αἱρήσει· οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στῇ. ἴσως ἂν οὖν εἴποι τις· εἶτʼ οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύσας ἐξ οὗ κινδυνεύεις νυνὶ ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελός ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει, καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. φαῦλοι

γὰρ ἂν τῷ γε σῷ λόγῳ εἶεν τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασιν οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος υἱός, ὃς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησεν παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι ὥστε, ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὑτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι· ὦ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλῳ τῷ ἑταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἕκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανῇ—αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθʼ Ἕκτορα πότμος ἑτοῖμος —ὁ δὲ τοῦτο ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὠλιγώρησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον

δείσας τὸ ζῆν κακὸς ὢν καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναίην, δίκην ἐπιθεὶς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἵνα μὴ ἐνθάδε μένω καταγέλαστος παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν ἄχθος ἀρούρης. ὴ αὐτὸν οἴει φροντίσαι θανάτου καὶ κινδύνου;οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ ἀληθείᾳ· οὗ ἄν τις ἑαυτὸν τάξῃ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἢ ὑπʼ ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲν ὑπολογιζόμενον μήτε θάνατον μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ. ἐγὼ οὖν δεινὰ ἂν εἴην εἰργασμένος, ὦ ἄνδρες

Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μέν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἔταττον, οὓς ὑμεῖς εἵλεσθε ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτειδαίᾳ καὶ ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει καὶ ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ, τότε μὲν οὗ ἐκεῖνοι ἔταττον ἔμενον ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλος τις καὶ ἐκινδύνευον ἀποθανεῖν, τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ᾠήθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθεὶς ἢ θάνατον

ἢ ἄλλʼ ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν.

But indeed, men of Athens, that I do no wrong according to the indictment of Meletus seems to me to need no great defence, but even these things are enough; but what I also said before, that great hatred has arisen against me and from many, know well that it is true. And this is what will convict me, if it does convict me -- not Meletus nor Anytus, but the slander and envy of the many. These things have convicted many other good men too,

and I think they will convict more; and there is nothing terrible in its not stopping with me. Perhaps then someone might say: 'Then are you not ashamed, Socrates, of having pursued such a pursuit from which you now run the risk of dying?' And I would answer him with a just argument, that you do not speak well, man, if you think that a man -- one who is of even a little use -- ought to take account of the danger of living or dying, and not to look at this alone, when he acts, whether he acts justly or unjustly, and the deeds of a good man or a bad one. For by your argument, at least, the demigods would be worthless,

as many as have died at Troy, both the others and the son of Thetis, who despised the danger so much beside enduring anything shameful that, when his mother, being a goddess, said to him, as he was eager to kill Hector, something like this, as I think: 'Child, if you avenge the murder of Patroclus your companion and kill Hector, you yourself will die -- for straightway after Hector your fate is ready' -- and he, hearing this, made light of death and of danger, and feared far more

to live being a bad man and not to avenge his friends, 'Straightway,' he says, 'may I die, having laid justice upon the wrongdoer, so that I do not remain here, laughed at beside the beaked ships, a burden of the earth.' Do you think he took account of death and danger? For this is how it is, men of Athens, in truth: wherever a man stations himself, judging it best to be there, or is stationed by a commander, there he must, as it seems to me, remain and run the risk, taking account of neither death nor anything else before disgrace. Then I would have done terrible things, men of

Athens, if, when the commanders stationed me -- the ones you chose to command me -- both at Potidaea and at Amphipolis and at Delium, then I remained where they stationed me, just as anyone else would, and ran the risk of dying, but when the god stationed me, as I both thought and supposed, with the order that I must live philosophizing and examining myself and the others, there, fearing either death

or anything else at all, I were to leave my post.

Notes

Section 29 · 29a–29e

δεινόν τἂν εἴη, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς τότʼ ἄν με δικαίως εἰσάγοι τις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπειθῶν τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδιὼς θάνατον καὶ οἰόμενος σοφὸς εἶναι οὐκ ὤν. τὸ γάρ τοι θάνατον δεδιέναι, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ δοκεῖν σοφὸν εἶναι μὴ ὄντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ εἰδέναι ἐστὶν ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν. οἶδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τὸν θάνατον οὐδʼ εἰ τυγχάνει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὂν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, δεδίασι δʼ ὡς εὖ εἰδότες

ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐστι. καίτοι πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος, ἡ τοῦ οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν; ἐγὼ δʼ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἴσως διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰ δή τῳ σοφώτερός του φαίην εἶναι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου οὕτω καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἀπειθεῖν τῷ βελτίονι καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν ὧν οἶδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἃ μὴ οἶδα εἰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ὥστε οὐδʼ εἴ

με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίετε Ἀνύτῳ ἀπιστήσαντες, ὃς ἔφη ἢ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεῦρο εἰσελθεῖν ἤ, ἐπειδὴ εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἷόν τʼ εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναί με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς εἰ διαφευξοίμην ἤδη ὑμῶν οἱ ὑεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσονται, —εἴ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα εἴποιτε· ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύτῳ οὐ πεισόμεθα ἀλλʼ ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι, ἐφʼ ᾧτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβειν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἐὰν δὲ

ἁλῷς ἔτι τοῦτο πράττων, ἀποθανῇ —εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ εἶπον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοιτε, εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πείσομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἕωσπερ ἂν ἐμπνέω καὶ οἷός τε ὦ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελευόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτῳ ἂν ἀεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων οἷάπερ εἴωθα, ὅτι ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὤν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἰσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως σοι ἔσται ὡς πλεῖστα,

καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς βελτίστη ἔσται οὐκ ἐπιμελῇ οὐδὲ φροντίζεις;

It would be a terrible thing, and truly then someone might justly bring me into court, on the ground that I do not believe that gods exist, disobeying the oracle and fearing death and thinking I am wise when I am not. For fearing death, men, is nothing else than thinking one is wise when one is not; for it is thinking one knows what one does not know. For no one knows death, not even whether it happens to be the greatest of all good things for man, but they fear it as if they knew well

that it is the greatest of evils. And yet how is this not the reproachful ignorance, the ignorance of thinking one knows what one does not know? But I, men, in this too perhaps differ from the many men, and if in anything I should seem to be wiser than anyone, it would be in this, that not knowing sufficiently about the things in Hades, I also think I do not know; but that doing wrong and disobeying one who is better, god or man, is bad and shameful, I know. Before the evils which I know are evils, then, the things which I do not know whether they even happen to be good I shall never fear nor flee; so that not even if

you now let me go, disbelieving Anytus, who said that either at the beginning I ought not to have come in here, or, since I have come in, it is not possible not to kill me, saying to you that if I escape, already your sons, pursuing the things Socrates teaches, will all be utterly corrupted -- if to these things you were to say to me: 'Socrates, now we shall not obey Anytus but let you go, on this condition, however, that you no longer spend your time in this inquiry nor philosophize; but if

you are caught still doing this, you will die' -- if then, as I said, you were to let me go on these terms, I would say to you that I, men of Athens, greet you and love you, but I shall obey the god rather than you, and as long as I breathe and am able, I shall not cease philosophizing and exhorting you and showing to whomever of you I always meet, saying the sorts of things I am accustomed to say, that: best of men, being an Athenian, of the greatest city and the most reputable for wisdom and strength, are you not ashamed of caring how you will have as much money as possible,

and reputation and honour, but of wisdom and truth and the soul, how it will be as good as possible, you do not care nor take thought?

Notes

Section 30 · 29e–31a

καὶ ἐάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδʼ ἄπειμι, ἀλλʼ ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ ἐάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἀρετήν,

φάναι δέ, ὀνειδιῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείστου ἄξια περὶ ἐλαχίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα καὶ νεωτέρῳ καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ ὅτῳ ἂν ἐντυγχάνω ποιήσω, καὶ ξένῳ καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὅσῳ μου ἐγγυτέρω ἐστὲ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὖ ἴστε, καὶ ἐγὼ οἴομαι οὐδέν πω ὑμῖν μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ τὴν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἢ πείθων ὑμῶν καὶ νεωτέρους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους μήτε σωμάτων

ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρημάτων πρότερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὡς ἀρίστη ἔσται, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτʼ ἂν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δέ τίς μέ φησιν ἄλλα λέγειν ἢ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. πρὸς ταῦτα, φαίην ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἢ μή, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετέ με ἢ μή, ὡς ἐμοῦ οὐκ

ἂν ποιήσαντος ἄλλα, οὐδʼ εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλʼ ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφʼ οἷς ἂν λέγω ἀλλʼ ἀκούειν· καὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες. μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄττα ὑμῖν ἐρεῖν καὶ ἄλλα ἐφʼ οἷς ἴσως βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδαμῶς ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ἐάν με ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἷον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειεν οὔτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναιτο—οὐ γὰρ οἴομαι θεμιτὸν

εἶναι ἀμείνονι ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονος βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνειε μεντἂν ἴσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἴσως οἴεται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακά, ἐγὼ δʼ οὐκ οἴομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ἃ οὑτοσὶ νῦν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτεινύναι. νῦν οὖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὥς τις ἂν οἴοιτο, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μή τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ

θεοῦ δόσιν ὑμῖν ἐμοῦ καταψηφισάμενοι. ἐὰν γάρ με ἀποκτείνητε, οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἄλλον τοιοῦτον εὑρήσετε, ἀτεχνῶς—εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν—προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύωπός τινος, οἷον δή μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθηκέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον

οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαθίζων.

And if any of you disputes it and says he does care, I shall not let him go at once nor go away, but I shall question him and examine him and cross-examine him, and if he does not seem to me to have acquired virtue,

though he says he does, I shall reproach him for making the things of most worth of least account, and the more worthless things of more account. These things I shall do to whomever I meet, younger and older, both foreigner and citizen, but more to the citizens, inasmuch as you are nearer to me by birth. For the god commands these things, know well, and I think that no greater good has yet come to be for you in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else than persuading you, both younger and older, to care neither for bodies

nor for money before the soul, nor so strongly, as for the soul, how it will be as good as possible, saying that virtue does not come from money, but from virtue come money and all the other good things for men, both in private and in public. If then, by saying these things, I corrupt the young, these things would be harmful; but if anyone says that I say other things than these, he says nothing. To these things, I would say, men of Athens, either obey Anytus or not, and either let me go or not, knowing that I will not

do otherwise, not even if I am about to die many times. Do not make an uproar, men of Athens, but remain with me in what I asked of you, not to make an uproar at the things I say but to listen; for, as I think, you will profit by listening. For I am about to say some other things to you, at which perhaps you will shout; but do not do this in any way. For know well, if you kill me, being such a man as I say I am, you will not harm me more than yourselves; for neither Meletus nor Anytus would harm me -- for he would not even be able to -- for I do not think it is permitted by divine law

for a better man to be harmed by a worse man. He might perhaps kill me, or drive me out, or deprive me of honour; but these things he perhaps thinks, and some other man somewhere, are great evils, but I do not think so; rather I think it is far more so to do what this man now does, to attempt to kill a man unjustly. Now then, men of Athens, I am far from making my defence for myself, as one might think, but for you, lest you do wrong concerning the

gift of the god to you, by voting to condemn me. For if you kill me, you will not easily find another such man, simply -- even if it is rather laughable to say -- one fastened upon the city by the god as a gadfly is upon a horse, a horse great and well-bred, but sluggish by reason of its size and needing to be roused by a gadfly of some sort; such a one, as it seems to me, the god has fastened upon the city, one who, rousing you and persuading you and reproaching you, each one

of you, I never at all stop settling down beside you the whole day long, everywhere.

Notes

Section 31 · 31a–32a

τοιοῦτος οὖν ἄλλος οὐ ῥᾳδίως ὑμῖν γενήσεται, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν ἐμοὶ πείθησθε, φείσεσθέ μου· ὑμεῖς δʼ ἴσως τάχʼ ἂν ἀχθόμενοι, ὥσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες ἄν με, πειθόμενοι Ἀνύτῳ, ῥᾳδίως ἂν ἀποκτείναιτε, εἶτα τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτε ἄν, εἰ μή τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψειεν κηδόμενος ὑμῶν. ὅτι δʼ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὢν τοιοῦτος οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, ἐνθένδε

ἂν κατανοήσαιτε· οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνῳ ἔοικε τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ πάντων ἠμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἤδη ἔτη, τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἀεί, ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ προσιόντα ὥσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον πείθοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς. καὶ εἰ μέν τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυον καὶ μισθὸν λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἶχον ἄν τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὁρᾶτε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ ὅτι οἱ κατήγοροι τἆλλα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὕτω κατηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γε οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι

παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγώ ποτέ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ᾔτησα. ἱκανὸν γάρ, οἶμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν. ἴσως ἂν οὖν δόξειεν ἄτοπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλεύω περιιὼν καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτερον συμβουλεύειν τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἴτιόν ἐστιν ὃ ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ

δαιμόνιον γίγνεται , ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἐπικωμῳδῶν Μέλητος ἐγράψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον, φωνή τις γιγνομένη, ἣ ὅταν γένηται, ἀεὶ ἀποτρέπει με τοῦτο ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔποτε. τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὅ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν, καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι· εὖ γὰρ ἴστε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολώλη καὶ οὔτʼ ἂν ὑμᾶς ὠφελήκη

οὐδὲν οὔτʼ ἂν ἐμαυτόν. καί μοι μὴ ἄχθεσθε λέγοντι τἀληθῆ· οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλῳ πλήθει οὐδενὶ γνησίως ἐναντιούμενος καὶ διακωλύων πολλὰ ἄδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι, ἀλλʼ

ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τὸν τῷ ὄντι μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεσθαι, ἰδιωτεύειν ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

Such another, then, will not easily come to be for you, men, but if you obey me, you will spare me; but you perhaps, being vexed, just as men roused from sleep, striking me, and obeying Anytus, might easily kill me, and then for the rest of your life you would go on sleeping, unless the god, caring for you, should send some other man upon you. But that I happen to be such a man as to have been given to the city by the god, from this point

you might understand: for it does not resemble human conduct, that I have neglected all my own affairs and have endured my household affairs being neglected for so many years now, but I always do your business, coming to each one of you in private, like a father or an elder brother, persuading you to care for virtue. And if I were getting anything from these things and receiving pay while I exhorted you to these things, I would have some argument; but as it is, you yourselves see that the accusers, accusing me of all the other things so shamelessly, at least in this have not been able to be so utterly shameless as to

produce a witness, that I ever either exacted pay from anyone or asked for it. For I provide, I think, a sufficient witness that I speak the truth -- my poverty. Perhaps then it might seem strange that I go about advising these things in private and busy myself with them, but in public I do not dare to go up before your assembly and advise the city. But the cause of this is what you have heard me saying many times in many places, that something divine and

daimonic comes to me, the very thing which Meletus, mocking it, wrote into the indictment. But this is mine from childhood onwards: a kind of voice comes to be, which, whenever it comes to be, always turns me away from what I am about to do, but never urges me on. This is what opposes me in doing political things, and it seems to me to oppose me very finely indeed; for know well, men of Athens, that if I had long ago attempted to do political things, I would long ago have perished, and I would have benefited neither you

nor myself at all. And do not be vexed with me for speaking the truth; for there is no man who will be saved, neither against you nor against any other multitude, if he genuinely opposes them and hinders many unjust and unlawful things from coming to be in the city, but

it is necessary for the one who really fights for the just, even if he is to be saved for a little time, to live as a private citizen and not as a public man.

Notes

Section 32 · 32a–33a

μεγάλα δʼ ἔγωγε ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους ἀλλʼ ὃ ὑμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἔργα. ἀκούσατε δή μοι τὰ συμβεβηκότα, ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι οὐδʼ ἂν ἑνὶ ὑπεικάθοιμι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δείσας θάνατον, μὴ ὑπείκων δὲ ἀλλὰ κἂν ἀπολοίμην. ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἄλλην μὲν ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν

πώποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβούλευσα δέ· καὶ ἔτυχεν ἡμῶν ἡ φυλὴ Ἀντιοχὶς πρυτανεύουσα ὅτε ὑμεῖς τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐβουλεύσασθε ἁθρόους κρίνειν, παρανόμως, ὡς ἐν τῷ ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἔδοξεν. τότʼ ἐγὼ μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων ἠναντιώθην ὑμῖν μηδὲν ποιεῖν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ ἐναντία ἐψηφισάμην· καὶ ἑτοίμων ὄντων ἐνδεικνύναι με καὶ ἀπάγειν τῶν ῥητόρων, καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ βοώντων, μετὰ τοῦ

νόμου καὶ τοῦ δικαίου ᾤμην μᾶλλόν με δεῖν διακινδυνεύειν ἢ μεθʼ ὑμῶν γενέσθαι μὴ δίκαια βουλευομένων, φοβηθέντα δεσμὸν ἢ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν ἔτι δημοκρατουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὀλιγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τριάκοντα αὖ μεταπεμψάμενοί με πέμπτον αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν θόλον προσέταξαν ἀγαγεῖν ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος Λέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνιον ἵνα ἀποθάνοι, οἷα δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνοι πολλοῖς πολλὰ προσέταττον, βουλόμενοι ὡς πλείστους ἀναπλῆσαι αἰτιῶν. τότε μέντοι ἐγὼ

οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδʼ ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν, οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ᾤχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ᾠχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ

τούτων ὑμῖν ἔσονται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.ἆρʼ οὖν ἄν με οἴεσθε τοσάδε ἔτη διαγενέσθαι εἰ ἔπραττον τὰ δημόσια, καὶ πράττων ἀξίως ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ὥσπερ χρὴ τοῦτο περὶ πλείστου ἐποιούμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλος

ἀνθρώπων οὐδείς.

And I for my part will furnish you with great proofs of these things — not words, but what you honour, deeds. Listen, then, to me about the things that happened, so that you may know that I would not yield to a single person against what is just, fearing death, and that by not yielding I would even perish. And I shall tell you things coarse and courtroom-like, but true. For I, men of Athens, held no other office at all

ever in the city, but I served as a councillor; and it happened that our tribe Antiochis was presiding when you deliberated about judging together, in a single vote, the ten generals who had not picked up the men from the sea-battle, unlawfully, as it seemed to all of you in later time. Then I alone of the prytanes opposed you, that nothing be done contrary to the laws, and I voted against it; and although the orators were ready to denounce me and have me arrested, and you were ordering and shouting, I thought that with the

law and what is just I ought rather to run the risk than to side with you when you were deliberating unjustly, fearing imprisonment or death. And these things happened while the city was still a democracy; but when the oligarchy came about, the Thirty in turn summoned me, fifth myself, to the Tholos and ordered me to bring Leon of Salamis from Salamis so that he might die — such orders as they gave to many others in many cases too, wishing to implicate as many as possible in guilt. Then, however, I

showed again not in word but in deed that to me death matters — if it were not rather crude to say so — not at all, but that I do nothing unjust or unholy, that matters to me altogether. For that government did not terrify me, strong as it was, into doing anything unjust, but when we came out of the Tholos, the other four went to Salamis and brought Leon, while I went away home. And perhaps I would have died for these things, if the government had not been overthrown quickly. And

of these things you will have many witnesses. Would you then think that I would have survived so many years if I had engaged in public affairs, and, acting as a good man ought, had come to the aid of what is just and had made this, as one ought, my highest concern? Far from it, men of Athens; for not even another

of men would have.

Notes

Section 33 · 33a–34a

ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσίᾳ τε εἴ πού τι ἔπραξα τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὁ αὐτὸς οὗτος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε συγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλῳ οὔτε τούτων οὐδενὶ οὓς δὴ διαβάλλοντες ἐμέ φασιν ἐμοὺς μαθητὰς εἶναι. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδενὸς πώποτʼ ἐγενόμην· εἰ δέ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμοῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτερος εἴτε πρεσβύτερος, οὐδενὶ πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρήματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι

μὴ λαμβάνων δὲ οὔ, ἀλλʼ ὁμοίως καὶ πλουσίῳ καὶ πένητι παρέχω ἐμαυτὸν ἐρωτᾶν, καὶ ἐάν τις βούληται ἀποκρινόμενος ἀκούειν ὧν ἂν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἴτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἴτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, ὧν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδενὶ μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδίδαξα· εἰ δέ τίς φησι παρʼ ἐμοῦ πώποτέ τι μαθεῖν ἢ ἀκοῦσαι ἰδίᾳ ὅτι μὴ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει.ἀλλὰ διὰ τί δή ποτε μετʼ ἐμοῦ χαίρουσί τινες πολὺν

χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐγὼ εἶπον· ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίρουσιν ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, οὖσι δʼ οὔ. ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἀηδές. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ᾧπέρ τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν καὶ εὐέλεγκτα. εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἔγωγε τῶν νέων

τοὺς μὲν διαφθείρω τοὺς δὲ διέφθαρκα, χρῆν δήπου, εἴτε τινὲς αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώποτέ τι συνεβούλευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβαίνοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἤθελον, τῶν οἰκείων τινὰς τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἴπερ ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπεπόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι. πάντως δὲ πάρεισιν αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοῖ οὓς ἐγὼ ὁρῶ, πρῶτον μὲν Κρίτων οὑτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης

καὶ δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔπειτα Λυσανίας ὁ Σφήττιος, Αἰσχίνου τοῦδε πατήρ, ἔτι δʼ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ Κηφισιεὺς οὑτοσί, Ἐπιγένους πατήρ, ἄλλοι τοίνυν οὗτοι ὧν οἱ ἀδελφοὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ διατριβῇ γεγόνασιν, Νικόστρατος Θεοζοτίδου, ἀδελφὸς Θεοδότου—καὶ ὁ μὲν Θεόδοτος τετελεύτηκεν, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἐκεῖνός γε αὐτοῦ καταδεηθείη—καὶ Παράλιος ὅδε, ὁ Δημοδόκου, οὗ ἦν Θεάγης ἀδελφός· ὅδε δὲ

Ἀδείμαντος, ὁ Ἀρίστωνος, οὗ ἀδελφὸς οὑτοσὶ Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος, οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὅδε ἀδελφός.

But I, throughout my whole life, both in public, if I did anything anywhere, will appear such as this, and in private the same man, never having yielded to anyone anything contrary to what is just, neither to another nor to any of these whom, slandering me, they say are my pupils. And I have never been a teacher of anyone; but if anyone desires to listen to me while I speak and do my own business, whether younger or older, I have never begrudged anyone, nor do I converse taking money

and not taking it, but alike to rich and poor I offer myself to be questioned, and if anyone wishes, to listen, answering, to what I say. And as for these, whether anyone becomes good or not, I could not justly bear the blame for them, since I never promised anyone any lesson nor taught any; but if anyone says that he ever learned or heard from me in private anything that not also all the others did, be well assured that he does not speak the truth. But why ever do some delight in spending much

time with me? You have heard, men of Athens; I have told you the whole truth: that they delight in listening while those who think they are wise but are not are examined. For it is not unpleasant. And this, as I say, has been commanded to me by the god to do, both from oracles and from dreams and in every way in which ever any other divine allotment commanded a man to do anything. These things, men of Athens, are both true and easy to refute. For if indeed I corrupt some of the young

and have corrupted others, surely, if any of them, having grown older, recognised that when they were young I ever advised them anything bad, they ought now to come forward and accuse me and take vengeance; and if they themselves did not wish to, some of their relatives — fathers and brothers and the other kin — if ever their kin suffered any evil at my hands, ought now to remember and take vengeance. In any case many of them are present here, whom I see: first Crito here, my contemporary

and fellow-demesman, father of this Critobulus, then Lysanias of Sphettus, father of this Aeschines, and further Antiphon of Cephisia here, father of Epigenes, and further these others whose brothers have been in this company: Nicostratus son of Theozotides, brother of Theodotus — and Theodotus has died, so that he at least would not plead on his behalf — and Paralius here, son of Demodocus, whose brother was Theages; and this

Adeimantus, son of Ariston, whose brother is this Plato, and Aeantodorus, whose brother is this Apollodorus.

Notes

Section 34 · 34a–35a

καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὧν τινα ἐχρῆν μάλιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ λόγῳ παρασχέσθαι Μέλητον μάρτυρα· εἰ δὲ τότε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασχέσθω—ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ—καὶ λεγέτω εἴ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτον. ἀλλὰ τούτου πᾶν τοὐναντίον εὑρήσετε, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἑτοίμους τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζομένῳ τοὺς οἰκείους αὐτῶν, ὥς φασι Μέλητος καὶ

Ἄνυτος. αὐτοὶ μὲν γὰρ οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχʼ ἂν λόγον ἔχοιεν βοηθοῦντες· οἱ δὲ ἀδιάφθαρτοι, πρεσβύτεροι ἤδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλον ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοὶ ἀλλʼ ἢ τὸν ὀρθόν τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι συνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν ψευδομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀληθεύοντι;εἶεν δή, ὦ ἄνδρες· ἃ μὲν ἐγὼ ἔχοιμʼ ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδόν ἐστι ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα ἴσως τοιαῦτα. τάχα δʼ ἄν τις

ὑμῶν ἀγανακτήσειεν ἀναμνησθεὶς ἑαυτοῦ, εἰ ὁ μὲν καὶ ἐλάττω τουτουῒ τοῦ ἀγῶνος ἀγῶνα ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευσε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὑτοῦ ἀναβιβασάμενος ἵνα ὅτι μάλιστα ἐλεηθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλούς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταῦτα κινδυνεύων, ὡς ἂν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κίνδυνον. τάχʼ ἂν οὖν τις ταῦτα ἐννοήσας αὐθαδέστερον ἂν πρός με σχοίη καὶ ὀργισθεὶς αὐτοῖς τούτοις θεῖτο ἂν μετʼ

ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον. εἰ δή τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει—οὐκ ἀξιῶ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε, εἰ δʼ οὖν—ἐπιεικῆ ἄν μοι δοκῶ πρὸς τοῦτον λέγειν λέγων ὅτι ἐμοί, ὦ ἄριστε, εἰσὶν μέν πού τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, οὐδʼ ἐγὼ ἀπὸ δρυὸς οὐδʼ ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὥστε καὶ οἰκεῖοί μοί εἰσι καὶ ὑεῖς γε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τρεῖς, εἷς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὐδένα αὐτῶν δεῦρο ἀναβιβασάμενος δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὦ ἄνδρες

Ἀθηναῖοι, οὐδʼ ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλʼ εἰ μὲν θαρραλέως ἐγὼ ἔχω πρὸς θάνατον ἢ μή, ἄλλος λόγος, πρὸς δʼ οὖν δόξαν καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑμῖν καὶ ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει οὔ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικόνδε ὄντα καὶ τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔχοντα, εἴτʼ οὖν ἀληθὲς εἴτʼ οὖν ψεῦδος, ἀλλʼ οὖν δεδογμένον

γέ ἐστί τῳ Σωκράτη διαφέρειν τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων.

And I have many others to name to you, whom Meletus ought to have produced as a witness above all in his own speech; and if he then forgot, let him produce him now — I give way — and let him say if he has anything of this sort. But you will find the complete opposite of this, men: all ready to help me, the corrupter, the one who does evil to their own kin, as Meletus and

Anytus say. For the corrupted themselves might perhaps have a reason in helping; but the uncorrupted, now older men, the kin of these, what other reason do they have in helping me except the right and just one, that they know that Meletus is lying and I am telling the truth? Very well, then, men: what I could say in my defence is nearly these things and perhaps other such things. And perhaps one

of you would be indignant, remembering himself, if he, when contending in a lesser trial than this trial, begged and entreated the jurors with many tears, and brought up his children so that he might be pitied as much as possible, and many others of his kin and friends, while I shall do none of these things, and that although I am in danger, as it might seem, of the last danger. Perhaps, then, someone, thinking these things, would take a more stubborn attitude toward me and, angered by these very things, would cast his vote with

anger. If then any of you is so disposed — for I do not think it worthy, I for my part, but if indeed — I think I would speak fairly to such a man, saying that I, my good sir, have kin too; for this very thing from Homer, I too have not sprung from oak nor from rock but from men, so that I too have kin, and sons, men of Athens, three: one already a young man, and two children; but nevertheless I shall bring up none of them here and beg you to vote acquittal. Why, then, shall I do none of these things? Not from stubbornness, men of

Athens, nor dishonouring you, but whether I am bold toward death or not is another argument, but as regards reputation, both for me and for you and for the whole city, it does not seem to me fine for me to do any of these things, being of such an age and having this name, whether it is true or false, but at any rate it is

held by someone that Socrates is different from the many men.

Notes

Section 35 · 35a–35d

εἰ οὖν ὑμῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἴτε σοφίᾳ εἴτε ἀνδρείᾳ εἴτε ἄλλῃ ᾑτινιοῦν ἀρετῇ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται, αἰσχρὸν ἂν εἴη· οἵουσπερ ἐγὼ πολλάκις ἑώρακά τινας ὅταν κρίνωνται, δοκοῦντας μέν τι εἶναι, θαυμάσια δὲ ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἀθανάτων ἐσομένων ἂν ὑμεῖς αὐτοὺς μὴ ἀποκτείνητε· οἳ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περιάπτειν, ὥστʼ ἄν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων

ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ διαφέροντες Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἀρετήν, οὓς αὐτοὶ ἑαυτῶν ἔν τε ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκρίνουσιν, οὗτοι γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν. ταῦτα γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔτε ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὁπῃοῦν τι εἶναι, οὔτʼ, ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν, ὑμᾶς ἐπιτρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταψηφιεῖσθε τοῦ τὰ ἐλεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστον τὴν πόλιν ποιοῦντος ἢ τοῦ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντος.χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὦ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιόν μοι δοκεῖ

εἶναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀποφεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ κάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, ἀλλʼ ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὀμώμοκεν οὐ χαριεῖσθαι οἷς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὔκουν χρὴ οὔτε ἡμᾶς ἐθίζειν ὑμᾶς ἐπιορκεῖν οὔθʼ ὑμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι· οὐδέτεροι γὰρ ἂν ἡμῶν εὐσεβοῖεν. μὴ οὖν ἀξιοῦτέ με, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς πράττειν ἃ μήτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μήτε

δίκαια μήτε ὅσια, ἄλλως τε μέντοι νὴ Δία πάντως καὶ ἀσεβείας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Μελήτου τουτουΐ. σαφῶς γὰρ ἄν, εἰ πείθοιμι ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ δεῖσθαι βιαζοίμην ὀμωμοκότας, θεοὺς ἂν διδάσκοιμι μὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς εἶναι, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς ἀπολογούμενος κατηγοροίην ἂν ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοὺς οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν· νομίζω τε γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρῖναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅπῃ μέλλει ἐμοί τε ἄριστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

If, then, those of you who seem to be different, whether in wisdom or in courage or in any other virtue, should be such, it would be shameful — men such as I have often seen some, when they are on trial, seeming to be something, but doing amazing things, as if they thought they would suffer something terrible if they died, as though they would be immortal if you did not kill them; who seem to me to bring shame upon the city, so that even a foreigner

might suppose that the Athenians who are distinguished in virtue, whom they themselves choose before themselves both in offices and in the other honours, these are no different from women. For these things, men of Athens, neither should you do, you who seem to be anything at all, nor, if we do them, should you allow it, but you should show this very thing, that you will vote against the man who brings in these pitiful dramas and makes the city laughable far more readily than against the man who keeps quiet. Apart from reputation, men, it does not seem to me just

to beg the juror, nor by begging to escape, but to teach and persuade. For the juror does not sit for this, to grant as a favour what is just, but to judge these things; and he has sworn not to show favour to whomsoever it seems good to him, but to judge according to the laws. We ought therefore neither to accustom you to perjury nor you to become accustomed to it; for neither of us would be pious. Do not, then, expect me, men of Athens, to do such things toward you as I consider neither fine nor

just nor holy, especially indeed, by Zeus, in every way while I am on trial for impiety under this Meletus. For clearly, if I persuaded you and by begging compelled you, though you have sworn, I would be teaching you to think that there are no gods, and in making my defence I would be accusing myself of not believing in gods. But far from it being so; for I believe, men of Athens, as none of my accusers does, and I entrust to you and to the god to judge concerning me in whatever way it is likely to be best both for me and for you.

Notes

Section 36 · 35e–36e

τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐπὶ τούτῳ

τῷ γεγονότι, ὅτι μου κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ μοι πολλὰ συμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστόν μοι γέγονεν τὸ γεγονὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἑκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμόν. οὐ γὰρ ᾠόμην ἔγωγε οὕτω παρʼ ὀλίγον ἔσεσθαι ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολύ· νῦν δέ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀπεπεφεύγη ἄν. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπέφευγα, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπέφευγα, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἄνυτος καὶ Λύκων κατηγορήσοντες ἐμοῦ, κἂν ὦφλε

χιλίας δραχμάς, οὐ μεταλαβὼν τὸ πέμπτον μέρος τῶν ψήφων. τιμᾶται δʼ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνὴρ θανάτου. εἶεν· ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τ τί ἄξιός εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτεῖσαι, ὅτι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἦγον, ἀλλʼ ἀμελήσας ὧνπερ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμοῦ τε καὶ οἰκονομίας καὶ στρατηγιῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχῶν καὶ συνωμοσιῶν καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγνομένων, ἡγησάμενος ἐμαυτὸν

ῷ ὄντι ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτʼ ἰόντα σῴζεσθαι, ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὐκ ᾖα οἷ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὑμῖν μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἔμελλον μηδὲν ὄφελος εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ ἰδίᾳ ἕκαστον ἰὼν εὐεργετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην εὐεργεσίαν, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ἐνταῦθα ᾖα, ἐπιχειρῶν ἕκαστον ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μήτε τῶν ἑαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι πρὶν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθείη ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως, πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν

αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι—τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὤν; ἀγαθόν τι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι· καὶ ταῦτά γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον ὅτι ἂν πρέποι ἐμοί. τί οὖν πρέπει ἀνδρὶ πένητι εὐεργέτῃ δεομένῳ ἄγειν σχολὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὅτι μᾶλλον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτεῖσθαι, πολύ γε μᾶλλον ἢ εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ συνωρίδι ἢ ζεύγει νενίκηκεν Ὀλυμπίασιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονας δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ

εἶναι, καὶ ὁ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δεῖται, ἐγὼ δὲ δέομαι.

Not to be indignant, men of Athens, at this

which has happened, that you voted against me, many things contribute for me, and this which has happened has not happened unexpectedly for me, but I wonder far more at the number that has resulted on each side of the votes. For I did not think that it would be by so little but by much; but now, as it seems, if only thirty of the votes had changed sides, I would have escaped. Meletus, then, as it seems to me, even now I have escaped, and not only have I escaped, but this at least is clear to all, that if Anytus and Lycon had not come up to accuse me, he would even have been fined

a thousand drachmas, not having obtained the fifth part of the votes. And the man proposes death for me as a penalty. Very well; and what shall I propose to you in return, men of Athens? Or is it clear that it should be what I deserve? What, then? What do I deserve to suffer or to pay, because in my life, having learned, I did not keep quiet, but neglecting what the many do — money-making and household management and generalships and public speaking and the other offices and conspiracies and factions that arise in the city — considering myself

to be in truth too decent to go into these things and survive, I did not go there, where, having gone, I would have been of no benefit either to you or to myself, but I went to benefit each person privately, the greatest benefit, as I say, going there, attempting to persuade each of you not to care for any of your own things before caring for yourself, so that you might become as good and as wise as possible, nor for the things of the city before the city itself, and to care for the other things in this same

way — what, then, do I deserve to suffer, being such a man? Something good, men of Athens, if indeed I must be assessed in truth according to what I deserve; and this, at least, a good thing such as would be fitting for me. What, then, is fitting for a poor man, a benefactor, who needs leisure to spend on your instruction? There is nothing more fitting, men of Athens, than for such a man to be fed in the Prytaneum, far more than if any of you has won at Olympia with a horse or a two-horse chariot or a four-horse team; for the one makes you seem to be happy, while I

am [happy], and the one has no need of food, while I do need it.

Notes

Section 37 · 36e–37e

εἰ οὖν δεῖ με κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον τῆς ἀξίας τιμᾶσθαι, τούτου

τιμῶμαι, ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτήσεως. ἴσως οὖν ὑμῖν καὶ ταυτὶ λέγων παραπλησίως δοκῶ λέγειν ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ οἴκτου καὶ τῆς ἀντιβολήσεως, ἀπαυθαδιζόμενος· τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε μᾶλλον. πέπεισμαι ἐγὼ ἑκὼν εἶναι μηδένα ἀδικεῖν ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ὑμᾶς τοῦτο οὐ πείθω· ὀλίγον γὰρ χρόνον ἀλλήλοις διειλέγμεθα. ἐπεί, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, εἰ ἦν ὑμῖν νόμος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις, περὶ θανάτου μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν

μόνον κρίνειν ἀλλὰ πολλάς, ἐπείσθητε ἄν· νῦν δʼ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἐν χρόνῳ ὀλίγῳ μεγάλας διαβολὰς ἀπολύεσθαι. πεπεισμένος δὴ ἐγὼ μηδένα ἀδικεῖν πολλοῦ δέω ἐμαυτόν γε ἀδικήσειν καὶ κατʼ ἐμαυτοῦ ἐρεῖν αὐτὸς ὡς ἄξιός εἰμί του κακοῦ καὶ τιμήσεσθαι τοιούτου τινὸς ἐμαυτῷ. τί δείσας; ἦ μὴ πάθω τοῦτο οὗ Μέλητός μοι τιμᾶται, ὅ φημι οὐκ εἰδέναι οὔτʼ εἰ ἀγαθὸν οὔτʼ εἰ κακόν ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τούτου δὴ ἕλωμαι ὧν εὖ οἶδά τι κακῶν ὄντων τούτου τιμησάμενος; πότερον δεσμοῦ;

καὶ τί με δεῖ ζῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἀρχῇ, τοῖς ἕνδεκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων καὶ δεδέσθαι ἕως ἂν ἐκτείσω; ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν μοί ἐστιν ὅπερ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἔστι μοι χρήματα ὁπόθεν ἐκτείσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; ἴσως γὰρ ἄν μοι τούτου τιμήσαιτε. πολλὴ μεντἄν με φιλοψυχία ἔχοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστός εἰμι ὥστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖταί μου οὐχ οἷοί τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκεῖν τὰς ἐμὰς

διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλʼ ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνασιν καὶ ἐπιφθονώτεραι, ὥστε ζητεῖτε αὐτῶν νυνὶ ἀπαλλαγῆναι· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρα αὐτὰς οἴσουσι ῥᾳδίως; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθόντι τηλικῷδε ἀνθρώπῳ ἄλλην ἐξ ἄλλης πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζῆν. εὖ γὰρ οἶδʼ ὅτι ὅποι ἂν ἔλθω, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκροάσονται οἱ νέοι ὥσπερ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοί με αὐτοὶ ἐξελῶσι πείθοντες τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους·

ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες δὲ καὶ οἰκεῖοι διʼ αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως οὖν ἄν τις εἴποι· σιγῶν δὲ καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγων, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ οἷός τʼ ἔσῃ ἡμῖν ἐξελθὼν ζῆν; τουτὶ δή ἐστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πεῖσαί τινας ὑμῶν.

If, then, I must be assessed, in accordance with what is just, according to my worth, of this—

I propose for myself meals in the prytaneum. Perhaps, then, in saying these things too I seem to you to speak in much the same way as I did about the lamentation and the supplication, out of stubbornness; but it is not so, men of Athens, but rather this. I am persuaded that I willingly wrong no one of men, but I do not persuade you of this; for we have talked with one another only a short time. For, as I think, if there were a law for you, just as also for other men, about death, not to judge in one day only but over many days, you would have been persuaded;

but now it is not easy in a short time to get rid of great slanders. Being persuaded, then, that I wrong no one, I am far from wronging myself and saying against myself that I am worthy of some evil and proposing such a thing for myself. Fearing what? That I might suffer this which Meletus proposes for me, which I say I do not know whether it is a good thing or an evil? Instead of this, then, shall I choose one of the things which I know well are evils, proposing that for myself? Which one, imprisonment?

And why must I live in prison, being a slave to the authority that is always being appointed, the Eleven? Or a fine, and to be bound until I pay it? But that is the same as what I was just saying; for I have no money from which to pay. But then shall I propose exile? For perhaps you would accept this for me. Much love of life would possess me, men of Athens, if I were so unreasoning as to be unable to reason that you, being my fellow citizens, were not able to bear my spending of time and my words, but they have become too burdensome for you and too envied, so that you now seek to be rid of them; and yet others will bear them easily?

Far from it, men of Athens. Fine, then, would my life be, if I, a man of such an age, went out, changing from one city to another and being driven out, to live. For I know well that wherever I go, the young men will listen as I speak, just as here; and if I drive them away, they themselves will drive me out, persuading the elders;

but if I do not drive them away, their fathers and kinsmen will do so on account of these very young men. Perhaps, then, someone might say: 'But by keeping silent and living quietly, Socrates, will you not be able to live for us after you have gone out?' This indeed is the hardest of all things to persuade some of you of.

Notes

Section 38 · 37e–38e

ἐάντε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτʼ ἐστὶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτʼ ἀδύνατον

ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι ὡς εἰρωνευομένῳ· ἐάντʼ αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῦτο, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρετῆς τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ ὧν ὑμεῖς ἐμοῦ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος, ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ, ταῦτα δʼ ἔτι ἧττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὕτως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, ὦ ἄνδρες, πείθειν δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ ἅμα οὐκ εἴθισμαι ἐμαυτὸν ἀξιοῦν κακοῦ

οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτιμησάμην ἂν χρημάτων ὅσα ἔμελλον ἐκτείσειν, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἐβλάβην· νῦν δὲ οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι, τοσούτου βούλεσθέ μοι τιμῆσαι. ἴσως δʼ ἂν δυναίμην ἐκτεῖσαι ὑμῖν που μνᾶν ἀργυρίου· τοσούτου οὖν τιμῶμαι.Πλάτων δὲ ὅδε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύουσί με τριάκοντα μνῶν τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δʼ ἐγγυᾶσθαι· τιμῶμαι οὖν τοσούτου, ἐγγυηταὶ δὲ ὑμῖν ἔσονται τοῦ ἀργυρίου οὗτοι ἀξιόχρεῳ.

οὐ πολλοῦ γʼ ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὄνομα ἕξετε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε, ἄνδρα σοφόν—φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μή εἰμι, οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῖν ὀνειδίζειν— εἰ γοῦν περιεμείνατε ὀλίγον χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἂν ὑμῖν τοῦτο ἐγένετο· ὁρᾶτε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου θανάτου δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ

πρὸς πάντας ὑμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ καταψηφισαμένους θάνατον. λέγω δὲ καὶ τόδε πρὸς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τούτους. ἴσως με οἴεσθε, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἑαλωκέναι τοιούτων οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα, εἰ ᾤμην δεῖν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν ὥστε ἀποφυγεῖν τὴν δίκην. πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἀλλʼ ἀπορίᾳ μὲν ἑάλωκα, οὐ μέντοι λόγων, ἀλλὰ τόλμης καὶ ἀναισχυντίας καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἐθέλειν λέγειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς τοιαῦτα οἷʼ ἂν ὑμῖν μὲν ἥδιστα ἦν ἀκούειν— θρηνοῦντός τέ μου καὶ ὀδυρομένου καὶ ἄλλα ποιοῦντος καὶ

λέγοντος πολλὰ καὶ ἀνάξια ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἐγώ φημι, οἷα δὴ καὶ εἴθισθε ὑμεῖς τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν. ἀλλʼ οὔτε τότε ᾠήθην δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦ κινδύνου πρᾶξαι οὐδὲν ἀνελεύθερον, οὔτε νῦν μοι μεταμέλει οὕτως ἀπολογησαμένῳ, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αἱροῦμαι ὧδε ἀπολογησάμενος τεθνάναι ἢ ἐκείνως ζῆν.

For if I say that this is to disobey the god and for this reason it is impossible to live quietly, you will not believe me, as though I were speaking ironically;

and if again I say that this too happens to be the greatest good for a man, to make speeches each day about virtue and about the other things about which you hear me conversing and examining both myself and others, and the unexamined life is not worth living for a man, you will believe me still less as I say these things. But these things are so, as I say, men, though to persuade is not easy. And at the same time I am not accustomed to think myself worthy of any evil.

For if I had money, I would have proposed a fine of as much as I was going to pay, for I would have been harmed in nothing; but as it is — for there is none — unless indeed as much as I could pay, that much you want me to propose a penalty for myself. Perhaps I could pay you about a mina of silver; of that much, then, I propose a penalty. But Plato here, men of Athens, and Crito and Critobulus and Apollodorus urge me to propose thirty minas, and they themselves to stand surety; I propose, then, that much, and these men will be sureties to you for the silver, men worthy of credit.

It is not for a long time's sake, men of Athens, that you will have a name and a charge from those who wish to abuse the city, that you killed Socrates, a wise man — for they will say he is wise, even if I am not, those who wish to reproach you — if at any rate you had waited a little time, this would have come to you of itself; for you see my age, that it is already far advanced in life and near to death. But I say this not

to all of you, but to those who voted death against me. And I say this too to these same men. Perhaps you think, men of Athens, that I have been convicted through lack of such speeches by which I might have persuaded you, if I thought I must do and say everything so as to escape the trial. Far from it. But I have been convicted through lack, not indeed of speeches, but of boldness and shamelessness and of not being willing to say to you such things as would have been most pleasant for you to hear — as I lamented and wailed and did and

said many other things unworthy of me, as I say, such things as you are accustomed to hear from the others. But neither then did I think I must do anything unfree on account of the danger, nor now do I regret having defended myself in this way, but I choose much rather, having defended myself in this way, to die than to live in that way.

Notes

Section 39 · 38e–39e

οὔτε γὰρ ἐν δίκῃ οὔτʼ ἐν πολέμῳ οὔτʼ ἐμὲ οὔτʼ ἄλλον οὐδένα δεῖ

τοῦτο μηχανᾶσθαι, ὅπως ἀποφεύξεται πᾶν ποιῶν θάνατον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γίγνεται ὅτι τό γε ἀποθανεῖν ἄν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὅπλα ἀφεὶς καὶ ἐφʼ ἱκετείαν τραπόμενος τῶν διωκόντων· καὶ ἄλλαι μηχαναὶ πολλαί εἰσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις τοῖς κινδύνοις ὥστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, ἐάν τις τολμᾷ πᾶν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τοῦτʼ ᾖ χαλεπόν, ὦ ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἐκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπώτερον πονηρίαν·

θᾶττον γὰρ θανάτου θεῖ. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἅτε βραδὺς ὢν καὶ πρεσβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου ἑάλων, οἱ δʼ ἐμοὶ κατήγοροι ἅτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὀξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττονος, τῆς κακίας. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἄπειμι ὑφʼ ὑμῶν θανάτου δίκην ὀφλών, οὗτοι δʼ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὠφληκότες μοχθηρίαν καὶ ἀδικίαν. καὶ ἐγώ τε τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταῦτα μέν που ἴσως οὕτως καὶ ἔδει σχεῖν, καὶ οἶμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἔχειν.

τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμῳδῆσαι, ὦ καταψηφισάμενοί μου· καὶ γάρ εἰμι ἤδη ἐνταῦθα ἐν ᾧ μάλιστα ἄνθρωποι χρησμῳδοῦσιν, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες οἳ ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, τιμωρίαν ὑμῖν ἥξειν εὐθὺς μετὰ τὸν ἐμὸν θάνατον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νὴ Δία ἢ οἵαν ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε· νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἴργασθε οἰόμενοι μὲν ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἔλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὡς ἐγώ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς

οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὓς νῦν ἐγὼ κατεῖχον, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ᾐσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσιν, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἀποκτείνοντες ἀνθρώπους ἐπισχήσειν τοῦ ὀνειδίζειν τινὰ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζῆτε, οὐ καλῶς διανοεῖσθε· οὐ γάρ ἐσθʼ αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλʼ ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥᾴστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν ἀλλʼ ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μαντευσάμενος ἀπαλλάττομαι.

τοῖς δὲ ἀποψηφισαμένοις ἡδέως ἂν διαλεχθείην ὑπὲρ τοῦ γεγονότος τουτουῒ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἄρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγουσι καὶ οὔπω ἔρχομαι οἷ ἐλθόντα με δεῖ τεθνάναι. ἀλλά μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμείνατε τοσοῦτον χρόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαμυθολογῆσαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἕως ἔξεστιν.

For neither in a trial nor in war ought either I or any other man contrive this,

how he will escape death by doing everything. For even in battles it often becomes clear that one might escape dying both by throwing away his arms and by turning to supplication of those pursuing; and there are many other contrivances in each danger so as to escape death, if a man dares to do and say everything. But perhaps it is not this that is hard, men, to escape death, but much harder to escape wickedness;

for wickedness runs faster than death. And now I, being slow and old, have been caught by the slower, but my accusers, being clever and sharp, by the faster, by wickedness. And now I depart, condemned by you to the penalty of death, while these men have been convicted by the truth of baseness and injustice. And I abide by the penalty, and so do they. These things, perhaps, had to be so, and I think they stand in a moderate way.

But after this I desire to prophesy to you, you who voted against me; for I am now at that point where men prophesy most, when they are about to die. For I say, men who killed me, that a vengeance will come upon you straight after my death, much harder, by Zeus, than the one with which you killed me; for now you have done this thinking to be rid of giving an account of your life, but the opposite will turn out for you, as I say. More will be those who

examine you, whom I now held back, and you did not perceive it; and they will be harder inasmuch as they are younger, and you will be more vexed. For if you think that by killing men you will hold back anyone from reproaching you that you do not live rightly, you do not think well; for this release is neither altogether possible nor noble, but that one is both noblest and easiest, not to cut short others but to prepare oneself to be as good as possible. Having prophesied these things to you who voted against me, I depart.

But with those who voted to acquit me I would gladly converse about this thing that has happened, while the magistrates are busy and I have not yet gone where I must go and die. But stay with me, men, for this much time; for nothing prevents us from talking with one another as long as it is permitted.

Notes

Section 40 · 39e–40e

ὑμῖν

γὰρ ὡς φίλοις οὖσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι ἐθέλω τὸ νυνί μοι συμβεβηκὸς τί ποτε νοεῖ. ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί—ὑμᾶς γὰρ δικαστὰς καλῶν ὀρθῶς ἂν καλοίην—θαυμάσιόν τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ πάνυ πυκνὴ ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιουμένη, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξειν. νυνὶ δὲ συμβέβηκέ μοι ἅπερ ὁρᾶτε καὶ αὐτοί, ταυτὶ ἅ γε δὴ οἰηθείη ἄν τις καὶ νομίζεται ἔσχατα κακῶν εἶναι· ἐμοὶ δὲ

οὔτε ἐξιόντι ἕωθεν οἴκοθεν ἠναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, οὔτε ἡνίκα ἀνέβαινον ἐνταυθοῖ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντί τι ἐρεῖν. καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δή με ἐπέσχε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτην τὴν πρᾶξιν οὔτʼ ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδενὶ οὔτʼ ἐν λόγῳ ἠναντίωταί μοι. τί οὖν αἴτιον εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ ὑμῖν ἐρῶ· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τοῦτο ἀγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἔσθʼ ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν,

ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθνάναι. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτου γέγονεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔσθʼ ὅπως οὐκ ἠναντιώθη ἄν μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον, εἰ μή τι ἔμελλον ἐγὼ ἀγαθὸν πράξειν.ἐννοήσωμεν δὲ καὶ τῇδε ὡς πολλὴ ἐλπίς ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δυοῖν γὰρ θάτερόν ἐστιν τὸ τεθνάναι· ἢ γὰρ οἷον μηδὲν εἶναι μηδὲ αἴσθησιν μηδεμίαν μηδενὸς ἔχειν τὸν τεθνεῶτα, ἢ κατὰ τὰ λεγόμενα μεταβολή τις τυγχάνει οὖσα καὶ μετοίκησις τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ τόπου τοῦ ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον. καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδεμία αἴσθησίς ἐστιν ἀλλʼ

οἷον ὕπνος ἐπειδάν τις καθεύδων μηδʼ ὄναρ μηδὲν ὁρᾷ, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος—ἐγὼ γὰρ ἂν οἶμαι, εἴ τινα ἐκλεξάμενον δέοι ταύτην τὴν νύκτα ἐν ᾗ οὕτω κατέδαρθεν ὥστε μηδὲ ὄναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταύτῃ τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεψάμενον εἰπεῖν πόσας ἄμεινον καὶ ἥδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωκεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, οἶμαι ἂν μὴ ὅτι ἰδιώτην τινά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαριθμήτους

ἂν εὑρεῖν αὐτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας—εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν, κέρδος ἔγωγε λέγω· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἢ μία νύξ. εἰ δʼ αὖ οἷον ἀποδημῆσαί ἐστιν ὁ θάνατος ἐνθένδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἀληθῆ ἐστιν τὰ λεγόμενα, ὡς ἄρα ἐκεῖ εἰσι πάντες οἱ τεθνεῶτες, τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἴη ἄν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί;

For to you

as being friends I wish to show what the thing that has now happened to me means. For to me, men who are judges — for calling you judges I would call you rightly — something wonderful has happened. For the customary prophetic voice of the daimonion, in all the time before, was very frequent and always opposed me even in small matters, if I was about to do something not rightly. But now there has happened to me what you yourselves see, these very things which one might think and which are believed to be the worst of evils; but for me

neither when I went out from home early in the morning did the sign of the god oppose me, nor when I went up here to the court, nor anywhere in the speech when I was about to say something. And yet in other speeches it often stopped me in the middle as I spoke; but now nowhere concerning this affair, neither in any deed nor in any speech, has it opposed me. What then do I suppose to be the cause? I will tell you: it seems to me that this thing that has happened is good, and there is no way that we suppose rightly, we who think death is an evil.

A great proof of this has come to me; for there is no way the customary sign would not have opposed me, if I were not about to do something good. Let us consider also in this way, how great a hope there is that it is good. For death is one of two things: either it is like being nothing and the dead man has no perception of anything, or, according to what is said, it happens to be a change and a migration of the soul from the place here to another place. And whether there is no perception but

it is like sleep, when one sleeps so as to see not even a dream, death would be a marvellous gain — for I think, if someone, having chosen that night in which he slept so deeply as to see not even a dream, and having set beside that night the other nights and days of his own life, had to consider and say how many days and nights he has lived better and more pleasantly than that night in his own life, I think he would find them, not only if he were some private man, but even the great king, few in number compared with the other days and nights —

if then death is such a thing, I at least call it a gain; for the whole of time appears in this way to be no more than one night. But if again death is like travelling away from here to another place, and the things said are true, that all the dead are there, what greater good than this could there be, men who are judges?

Notes

Section 41 · 40e–41e

εἰ γάρ τις

ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἅιδου, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τουτωνὶ τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὑρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς, οἵπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικάζειν, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδάμανθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τριπτόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δίκαιοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν βίῳ, ἆρα φαύλη ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀποδημία; ἢ αὖ Ὀρφεῖ συγγενέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόδῳ καὶ Ὁμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἄν τις δέξαιτʼ ἂν ὑμῶν; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω τεθνάναι εἰ ταῦτʼ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ. ἐπεὶ

ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτῷ θαυμαστὴ ἂν εἴη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτόθι, ὁπότε ἐντύχοιμι Παλαμήδει καὶ Αἴαντι τῷ Τελαμῶνος καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἄδικον τέθνηκεν, ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκείνων—ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἀηδὲς εἴη—καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἐξετάζοντα καὶ ἐρευνῶντα ὥσπερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγειν, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός ἐστιν καὶ τίς οἴεται μέν, ἔστιν δʼ οὔ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δʼ ἄν τις, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, δέξαιτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγαγόντα

τὴν πολλὴν στρατιὰν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίσυφον ἢ ἄλλους μυρίους ἄν τις εἴποι καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ συνεῖναι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἴη εὐδαιμονίας; πάντως οὐ δήπου τούτου γε ἕνεκα οἱ ἐκεῖ ἀποκτείνουσι· τά τε γὰρ ἄλλα εὐδαιμονέστεροί εἰσιν οἱ ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθάδε, καὶ ἤδη τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀθάνατοί εἰσιν, εἴπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, εὐέλπιδας εἶναι πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἕν τι τοῦτο διανοεῖσθαι ἀληθές, ὅτι

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε ζῶντι οὔτε τελευτήσαντι, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τούτου πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἐμὰ νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου γέγονεν, ἀλλά μοι δῆλόν ἐστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἤδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψεν τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοῖς καταψηφισαμένοις μου καὶ τοῖς κατηγόροις οὐ πάνυ χαλεπαίνω. καίτοι οὐ ταύτῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ κατεψηφίζοντό μου καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλʼ οἰόμενοι βλάπτειν·

τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξιον μέμφεσθαι. τοσόνδε μέντοι αὐτῶν δέομαι· τοὺς ὑεῖς μου, ἐπειδὰν ἡβήσωσι, τιμωρήσασθε, ὦ ἄνδρες, ταὐτὰ ταῦτα λυποῦντες ἅπερ ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐλύπουν, ἐὰν ὑμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ χρημάτων ἢ ἄλλου του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρετῆς, καὶ ἐὰν δοκῶσί τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐγὼ ὑμῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὧν δεῖ, καὶ οἴονταί τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι.

For if someone

arriving in Hades, freed from these who claim to be judges, finds the judges who are truly so, who are also said to judge there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and Triptolemus and others, as many of the demigods as were just in their own life, would the journey away be a poor thing? Or again, to meet Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer, for how much would any of you accept it? For I am willing to die many times if these things are true. For

for me too the spending of time there would be wonderful, whenever I met Palamedes and Ajax son of Telamon and anyone else of the ancients who died through an unjust judgment, comparing my own sufferings with theirs — as I think, it would not be unpleasant — and indeed the greatest thing, to spend my time there examining and inquiring, just as here, who among them is wise and who thinks he is but is not. For how much would anyone, men who are judges, accept to examine the man who led the great army to Troy

or Odysseus or Sisyphus or countless others one might name, both men and women, with whom to converse and be together and examine would be a happiness beyond telling? Certainly not for this reason do those there kill; for in other respects too those there are happier than those here, and for the rest of time they are immortal, if indeed the things said are true. But you too must, men who are judges, be of good hope towards death, and think this one thing true, that

there is no evil for a good man, neither living nor having died, nor are his affairs neglected by the gods; nor have my affairs now come about by chance, but it is clear to me that to die now and be freed from affairs was better for me. For this reason too the sign nowhere turned me away, and I for my part am not very angry with those who voted against me and my accusers. And yet it was not with this thought that they voted against me and accused me, but thinking to harm me;

this is worthy of blame in them. So much, however, do I ask of them: punish my sons, men, when they grow up, grieving them with the very same things with which I grieved you, if they seem to you to care for money or anything else before virtue, and if they seem to be something while being nothing, reproach them just as I reproached you, because they do not care for the things they ought, and think they are something while being worthy of nothing.

Notes

Section 42 · 41e–42a

καὶ ἐὰν

ταῦτα ποιῆτε, δίκαια πεπονθὼς ἐγὼ ἔσομαι ὑφʼ ὑμῶν αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ ὑεῖς. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἤδη ὥρα ἀπιέναι, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανουμένῳ, ὑμῖν δὲ βιωσομένοις· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἄμεινον πρᾶγμα, ἄδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

And if

you do these things, I shall have suffered justly at your hands, both I myself and my sons. But now it is time to go away, for me to die, for you to live; but which of us goes to a better thing is unclear to everyone except the god.

Notes

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Corrections are welcome via the contact form; please say which section and Stephanus number you mean. This page is a draft: 287 hard words seeded, 91 notes.

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